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Coherence in EU external relations is a long-standing concern. While seemingly 
surpassed in the last years by the idea of the ‗comprehensive approach‘, the latter is 
nothing but the latest attempt to advance coherence in this field. The issue of the role of 
law in the quest for coherence is characterised by the existence of important gaps in the 
literature, at both theoretical and practical levels. This thesis aims at complementing legal 
literature on coherence with a study that specifically focuses on how coherence is sought 
between specific policies and activities coexisting in external action. It also intends to 
complement the empirical political science literature on coherence by focusing on the 
legal aspect of the query. The thesis elaborates on the notion of coherence in EU foreign 
policy, addressing questions like: What does coherence in external action mean? Why is 
it an obsession? What purposes does it serve? It also proposes a categorisation of the legal 
provisions and principles that are relevant to the struggle for coherence based on four 
mechanisms set out in EU primary law. It then focuses on the CFSP-development nexus 
in Union action in Somalia between 2008 and 2014 as a striking case to analyse these 
mechanisms in the development and implementation of policy action. The thesis reflects 
on the interaction between law and policy in the external dimension of the EU project, 
and provides arguments to think about how the law of external relations could more 
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Introduction to the thesis 
1 Aims and scope of the thesis 
The thesis analyses the role of law in the quest for coherence in EU external relations. It 
claims that the ‗obsession‘ with coherence in this field is fundamentally concerned with 
ensuring coherence between different policies and activities implemented in parallel. The 
project  stems from the observation that coherence at this level has been examined at 
great length in political science empirical research,1 whereas studies of the impact of legal 
norms on coherence between specific policies and activities (including at the empirical 
level) are largely missing. This situation is regrettable, especially if we take into 
consideration the presence of coherence in the treaties – with 16 provisions referring to it 
– as well as the increasingly important use of the notion in the case law of the CJEU.2  
 Legal analyses of coherence in the external relations of the Union have addressed the 
notion and the issue as to whether coherence constitutes a principle of EU law.3 Legal 
studies have also been devoted to comprehensively conceptualising the role of EU 
primary law in the quest for coherence in this area.4 Given their comprehensive nature, 
these studies have obviously remained at a very abstract level. The aim of the thesis is 
twofold. It intends to complement empirical political science research on coherence 
between policies and activities, by analysing the role that law plays in ensuring coherence 
at this level. Does the primary law of the EU foresee mechanisms to advance coherence? 
Most importantly, are these mechanisms fit for purpose? The thesis also aims to 
complement comprehensive studies on the role of EU primary law in the obsession with 
coherence, with a more concrete (and partly empirical) analysis showing how these 
                                                 
1 See, for example, M. CARBONE, Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy, Routledge, 2009 and 
A. MISSIROLI, ‗European Security Policy: the Challenge of Coherence‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, 6, 
2001 
2 For instance, Articles 7 TFEU and 13(1), 16(6), 18(4) and 21(3) TEU. See also Case C-658/11, 
Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case, paras 52 and 60, and Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, 
Tanzania Case, paras 43, 68 and 72 
3 See, for all, P. GAUTTIER, ‗Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European 
Union‘, European Law Journal, 10, 1, 2004, C. TIETJE, ‗The concept of coherence in the TEU and the 
CFSP‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2, 1997 and C. GEBHARD, ‗Coherence‘, in C. HILL and M. 
SMITH (eds.), International Relations and the European Union: Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2011 
4 M. CREMONA, ‗Coherence in European Union Foreign Relations Law‘, in P. KOUTRAKOS 
(ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2011 and C. HILLION, ‗Tous 
pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations of the European Union‘, M. CREMONA (ed.), 
Developments in EU external relations law, Oxford University Press, 2008  
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primary law norms operate in the context of concrete policies and activities coexisting in 
the external domain. 
 The thesis takes a legal approach. In certain instances, it engages in a type of analysis 
that is not confined to the legal aspect of coherence. This analysis is considered essential 
in understanding the context in which legal norms operate. Likewise, policy documents 
and literature in the fields of political science and international relations are important 
throughout the thesis. However, I do not intend to make a direct contribution in the 
fields of political science and international relations. The thesis aims at complementing 
empirical political science literature on coherence in external relations, by focusing on 
the legal dimension of the query. 
2 ‘Coherence, coherence’ 
2.1 General approach to the idea of coherence in EU external relations  
The thesis argues that coherence is a far-reaching political ambition that should 
characterise the policies and activities of the Union, across internal and external policy 
areas. The emphasis on ‗policies and activities‘, which are the terms used in Article 7 
TFEU, stresses that coherence is an ambition that extends to the whole of the Union‘s 
action. The quest for coherence transcends the legal sphere. In the context of the external 
relations of the Union, coherence is also an obsession, which explains why the question is 
particularly interesting in this area. The thesis focuses on coherence in external action, 
and the role of law therein. It analyses policies and activities developed under explicit EU 
external powers.5 Due to the fragmented nature of EU external relations law and to the 
Union‘s self-perception of its potential as an international actor, EU law and policy are 
obsessed with coherence in this area. Moreover, the legal framework sets out 
mechanisms designed to secure coherence in this field. Since law is an important cause, 
law tries to be part of the solution. This is why, although the ambition is ultimately 
political, the quest for coherence in EU external relations cannot be understood without 
addressing the legal dimension. References to coherence and the law, coherence through 
law and the legal dimension of coherence emphasise the multifaceted nature of the query.  
 The thesis acknowledges that coherence and the legal principles that contribute to it, 
like the principle of sincere cooperation, are not the legal norms constraining political 
actors the most. However, I do not share the view that legal research should be confined 
                                                 
5 Articles 2-4 TFEU 
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to the analysis of those rules and principles that most obviously constrain political action. 
In fact, whenever there seems to be an agreed understanding that certain treaty 
provisions and principles are devoid of practical effects, providing evidence confirming or 
denying this assumption is particularly interesting.  
 Furthermore, the thesis is not built on the assumption that coherence is an objective 
that the Union can aspire to fully achieve. No open international actor is perfectly 
coherent and, in any case, this would not be desirable.6 Moreover, what the Union 
aspires to in the abstract (i.e. acting in a coherent manner on the international stage) is 
often in tension with how it needs or prefers to act in its response to concrete 
international events. The link between the notions of coherence and effectiveness that we 
can find in EU primary law and in policy documents is in tension with a competing idea 
of the Union‘s effectiveness as an international actor. In the first understanding of 
effectiveness, the question as to how the Union acts at the international level is central. 
The assumption is that the EU can only be ultimately effective as regards its external 
objectives if it acts in a coherent manner. The latter version of effectiveness prioritises, 
instead, the need to maximise the Union‘s external presence, by ensuring that the EU 
provides a timely response to international matters as often as possible, regardless of 
whether these responses qualify as coherent or not. This is only one example of how 
coherence is often in tension with other interests. When trying to make sense of the 
obsession with coherence, the thesis presents the ‗ought to be‘ idea of coherence in EU 
primary law and policy documents. The reader should, however, be aware of these 
caveats. Moreover, the fact that coherence extends to everything the Union does, has an 
instrumental character (i.e. it is important because of the purposes it serves), and is not a 
specific stage to reach explains why it can be perceived as both a broad political ambition 
and a principle guiding the development of EU external relations.   
 In short, I argue that neither the quest for coherence in external action, nor the legal 
norms relevant in advancing it operate as a zero sum game. I take a nuanced and 
constructive position both to the ambition of coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy, 
and to the role of law therein. 
                                                 
6 According to Pascal Gauttier: ‗perfect coherence proves to be nevertheless impossible to achieve in a 
pluralist political system (…). A certain measure of incoherence remains thus inevitable, and must be 
deemed acceptable insofar as it arises from an open decision-making process‘, P. GAUTTIER, op. cit. 3, 
page 24  
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2.2 Writing about coherence in times of EU crisis  
It is not easy to write about the quest for coherence in EU external relations when the 
European idea itself is going through a severe crisis. The quest for coherence is obviously 
an ambitious political objective. Moreover, it is linked to the idea of strengthened EU 
actorness on the international scenario. Coherence is an integrationist goal aimed at 
bringing the EU further as an external project. This is why the EU‘s response to the war 
in Ukraine in 2014 and to the refugee crisis in 2015-2016, and the recent referendum 
whereby UK citizens have decided to leave the EU do not exactly provide the best 
context in which to write about an integrationist agenda for the Union. This is clearly not 
a thesis for EU sceptics. It is not a thesis either for the increasing number of people who 
defend an instrumentalist approach to the Union, based on cost-benefit analyses. Truth 
being said, perhaps even I would have lost any hope for the idea of coherence were it not 
for the three months I spent at the EU Delegation to Ethiopia.7 During that time, I could 
confirm how the promotion of human rights and democracy were consistently important 
objectives in the actions of the Union in Ethiopia. Noticeably, this could not be said 
about other external actors offering assistance to Ethiopia. Human rights considerations 
were essential in a project on the reintegration of former combatants from the 
Benshangul-Gumuz People Liberation Movement. They were central, too, in a project 
on the reintegration of Ethiopian migrants returning from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Democratic considerations were crucial in the many meetings (between the Union and 
Member States) held at the EU Delegation to discuss the kind of support that the Union 
should provide for the general elections that took place in 2015. I could see, too, how EU 
officials consistently explained to representatives of the Government of Ethiopia as well as 
to other international organisations and NGOs that ‗this or that‘ had to be done ‗this or 
that‘ way because EU rules so required. I could clearly perceive that this way of acting 
was considered inflexible and ‗annoying‘. I understood, however, that this modus operandi 
rendered the Union more credible and persuasive when, in the context of political 
dialogue, it tried to convince the Government of Ethiopia of the need to act in a certain 
manner. Credibility was important when the Union pressured the Government of 
Ethiopia to respect human rights in trials involving opposition leaders. Credibility played 
its role, too, when the EU recalled the Government of Ethiopia that resettlement 
                                                 
7 I was an intern at the Governance, Economic and Social Section of the EU Delegation to Ethiopia 
between August and November 2014 
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activities affecting tribes living in the Omo Valley had to comply with human rights. 
Complementing this direct pressure, I attended trial observation organised by the Union 
in Addis Ababa, and saw how some EU officials travelled to the Omo Valley to observe 
the resettlement activities of the Government. Besides soft power considerations – which 
are not very fashionable these days either – during my weeks in Ethiopia I learned about 
joint programming between the Union and the Member States in the field of 
development policy (i.e. an exercise of vertical coherence). I learned that joint 
programming strengthens the position of the Union in its dialogue with the Government 
of Ethiopia. The pressure of the EU delegation or an individual Member State cannot 
compare to the pressure of the Union as a block. Although I only realised about this 
months later, my experience in Ethiopia was essential to believe in my thesis again. 
3 Outline  
Chapter 1 of the thesis explores the reasons behind the obsession with coherence and the 
notion of coherence in EU external action. Moreover, it analyses the nature of coherence 
in external relations, drawing from its place in the treaties and case law of the CJEU. 
Most importantly, the chapter introduces the approach of the thesis to the legal 
dimension of coherence. This approach constitutes the backbone of the thesis. It proposes 
a categorisation of the fundamental mechanisms foreseen in EU primary law to secure 
coherence between parallel policies and activities. While the approach to the legal 
dimension of coherence remains very abstract in chapter 1, it is studied again in chapters 
2 and 3, and it becomes more concrete every time it is examined. Starting from the 
treaties, the analysis considers certain developments in secondary law acts that are 
subject to the ordinary legislative procedure and finally focuses on specific legal acts 
adopted in the context of Union action in Somalia. Chapter 1 concludes with an 
examination of the idea of the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘ as the latest attempt to 
advance coherence in EU external relations.  
 Chapter 2 applies the approach of the thesis to the legal dimension of coherence in 
the context of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. This case – the thematic case of 
this thesis – constitutes a paradigmatic example of two parallel policy areas requiring an 
exceptional degree of complementarity. As a result of the incorporation of the security-
development nexus (i.e. the idea that security and development challenges are 
intertwined), the Union has taken the view that special efforts shall be directed towards 
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ensuring that CFSP and development cooperation measures complement and reinforce 
each other. When analysed in this specific context, the approach to the legal dimension 
of coherence considers certain secondary law developments that are relevant to 
coherence in the external action. For instance, I examine the adoption of the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Furthermore, with a view at setting the scene 
for the case study presented in chapter 3, chapter 2 presents four theoretical claims 
concerning the four mechanisms foreseen in EU law to ensure coherence in the external 
action. Chapter 2 concludes with an examination of joint programming in EU 
development cooperation. While still at a theoretical level (i.e. the analysis does not focus 
on any particular country or region), the case of joint programming provides a specific 
example of many issues addressed in chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis. For instance, it 
illustrates the link between the principle of sincere cooperation and the notions of 
coherence and effectiveness of the Union as an actor. Moreover, joint programming is a 
concrete example of an exercise designed to increase coherence between the development 
policies of the EU and those of its Member States. It fits perfectly into vertical inter-
policy coordination as one of the mechanisms foreseen in the treaties to advance 
coherence in EU external relations (section 4 of chapter 2). 
 Chapter 3 presents the CFSP and development cooperation toolbox in Somalia 
between 2008 and 2014. It explains the wide array of instruments that the Union has 
used in its action in Somalia in the analysed period and within the analysed policy areas. 
The chapter offers a practical example of the idea of the Union‘s toolbox to tackle 
international concerns, introduced in chapter 1 of the thesis. It must be read together 
with Annex 2 of the thesis, which provides an extensive list of CFSP and development 
cooperation legal acts, falling within the different EU tools deployed in Somalia (e.g. 
restrictive measures, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EDF). Annex 2 is the most tangible 
expression of the Union‘s wide toolbox. Moreover, chapter 3 provides the necessary 
context for understanding the case study. It presents an overview of Somalia‘s recent 
history, as well as the Union‘s approach to the country since the beginning of the 2000s. 
Besides, the chapter shows that the security-development nexus is not only visible in EU 
policy documents. Chapter 3 also presents the case study of the thesis, which is based on 
an analysis of 14 legal acts from the wide CFSP and development cooperation toolbox in 
Somalia (2008-2014). It explains the scope of the case study, as well as the legal acts 
examined. The idea of the legal dimension of coherence presented in this chapter adds to 
the consideration of primary law and of certain developments in secondary law, attention 
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for the role that specific treaty provisions and legal principles play in legal acts 
concerning the Union‘s action in a third State. The case study responds to the four claims 
presented in chapter 2 with four empirical claims on the basis of the role of law in 
practice. This opposition emphasises that the case study is thought of as a test, in the light 
of practice, of the legal framework presented in chapters 1 and 2. Finally, the conclusions 
of the thesis present the overall conclusions of the project. 
 There are at least three possible ways of reading this thesis. If the main interest is in 
analysing how ideas and principles concerning EU external relations that appear very 
abstract in the treaties and in policy documents translate into concrete realities, the thesis 
must be read chapter by chapter. If the focus is on the legal dimension of coherence 
alone, then the attention must be put in sections 5 (chapters 1 and 3) and section 4 
(chapter 2). This way of reading the thesis will also show how treaty provisions and 
principles that are abstract and ambiguous in the treaties are applied in concrete cases. 
Lastly, if the reader is interested in the interaction between law and policy, then each 
chapter can be considered on its own. The three chapters of this thesis follow the same 
structure: they focus first on the political dimension of coherence to then introduce the 




Coherence in EU external relations and the law 
1 Introduction to chapter 1 
The quest for coherence in EU external relations has been a central topic in the academic 
and political debates in this field since the establishment of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC, 1970). Coherence, which found its way into EU external relations 
law with the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA, 1987), has been referred to as a 
‗burning question‘, a ‗recurrent theme‘ and a ‗fervently discussed‘ issue, to mention but a 
few examples from the literature.8 Remarkably, 16 provisions in the current version of the 
treaties refer to the idea of coherence, many of which in the context of the Union‘s 
external action.9 Academic studies have generally assumed that coherence in EU external 
relations is desirable and have focused, either on how the institutional design and the 
legal framework can advance it, or on the empirical analysis of whether certain policies 
and activities are or not consistent. The chapter addresses questions that have been to 
some extent overlooked in the literature, and is aware that this means navigating difficult 
waters. It aims at understanding the obsession with coherence in the Union‘s foreign 
policy: what factors justify the obsession? What does the term ‗coherence‘ mean in this 
context? How does the CJEU use the notion of coherence in recent cases concerning the 
external action? The chapter studies these issues with a view to assessing the impact of 
the legal framework on coherence in this area. 
 The analyses of the reasons behind the quest for coherence and the notion of 
coherence are based on primary law, as well as on policy documents. Given that the 
obsession with coherence is manifest in the treaties and in policy documents, it is 
justifiable to consider both when trying to make sense of it. Furthermore, if policy 
documents are essential in the reasoning of the Court in cases concerning the external 
action, they should also be central in the academic legal debate.  
                                                 
8  H. G. KRENZLER and H. C. SCHNEIDER, ‗The Question of Consistency‘, in E. 
REGELSBERGER et al (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, 1996, 
page 134, P. GAUTTIER, op. cit. 3, page 25 and C. GEBHARD, ‗Coherence‘, in C. HILL and M. SMITH 
(eds.), International Relations and the European Union: Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2011, page 101  
9 C. HILLION, ‗Cohérence et action extérieure de l‘Union Européenne‘, LAW 2012/14, EUI WP, 
page 1 
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 Besides, the chapter introduces the approach of the thesis to the legal dimension of 
coherence, as a particular way of conceptualising the role of law in the quest for 
coherence in EU external relations. This approach constitutes the backbone of the thesis. 
It is further elaborated on in chapter 2, where I apply it to the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus and in chapter 3, where I analyse that nexus in the context of Union 
action in Somalia. Finally, chapter 1 addresses how the notion of coherence and the 
‗trendier‘ idea of the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘ interrelate. 
2 Coherence in EU primary law and in policy documents: terminological confusion 
The first references to coherence in EU external relations date back to the 1970s when the 
EPC was introduced and fragmentation in the Union‘s foreign policy materialised. The 
first form of CFSP had to coexist with the external policies of the EC. However, the idea 
of coherence was not introduced in primary community law until 1987, when the SEA 
was adopted. The SEA referred to the notion of coherence in its Preamble and in Article 
30, on provisions on the EPC. It essentially referred to coherence between the Member 
States and the EPC and between ‗the external policies of the European Community and 
the policies agreed in European Political Co-operation‘.10  
 In the context of treaty reform initiated in 2001 with the Laeken Convention and 
ultimately leading to Lisbon Treaty in 2009,11 the idea of coherence played a central role. 
The Laeken Declaration posed the question: ‗How should the coherence of European 
foreign policy be enhanced?‘. 12  Later, once the Constitutional Treaty had failed, the 
Commission adopted the Communication: Europe in the World – some practical 
proposals for greater coherence, effectiveness, and visibility (2006). 13  The document 
focused on efforts that could enhance coherence in EU external action in the context of 
the existing treaty framework. In the same direction, in the Presidency Conclusions of 15 
and 16 June 2006, the European Council invited the Presidency, the Council, the HR 
and the Commission to study measures that, on the basis of the existing treaties, could 
strengthen coherence in the foreign policy of the Union.14 As a result of this long process, 
the current version of the treaties contains 16 provisions referring to the idea of 
coherence, the majority of which are in the context of EU external relations.  
                                                 
10 Article 30 (2)(d) and (5) of the SEA 
11 The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009  
12 European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001: Presidency Conclusions 
13 Communication: Europe in the World (C(2006) 278) 
14 Brussels European Council 15-16 June 2006: Presidency Conclusions (10633/1/06) 
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 The constant calls for coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy did not stop with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Quite the contrary, references to coherence in 
official policy documents concerning this field of EU action are commonplace. In fact, as 
a consequence of certain institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty 
(namely, the new role of the HRVP and the creation of the EEAS),15 together with 
coherence, we now find plenty of references to the idea of the ‗EU‘s comprehensive 
approach‘.16 As explained in section 7 of this chapter, the comprehensive approach is 
fundamentally a fresh attempt to advance coherence in external action. The Global 
Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) refers to coherence 
on 20 occasions, to consistency in 9 cases, and to the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘ 4 
times.17 
 The debate regarding coherence in EU external relations is characterised by 
confusion over the use of the words ‗consistency‘ and ‗coherence‘. This terminological 
confusion is a long-standing reality, as it is as old as the SEA.18 While the English version 
of the treaties and case law of the CJEU refer to consistency only, EU policy documents 
clearly prefer the word coherence, but also sporadically use the term consistency. This 
would not be problematic if these two words were interchangeable in English. However, 
as is widely accepted in the literature, consistency and coherence mean different things.19 
Consistency constitutes a necessary but insufficient condition for coherence. While 
consistency is linked to an idea of the absence of contradictions, coherence adds to the 
former the idea of synergetic connection or integration of different parts in a unified 
whole. To complicate the matter even more, whereas the English version of the treaties 
uses the term consistency, the French, Italian, German and Spanish language versions, 
for instance, refer to cohérence, coerenza, Kohärenz and coherencia, respectively.  
The SEA, which was drafted in English, introduced for the first time the idea of 
coherence in EU primary law. Where the English text read ‗consistency‘, other language 
                                                 
15  See, for example, Articles 18 and 27 TEU and the Council Decision establishing the EEAS 
(2010/427/EU) 
16 See, for instance, the Joint Communication: The EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict 
and crises (JOIN(2013) 30), page 2 
17  Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016), available at: 
https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf (last visited: 29 August 
2016) 
18 According to Marise Cremona, this confusion goes back to the SEA in its provisions on the EPC 
and ‗unfortunately has not been remedied in the Treaty of Lisbon‘, op. cit. 4, page 12 
19 See, for example: C. HILLION, op. cit. 4, page 14 and S. DUKE, ‗Consistency, Coherence and 
European Union External Action: the path to Lisbon and beyond‘, in P. KOUTRAKOS (ed.), European 
Foreign Policy: Legal and Political perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2011, pages 17-18. On the difference between 
the notions of consistency and coherence, see section 4 of this chapter, pages 26-29 
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versions, like the Spanish and the French ones read cohérence and coherencia respectively. 
Although all official languages are equally authentic, the choice for consistency in the 
text in which the SEA was drafted may respond to the fact that English allows for nuance 
that is not possible or is much less evident in other languages. For example, there is an 
important difference regarding the common usage of the word consistency in English and 
that of coherencia in Spanish. While in Spanish the word coherencia is generally used to 
refer both to an absence of contradictions and the creation of synergies, in English the 
word consistency replaces the term coherence when we refer to the first part of the query 
(i.e. absence of contradictions). The word consistencia is rarely used in Spanish to refer to 
the idea of an absence of contradictions between two abstract elements. It is widely 
employed instead to describe the physical state of a substance. By way of example, in 
Spanish we say that the dough of a cake did not acquire the desired consistencia. If we 
want discuss how the policy of an institution took one direction over a certain period of 
time, but has taken a contradictory direction in recent times, we will probably say that 
the institution‘s policy is incoherente. In English, however, the term consistency is 
generally used to refer both to dough and the policy of our government. Therefore, the 
choice for the word coherencia where in English we read consistency may result from the 
fact that in Spanish the word coherencia is commonly used where, in English, the term 
consistency is widely employed, instead. 20 
Interestingly, the terms ‗coherence and consistency‘ were used in the English version 
of Case C-266/03 as the translation of the original ‗unité et cohérence’ of the action and 
international representation of the EU.21 However, there is an example in the treaties 
where the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union‘s action in English are in the 
French version: unité, cohérence, and efficacité.22 This shows that unité in French does not 
correspond to coherence in English. That the Court‘s term unité was translated as 
coherence indicates, however, that coherence in English means something more than 
coherence in the French version of the treaties and the case law of the Court.23 Moreover, 
                                                 
20 In fact, because of the common use of the word consistency in English, in some instances it would 
be more appropriate to refer to consistency (see the Introduction to the thesis, page 4). However, for the 
sake of clarity I generally refer to coherence throughout the thesis  
21  Case C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-04805, para 60. This is particularly 
important because this paragraph has been reproduced in other judgments, for example: C-433/03, 
Commission v Germany, [2005] ECR I-06985, para 66, Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, PFOS Case, 
[2010] ECR I-03317, para 75, and Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 72 
22 Article 26(2) para 2 TEU 
23 For Christophe Hillion, that coherence is the translation of unité indicates that ‗coherence in English 
would thus encapsulate the notion of united whole‘. C. HILIION, op. cit. 4, pages 13-15 
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the reference to ‗coherence and consistency‘ in the English translation of Case C-266/03 
reinforces the idea of a distinction between these two terms. 
The choice of consistency in English is not necessarily a mistake. In fact, the word 
consistency appeals in a clearer manner to the main concern of EU primary law in the 
quest for coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy, that is: to ensure a certain degree of 
consistency across EU policies and activities. This is not to say that references to coherence 
in the English version of the treaties do not imply a further-reaching idea of coherence 
than the one behind the word consistency. There are other terms in the treaties, like for 
instance cohesiveness, convergence and complementarity that clearly allude to the notion 
of coherence.24 This justifies why, throughout the thesis, the preferred term is coherence. 
However, there are reasons to argue that EU primary law is particularly worried about 
securing consistency in EU external relations.25 
3 Making sense of an obsession 
The obsession with coherence in the external action of the Union, as reflected in the 
treaties and in policy documents in this area, is based on the EU‘s perception of its 
potential as an international actor:26 
‗But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, 
more coherent and more capable.‘ 
Coherence is a fixation with the policies and activities of EU external action, which must 
qualify as ‗coherent‘ for the Union to be effective as an international actor. There are, in 
fact, two fundamental reasons behind the permanent quest for coherence in EU external 
action. The first one is the complex legal system in which EU actors implement the 
external policies of the Union (the internal factor). The second one is the fact that the 
Union considers ensuring coherence in its foreign policy as a conditio sine qua non to its 
effectiveness on the international panorama (the external factor).   
3.1 The internal factor: legal fragmentation in the foreign policy of the Union 
The Union likes referring to its wide toolbox for responding to international concerns. By 
doing so, the EU links its strength in the outside world not only to the existence of a wide 
                                                 
24 See Articles 24(3) para 2 and 32 para 1 TEU, and Article 210(1) TFEU. See section 4 in this chapter 
on the notions of consistency and coherence, pages 26-29 
25 I reflect on this matter in section 5 in this chapter, page 45 
26 European Security Strategy (15895/03), page 13 
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array of tools, but also to the way in which it should use them: coherently. A great 
example can be found in the Council Conclusions on the EU‘s Comprehensive Approach 
(2014):27  
‗The European Union and its Member States can bring to the international stage the unique 
ability to combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from 
diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and human rights, as well as 
justice and migration. This contributes greatly to the Union‘s ability to play a positive and 
transformative role in its external relations and as a global actor.‘  
The tools of the Union, as referred to in this fragment, correspond to the many policies of 
the EU. These policies are implemented under different policy areas (e.g. CFSP, 
common commercial policy) and instruments (e.g. EDF, CSDP military operations). 
This is why references to the EU‘s toolbox, like the one in the Council Conclusions on 
the EU‘s Comprehensive Approach, can be said to refer to the different policies, 
instruments and policy areas of the EU.28 Furthermore, depending on the policy field and 
instrument chosen, the role of EU actors differs. For instance, the Commission does not 
play the same role in the common commercial policy as in the CFSP. The relevance of 
different policy areas in the context of EU external relations is clear from Article 21(3) 
TEU, which can be considered the most important provision regarding coherence in this 
field. While Articles 7 TFEU and 13(1) TEU, which are of general application to the 
Union‘s action, refer to coherence between different policies and activities or actions, 
Article 21(3) TEU puts the emphasis on coherence between the different areas of the 
Union‘s foreign policy. By doing so, this provision implicitly stresses the especial 
challenge for coherence created by the existence of different policy areas, most notably by 
the sui generis character of the CFSP.29 As one can see, I draw a distinction between 
‗policies‘ and ‗policy areas‘. By policies, I refer, in general, to the substantive activities 
conducted in the external action of the Union and, in particular, to the objectives 
promoted by these policies or activities. By policy areas I refer, instead, to the different 
                                                 
27 Council Conclusions (9644/14), page 2 (emphasis added). Another reference to the Union‘s wide 
toolbox can be found in the Council Conclusions on Security and Development (15097/07): ‗The Council 
recalls that the EU, as an important global actor, can avail itself of a wide array of instruments to 
contribute to long-term development and poverty eradication, to prevent and manage violent conflict and 
to build peace in developing countries‘, page 2 
28 Chapter 3 and Annex 2 provide a concrete example of the idea of the Union‘s wide toolbox with the 
case of Somalia (2008-2014) 
29 Article 24(1) and 40 TEU 
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external competences that the treaties attribute to the Union.30 Given that most of these 
competences are of a shared nature, the external policies of the Union often coexist with 
those of its Member States in a parallel manner. The multiplicity of policy areas and 
instruments, where specific policies are implemented, and where EU actors play different 
roles, constitutes legal fragmentation in EU external relations. This is why, while the idea 
of the Union‘s wide toolbox is positively charged, it often hides the fact that organising 
the different tools of the EU is no easy task.  
 Indeed, the different policies and activities of the external action of the Union, 
including those of its Member States, are implemented in a truly parallel or horizontal 
manner.31 Unlike the foreign policies of Member States, if the EU manages to be a 
coherent actor, we will speak about a very horizontal coherence.32 This is why, throughout 
the thesis, I emphasise the parallel character of the coexistence of EU policies and 
activities. As far as the EU-Member States axis is concerned, the logic of exclusivity, 
either because competences are defined as exclusive in the treaties or because of the 
primacy of existing EU legislation,33 is not sufficiently relevant in the field of external 
relations so as to change the truly parallel character of EU and Member States action.34 
For instance, this is the case in the development cooperation field,35 where the Union and 
its Member States program and implement their own aid programmes for each partner 
country.36 The CFSP, albeit generally requiring the unanimity of the Council, is not to 
affect the ‗formulation and conduct‘ of Member States‘ foreign policies.37 
                                                 
30 The emphasis on ‗policy areas‘ in Article 21(3) TEU, as opposed to ‗policies and activities‘ in 
Article 7 TFEU indicates that the quest for coherence in the EU external action has a more legal 
connotation, as the idea of policy areas appeals to the principle of conferred powers  
31 ‗Horizontal‘ in this context is to be differentiated from references to ‗horizontal coherence‘ linked to 
coherence between the different policies and activities of the Union (without considering those of Member 
States) 
32 ‗A truly hierarchical foreign and security policy architecture – if it exists at all – is more typical of an 
individual State‘s constitutional set-up and bureaucratic machinery than of the condominium-type 
EU/CFSP structure and decision-making procedures.‘ A. MISSIROLI, op. cit. 1, page 183 
33 Marise Cremona refers to the latter as ‗legislative (non-a priori) exclusivity‘. See Articles 3(1) and 
(2) TFEU and M. CREMONA, ‗Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and 
Compliance‘, in M. CREMONA and B. DE WITTE (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional 
Fundamentals, Bloomsbury Publishing, Oxford, 2008, page 129   
34 The common mercial policy is the only express external policy field that falls under the category of 
exclusive EU competences (Article 3(1)(e) TFEU) and it is debated whether the principle of primacy 
applies to the CFSP at all 
35 Article 4(4) TEU defines the development cooperation policy as a shared competence that is not 
subject to pre-emption 
36  As established in Article 210(1) TFEU, this should, however, happen with a high degree of 
coordination, which is in practice mainly facilitated by Union delegations. See chapter 2, section 5, on joint 
programming in EU development policy, pages 105-115 
37 See Article 24(1) para 2 TEU and Declarations no 13 and 14 Annexed to the Lisbon Treaty 
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 From the perspective of the Union (now considered without its Member States), 
there is no hierarchy between policy areas (e.g. CFSP and common commercial policy),38 
no hierarchy between actors (e.g. the Commission and the Council), no hierarchy 
between instruments (e.g. EIDHR and IcSP), and no hierarchy between policy objectives 
(e.g. human rights and poverty eradication). Besides the non-hierarchical relations 
between EU policy areas, the law of EU external relations does not offer a clear-cut 
solution as to the choice of the right policy area to tackle international concerns. In 
particular areas that are closely linked on the ground, like the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus, and the CFSP and the external dimension of the AFSJ, the choice of 
the legal basis is a source of interinstitutional conflict.39 The delimitation between explicit 
external activities of the Union and the external dimension of internal policies is not 
straightforward either.40 The HRVP is a good example of horizontality between actors. 
Despite the important responsibilities for coherence that the treaties entrust to the HRVP 
and her coordinating role,  she cannot force other EU actors to follow concrete positions 
on the international scene.41 Moreover, each policy area has its own instruments, like the 
development cooperation policy, where, for example, the Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights Worldwide (EIDHR) and the Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace (IcSP) can be used simultaneously in the assistance to a specific developing 
country.42 The instrument chosen determines the procedure to be followed and, thus, the 
specific role of EU actors. By way of example, the EEAS does not play the same role 
under the EDF and the IcSP. Furthermore, EU institutions work towards objectives, 
such as poverty eradication and the strengthening of international security that are highly 
                                                 
38 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, ex-Article 47 TEU enshrined the primacy of the 
acquis communautaire over the CFSP. Article 40 TEU has eliminated this unbalance between CFSP and 
non-CFSP policy areas  
39  Case C-91/05, Commission v Council, ECOWAS Case, [2008] ECR I-03651, stands out as the 
seminal example of inter-institutional conflict regarding the correct choice of the legal basis in the CFSP-
development cooperation policy interface. Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 
72 is a good example of the same type of battle in the context of the CFSP and the external dimension of 
the AFSJ. See chapter 2, section 4, pages 85-98 
40 The current refugee crisis shows how difficult it is to establish a dividing line between the CFSP and 
the external dimension of the AFSJ. Operation Sophia, the EU military response to human smuggling and 
trafficking in the Southern Central Mediterranean was established under a CFSP legal basis only, but there 
are arguments to claim that a dual CFSP-AFSJ legal basis would have been desirable. See Council 
Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European Union military operation in the Southern 
Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) and M. ESTRADA CAÑAMARES, ‗Operation Sophia 
before and after UN Security Council Resolution no 2240 (2015)‘, European Papers, 1, 1, 2016, pages 185-
191 
41 See, for instance, Articles 18 and 27 TEU, and Declaration 14 Annexed to the Lisbon Treaty  
42 Regulation 235/2014 and Regulation 230/2014. Notice that, although the IcSP is a sui generis 
instrument, in the Union‘s action in developing countries it is a development cooperation instrument. See 
section 4 of chapter 2, pages 91-98  
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interlinked on the ground.43  Yet these objectives are typically pursued in the context of 
policy areas that operate under procedures that are not to affect each other:44 
‗CSDP crisis management instruments and crisis response measures under the Instrument 
for Stability (IfS) pursue mostly short-term objectives, whereas development instruments by 
nature are oriented towards the long term. Although objectives and decision-making 
procedures are different, natural synergies and complementarities should be ensured (…). 
The EU can use, in a coherent manner, different tools and instruments within their own 
mandates and decision-making processes to deliver on the shared objectives.‘ 
Noticeably, policy documents acknowledge that coherence is not only a matter of 
political will. There are ‗objectives‘, ‗instruments‘ and ‗decision-making processes‘ to be 
respected. At the root of legal fragmentation in EU external relations there is the close 
link that Member States establish between their foreign policies and their sovereignty. 
The main expression of this link is obviously the sui generis nature of the CFSP, which has 
survived the abolition of the pillar structure after the Lisbon Treaty reforms. Despite the 
fact that all EU external policies are now part of a single legal order,45 the CFSP still 
operates under specific rules and procedures. For example, the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
in this domain is restricted.46 Furthermore, the CFSP does not fall under any of the 
general categories of Union competences, which reinforces its character as a sui generis 
EU competence.47 This situation is not likely to change in the near future. As shown in 
Declarations no 13 and 14 Annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, Member States are keen on 
stressing that the CFSP, the HRVP and the EEAS cannot affect their competence and the 
extent of their powers to conduct their own foreign policies. 
 Both the persistence of the sui generis nature of the CFSP and the emphasis on the 
non-encroachment on Member States‘ foreign policies point to the same reality: the 
unwillingness of Member States to limit their scope for manoeuvre when it comes to 
issues that they perceive as being at the core of their sovereignty.48 The special connection 
                                                 
43 Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU 
44 See Article 40 TEU and Joint Communication: The EU‘s comprehensive approach to external 
conflict and crises (JOIN(2013) 30), page 8  
45 After the abolition of the pillar structure, the EC and the EU have merged under the EU 
46 Article 24(1) para 2 TEU 
47  According to Article 2(4) TFEU: ‗The Union shall have competence, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union, to define and implement a common foreign and security 
policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy‘ 
48  In the same lines, see: D. THYM, ‗The Intergovernmental Constitution of the EU‘s Foreign, 
Security and Defence Executive‘, European Constitutional Law Review, 7, 3, 2011, pages 25-26; and U. 
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between the external relations of Member States and their sovereignty does not only 
bring about complexity from the perspective of the different policies of the Union (i.e. 
CFSP and non-CFSP divide).49 It also has important consequences from the perspective 
of the relations between the policies of the Union and those of its Member States. As far 
as the CFSP is concerned, albeit generally requiring the unanimity of the Council, the 
CFSP cannot affect the ‗formulation and conduct‘ of Member States‘ foreign policies.50 
This means that, even if Member States, united within the Council, reach a common 
approach on an international matter,51 they are still competent to conduct their own 
foreign policies. Other non-CFSP policy areas, for instance the development cooperation 
policy, are not subject to pre-emption.52 The idea that the more external assistance the 
Union and its Member States provide the merrier is certainly one of the reasons why this 
policy area falls under this category of competences. It is assumed that 29 development 
policies working in parallel will result in more assistance to the developing world than if 
the Union, alone, was in charge of a single EU development policy.53 However, it is also 
the case that development policy is a fundamental political tool in the foreign policies of 
Member States, which also justifies why development cooperation is a non-preemptive 
shared competence.54 Besides setting limits to the integration process, the foreign policy-
sovereignty link explains, at least to a great extent, structural complexity in external 
relations law. This is so from the viewpoint of the relations between different EU policy 
areas (e.g. CFSP-development cooperation), and also from the perspective of the way in 
which EU competences are defined in the treaties (e.g. the CFSP or the development 
cooperation policy).  
 In short, by acting in a coherent manner the Union shows that it has overcome the 
challenges of a system where multiple policy areas and instruments, with specific policies 
and roles for EU actors constantly interact.  
                                                                                                                                                        
SCHMALZ, ‗The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union‘s Foreign Policy 
Dualism?‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, 1998, page 422   
49 Article 40 TEU 
50 See Article 24(1) para 2 TEU and Declarations no 13 and 14 Annexed to the Lisbon Treaty 
51 E.g. Article 29 TEU 
52 Article 4(4) TFEU. This provision establishes that the policy on humanitarian aid is also a non-
preemptive shared competence 
53  In the European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), the Union claimed: ‗The EU 
provides over half of the world's aid‘, page 1 
54 The political sensitivity of development policy for Member States is clear in the case of joint 
programming in EU development policy. See chapter 2, section 5, pages 105-115 
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3.2 The external factor: the EU’s self-perception of its potential as an international 
actor 
Coherence would not be an obsession in EU external relations if the Union did not 
consider it a conditio sine qua non to its effectiveness as an international actor:55 
‗The EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations 
when all EU institutions and the Member States work together on the basis of a common 
strategic analysis and vision.‘  
The link between the ideas of coherence and effectiveness of the Union as an 
international actor can be found in the treaties and case law of the Court of Justice. This 
is especially clear in the context of the CFSP, as can be seen in Articles 24(3) para 2 and 
32 para 1 TEU: 
‗The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union 
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.‘ 
‗Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on 
any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common 
approach. (…). Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that 
the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States 
shall show mutual solidarity.‘ 
Likewise, we can find a similar association in Article 210(1) TFEU, in the context of the 
development cooperation policy:56  
‗In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the 
Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult 
each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during 
international conferences.‘  
                                                 
55  Joint Communication: The EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
(JOIN(2013) 30), page 3. See also the European Security Strategy (15895/03), which established that: ‗The 
European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management‘ 
(page 11). The European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01) claims that it ‗identifies priorities 
which will be reflected in effective and coherent development cooperation programmes at the level of 
countries and regions‘, page 8   
56 As regards the association between complementarity and efficiency under this provision see chapter 
2, section 4, page 103-105. On the role of the principle of sincere cooperation in advancing coherence and 
effectiveness, see section 5 in this chapter, pages 32-35 
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As regards the case law of the CJEU, in the Inland Waterways Cases the Court deemed 
Member State duties flowing from the principle of sincere cooperation in the context of 
the negotiation of EU international agreements as essential to:57 
‗Facilitate the achievement of the Community tasks and to ensure the coherence and 
consistency of the action and its international representation.‘ 
Often the link between coherence and effectiveness finds its justification in the idea of the 
EU‘s actorness. The assumption is that the Union needs to act in a coherent manner to 
show its identity as an international player, which is indispensable for it to be ultimately 
effective as regards the objectives it pursues at the international level. 58  The EU 
acknowledges that the foreign policy domain is one where ascertaining one‘s power is 
crucial. Indeed, the way in which actors perceive each other is fundamental in the 
struggle for power in world politics. By acting coherently, the EU believes that it can be 
‗a force for positive change‘.59 By being incoherent, it assumes that it can even disappear 
as an international player. The main challenge is obviously the fact that the EU shares 
the international space with each of its Member States and also that the Union is in 
relative terms still a very young actor. The Union needs to act coherently to be taken 
seriously by other actors. By way of example, Simon Nuttall mentions the Iraq War 
where, to his view: ‗differences among the Member States (…) deprived the Union of the 
credibility it needed to play an effective role.‘60 This idea of a lack of coherence that may 
lead to the EU not being recognisable on the international scenario shows that the 
Union‘s assumption is not that coherence necessarily leads to effectiveness, as some 
authors seem to understand it, but rather that an incoherent Union cannot be an effective 
Union.61  
 Being visible is obviously not enough to be an effective international actor. By 
(coherently) adhering to its founding principles, regardless of the policy area or 
instrument used, the EU shows not only its existence as an international player but also 
                                                 
57  Case C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-04805, para 60 and Case C-433/03, 
Commission v Germany, [2005] ECR I-06985, para 66 
58 In fact, in the pre-Lisbon legal framework, ascertaining the EU‘s identity was one of the objectives 
of the CFSP. Currently, it is not an explicit external objective but it is mentioned in the Preamble of the 
TEU as one of the functions of the CFSP  
59 European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), page 1 
60 S. NUTTALL, ‗Coherence and Consistency‘, in C. MILL and M. SMITH (eds.), International 
Relations and the EU, Oxford University Press, 2005, page 94 
61 For Antonio Missiroli the EU assumes that ‗by acting unitarily and with a common purpose, the 
EU (…) also bees ipso facto more efficient and effective‘. A. MISSIROLI, op. cit. 1, page 182  
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its identity as an international actor that is founded on certain values and principles.62 
This is considered crucial to persuade others to adopt reforms in the direction of those 
values and principles, which constitutes the essence of the external objectives of the 
Union.63 This is why the Union‘s response to the current refugee crisis undermines its 
position when trying to convince governments of third States of the need to treat their 
refugees according to human rights and international standards, including refugee law. 
Perhaps worried about the latest developments in the EU (including the response to the 
refugee crisis) the Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy 
(2016) recalls:64 
‗Living up consistently to our values internally will determine our external credibility and 
influence‘.  
‗To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is essential. The EU‘s credibility hinges on 
our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness 
and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values.‘ 
Interestingly, the Preamble of the SEA (1987) linked the idea of coherence to the Union‘s 
independence and also to its commitments within the framework of the UN Charter. By 
doing so, the SEA referred to coherence as a precondition of the EU‘s identity on the 
international scene. In this view, coherence is indispensable to show that the Union is an 
actor that transcends its Member States and, thus, to confirm the autonomy of the EU. 
Moreover, acting in a coherent manner is essential to make a difference in the world as 
regards the Union‘s founding principles: 
‗Aware of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly 
with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect 
its common interests and independence and in particular to display the principles of 
democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached 
so that together they may make their own contribution to the preservation of international 
peace and security in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within the 
framework of the United Nations Charter.‘ 
                                                 
62 Articles 2, 3 and 21 TEU 
63 In this direction, see: A.C. MARANGONI and K. RAUBE, ‗Virtue or Vice? The coherence of the 
EU‘s external policies‘, Journal of European Integration, 36, 5, 2014, pages 479-482. See also Articles 3(5) and 
21 TEU 
64  Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy, pages 15 and 10, 
respectively (note 17) 
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We may refer to the idea of coherence in the sense of continued adherence to the 
founding principles of the EU as what the Union perceives as its qualitative distinctive 
feature as an international actor. Coherence also allows the EU to show what it considers 
its quantitative added value as a global player. It is not rare to find references in policy 
documents to the significance (in quantitative terms) of having the Union and its 
Member States working alongside each other. It is not unusual to read about the Union‘s 
wide array of tools to address international concerns. The European Consensus on 
Development (2006) refers to both ideas:65  
‗The EU, both at its Member States and Community levels, is committed to meeting its 
responsibilities. Working together, the EU is an important force for positive change. The EU 
provides over half of the world's aid (…).‘ 
‗The Community has a wide range of modalities for implementing development aid which 
enable it to respond to different needs in different contexts. These are available to all 
geographical and thematic programmes and reflect a genuine Community added value.‘ 
That the identity and persuasiveness of the Union as a global actor justify calls for 
coherence across EU policies and activities, including in the internal domain, stresses the 
importance of the external factor in the obsession with coherence. Furthermore, the close 
link between the notion of coherence and the strengthened EU actorness in the world 
reinforces the character of coherence as an integrationist goal, aimed at bringing the 
Union forward as an international actor.66  
 In short, the obsession with coherence is not only linked to the way in which the 
Union deals with its complex system for EU external relations internally. It also has a 
clear external projection, as it is perceived as having a direct impact on the EU‘s 
international actorness. The reasons that justify the obsession with coherence in the 
Union‘s foreign policy have a remarkable explanatory value as regards the function that 
coherence is supposed to fulfil in this area. Coherence in EU external relations should 
bring the EU as an external project forward (the external factor) by evidencing that the 
Union has overcome the challenges of its complex system for external relations (the 
internal factor). Even if one thinks of references to coherence in the treaties as devoid of 
                                                 
65 European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), pages 1 and 17 (respectively) 
66 According to Carmen Gebhard: ‗the notion conveys the general aspiration of acting with even more 
unity, of being more cohesive, and thus of moving closer to an optimum level of integration. Hence, it is 
positively loaded in the sense that it directly appeals to the very core objectives of integration‘, C. 
GEBHARD, op. cit. 3, page 110  
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legal effects, these references say a lot about the nature of the EU as a complex 
international actor, and about the way in which the Union perceives that it can be most 
effective as regards its external objectives. There was no need whatsoever to refer to 
coherence between EU policies and activities 16 times in the treaties. The Global 
Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) did not need to 
refer either to coherence in 20 occasions, to consistency in 9 cases, and to the ‗EU‘s 
comprehensive approach‘ 4 times.67 
4 Coherence as the dreamed outcome: the notion of coherence in the EU external 
action  
Elaborating on the notion of coherence, or at least pointing to some of its elements, is 
essential in understanding what the quest for coherence in the EU external action is 
about (or at least what it is not about). Yet this is a matter that is often addressed at a 
superficial level in the literature. Studies on coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy 
generally confine themselves to drawing a distinction between the notions of consistency 
and coherence (often referred to as negative and positive coherence).  
 The notion of coherence in the external relations of the Union is multidimensional, 
since it responds to the different elements constituting fragmentation in this field. As 
stressed by Simon Nuttall, coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy is ‗a term of art‘ 
which has ‗acquired overtones going well beyond its dictionary meaning.‘68 By way of 
example, the claim that consistency is a static idea, implying that we can only say that 
two measures are or not consistent does not hold true in this context. We will identify 
different degrees of consistency between two EU measures, even if this is not strictly in 
line with the dictionary definition of consistency. Furthermore, coherence in external 
action presents specificities in each and every context where it is analysed. It does not 
mean the same when the CJEU claims that the single procedure for the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements responds to the requirements of ‗clarity, 
consistency and rationalisation‘ as when the Court establishes that the duty to inform the 
European Parliament in these procedure ‗contributes to ensuring the coherence and 
consistency‘ of the different areas of the Union‘s external action.69 This may well explain 
                                                 
67 Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (note 17) 
68 S. NUTTALL, European Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, 2000, page 25 
69 See Article 218 TFEU and Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, paras 68 and 
72 
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why, despite increasingly referring to coherence in its case law, the Court of Justice is 
reluctant to elaborate on the concept.70 However, it does not excuse the academic debate 
from trying to say something substantial about the notion of coherence in this area. 
References to coherence in the treaties, official policy documents and the case law of the 
CJEU provide enough input to engage in this exercise. Claiming that the Union has not 
managed to build a coherent EU response to a specific international event every time a 
foreign minister of a Member State sends a message, even if it is substantially in line with 
Council conclusions on the matter, does not correspond to the way in which coherence is 
conceived in the law and policy of EU external relations. Although developing a one-
sentence definition is not possible, this does not mean that we cannot identify certain 
elements of the concept. This is what this section is about.  
Intra-policy coherence and inter-policy coherence 
Coherence can only be measured by comparing different things, but which? The most 
frequently repeated angles of analysis are vertical and horizontal coherence. While the 
former focuses on comparing the policies of the Union and those of its Member States, 
the latter‘s interest is in the different EU policies, without considering the action of the 
Member States.71 Besides these two well-known dimensions for studying coherence, there 
is an important difference between ‗intra-policy coherence‘ and ‗inter-policy coherence‘. 
Intra-policy coherence refers to coherence of the same policy or activity (e.g. the 
Commission‘s development cooperation policy on general elections support) in different, 
yet comparable, contexts (e.g. between 2012 and 2014 or in Kenya and South Sudan in 
2014). Inter-policy coherence alludes to coherence between different policies or activities, 
either from the horizontal perspective (e.g. internal and external EU policies) or from the 
vertical perspective (e.g. the development cooperation policy and the policies of Member 
States in the same field). Inter-policy coherence can also be analysed within a specific 
policy area of the Union. For example, we can analyse coherence between the policies 
and activities implemented under the many instruments of the development cooperation 
policy (e.g. EIDHR, EDF). Furthermore, when analysing vertical inter-policy coherence, 
                                                 
70 For Bart Van Vooren, when trying to define coherence: ‗one (…) finds oneself easily trapped 
between the need for abstraction and the need for a concrete definition of coherence. If the concept is all 
too abstract, it bees an ideal with little or no real traction for (legal) organisation of the European Union 
(…). If the concept abandons generality and is too concrete, it loses its guiding characteristics and is 
nothing but a way to explain and justify what is already in existence.‘ B. VAN VOOREN, A paradigm for 
coherence in EU external relations law: the European neighbourhood policy, EUI Thesis, 2010, pages 51-52 
71 Surprisingly, the Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) 
refers to horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States, pages 26 (note 17) 
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it is common to focus on the actors that are responsible for the actions we are comparing. 
Nevertheless, the obsession with coherence is an obsession with the policies and activities 
finally produced. This is why references to coherence between the EU and its Member 
States are nothing but disguised references to the actions that these actors are responsible 
for. The Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016) 
provides an example of this when it refers to EU and Member State coherence in the 
context of specific policies:72 
‗Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its 
humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health 
and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its 
Member States.‘ 
The distinction between intra and inter-policy coherence is fundamental as the quest for 
coherence primarily focuses on the latter. There are different arguments supporting this 
claim. First, the obsession responds to legal fragmentation in EU external relations. In 
fact, the first calls for coherence date back to the 1970s, when the precursor of today‘s 
CFSP, the EPC, was established and had to coexist alongside the external dimension of 
EC policies. Moreover, the HRVP and the EEAS, arguably the most important 
institutional innovations regarding coherence after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, are designed to bridge persisting CFSP and non-CFSP fragmentation. They are 
intended, thus, to ensure coherence between the CFSP and the rest of the Union‘s 
policies.73 Second, when the idea of the effectiveness of the Union as an international 
actor is linked to the coherent use of its toolbox, the emphasis is on the potential of the 
EU to organise its multiple policies, instruments and policy fields in a coherent manner. 
Third, references to coherence in the treaties almost always appeal to coherence between 
parallel policies, activities, actions or areas, instead of to coherence of the same policy, 
activity, action or area.74  
                                                 
72 Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016), page 26 (note 17) 
73 See Articles 18 and 27 TEU and the Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU). In 
the same lines, see Article 22(1) TEU on the role of the European Council regarding the strategic direction 
of both CFSP and non-CFSP policy areas   
74 By way of example, coherence between policies and activities (Article 7 TFEU), between policies 
and actions (Article 13(1) TEU), between areas and between areas and policies (Article 21 TEU). Article 
16 TEU refers to coherence ‗in the work of the different Council configurations‘ and Article 214(1) TFEU 
refers to complementarity between ‗the Union‘s measures and those of the Member States‘ in the field of 
humanitarian aid 
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 This thesis focuses on vertical and horizontal inter-policy coherence, not on intra-
policy coherence. It is particularly interested in the horizontal relations between parallel 
EU policy areas (i.e. CFSP and development cooperation) and in the vertical relations 
between those policy areas (as EU competences) and the competences of Member States 
(i.e. EU and Member States development policies).75 Although the focus is on comparing 
different competences and policy areas, referring to horizontal and vertical inter-policy 
coherence stresses that the quest for coherence concerns all policies and activities. Legal 
mechanisms designed to advance coherence between EU policy areas or between EU 
and Member States competences are aimed at ensuring coherence between all actions 
implemented under these policy areas or competences.  
Single event coherence and continued coherence  
The distinction between ‗single event coherence‘ and ‗continued coherence‘ is essential to 
understanding the EU‘s quest for coherence in external action. However, it has been 
largely ignored in the literature. This distinction brings in the notions of coherence at a 
certain point in time, on the one hand, and as the result of acting in a similar manner in 
successive situations, on the other hand.76 The thesis is interested in both dimensions. 
Inter-policy coherence generally leads us to imagine one international event, where the 
Union managed or failed to ensure a coherent response (e.g. are current development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid measures to tackle severe droughts in Ethiopia 
coherent?). However, inter-policy coherence can also be examined over a long-term 
timeframe (e.g. was the Union‘s promotion of democracy under the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy coherent between 2010 and 2015?). 
Consistency and coherence 
Consistency refers to the absence of contradictions between EU policies and activities. 
Given that these policies are often implemented under different policy areas and 
instruments, ensuring consistency in external action is already an ambitious goal. For 
instance, the requirement that the policies and activities of the Union shall ‗take all of its 
                                                 
75 For the sake of simplicity, I will from now on generally refer to policy areas/fields to describe the 
coexistence between different EU policy fields (when the focus is on the horizontal perspective), and 
between these policy fields and the competences of Member States on the same matters (when the analysis 
focuses on the vertical axis)    
76 Article 13(1) TEU establishes that the Union‘s institutional framework shall ‗ensure the consistency, 
effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.‘ Article 30(2)(d) of the SEA referred to these two 
dimensions of coherence when it claimed that the Presidency and the Commission should ensure that 
consistency between the external policies of the EC and the policies of the EPC ‗is sought and maintained.‘  
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objectives into account‘ reminds political actors that they shall always consider the 
different EU objectives at stake in order to avoid fundamental contradictions. 77 
Coherence, on the other hand, refers to the idea of the different policies and activities of 
the Union reinforcing one another. The requirement to take all EU objectives into 
account can also be read as a requirement of comprehensiveness, 78 in the sense that actors 
should not only be aware of, but should also contribute to, objectives that are mainly 
being implemented in other policy areas or instruments. In his Opinion in the ‗Mauritius 
Case‘, AG Bot argued that, on the basis of coherence, the CFSP needs not only to take 
account of development objectives; it may also contribute to these objectives.79 
 While consistency stresses the idea of separation, coherence comes closer to the 
notion of a unified whole. Consistency is less ambitious and easily leads us to the notion 
of continuity, whereas coherence is often used to refer to the idea of multiple tools 
deployed on the basis of common strategies. This is why it refers, in a much clearer 
manner than consistency, to the Union‘s wide toolbox for tackling international concerns 
and to the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘. 80  The use of the words consistency and 
coherence in the recent Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security 
Policy (2016) supports this view. References to consistency in this document are 
repeatedly linked to the Union‘s policies, values and principles (e.g. ‗living up 
consistently to our values‘). Instead, allusions to coherence refer to the strategic use of the 
EU‘s wide toolbox and to coherence between the Union and its Member States (‗all the 
tools at our disposal in a coherent and coordinated way‘).81 
 Since EU policies and activities are implemented under different policy areas and 
instruments, there is inevitably an important risk of substantive contradictions (i.e. 
inconsistencies) between them. Fragmentation in external action can also lead to 
overlaps. For example, the Union may conduct the same activities, pursuing the exact 
same objectives, under both the CFSP and the development cooperation policy. Even if 
overlaps do not necessarily lead to substantive contradictions, they are at odds with the 
notion of coherence, in the sense of complementarity and synergetic action between 
policies and activities. Overlapping action does not maximise the impact of EU efforts to 
                                                 
77 Article 7 TFEU 
78  For Anne Claire Marangoni and Kolja Raube: ‗coherence makes the EU‘s commitment to 
comprehensive and global objectives credible‘. A. C. MARANGONI and K. RAUBE, op. cit. 63, page 478 
79 Conclusions of AG Bot, Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case, para 126 
80 See section 7 in this chapter, pages 49-53 
81 Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (note 17) 
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advance concrete external objectives, as it is almost by definition inefficient. This is why 
the idea of delimitation is essential in the quest for coherence in EU external relations. 
Noticeably, delimitation is not only an expression of the principles of conferral and 
institutional balance.82 It does not only refer to treaty articles defining the scope of policy 
areas and instruments. For example, joint programming in development cooperation is 
an initiative through which the EU and its Member States divide their tasks to avoid 
overlaps and maximise the efficiency of their action, as mandated by Article 210(1) 
TFEU. 83  It is an exercise of delimitation that does not flow from the principles of 
conferral and institutional balance.  
 When using the term consistency, the treaties do not only imply the idea of absence 
of contradictions between policies and activities when they refer to consistency. For 
example, in the context of the development cooperation policy the treaties refer to the 
need to ensure that EU and Member States‘ policies ‗complement and reinforce each 
other‘.84 The focus is on making sure that the EU policy and that of the Member States 
have a greater impact, because they reinforce each other, than if they did not coordinate 
at all. As far as the CFSP is concerned, the treaties refer to the effectiveness of the Union 
as a ‗cohesive force‘ and to the ‗convergence‘ of Member States‘ actions.85 The mere 
reference to a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and a common security and 
defense policy (CSDP) implies an idea that goes far beyond the absence of contradictions 
between the CFSP and the foreign policies of Member States. The assumption behind the 
notions of convergence and cohesiveness is that vertical coherence in the CFSP context is a 
zero sum game. If Member States unanimously reach a common approach on a CFSP 
matter, it is assumed that this will ensure both vertical consistency and coherence, as 
Member States will then simply reproduce the common approach in their own foreign 
policies. However, this is more of an aspiration than a reality because Member States are 
still empowered to develop their own foreign policy and the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
within the CFSP is limited.86 The fact that the treaties establish how common strategies 
shall be developed is another piece of evidence supporting the claim that the notion of 
coherence in the treaties is much more ambitious than the idea of consistency between 
                                                 
82 See, for all, Articles 7 TFEU and 40 TEU, respectively  
83  This provision refers to coordination between the EU and its Member States in the field of 
development cooperation as essential to ensure ‗complementarity and efficiency in EU and Member States 
action‘. See chapter 2, section 5, on joint programming in EU development policy, pages 105-115  
84 Article 210(1) TFEU  
85 Articles 24(3) para 2 and 32 para 1 TEU 
86 See Declaration 13 and Article 24(1) TEU 
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different policies and activities. That being said, instead of thinking about a dichotomy 
between the notions of consistency and coherence, it is more accurate to approach them 
as a continuum. When the Union and its Member States coordinate their development 
policies, the aspiration is to ensure complementarity (coherence) between EU and Member 
State action. However, since development cooperation is a shared and non-preemptive 
competence, the result of these coordination efforts may only be that EU and Member 
State development policies do not contradict each other. Because of the fragmented 
nature of EU external relations law, consistency in this field must already be considered a 
success. 
Coherent outcomes and strategic coherence  
According to official policy documents concerning EU external action, the Union must 
not only avoid contradictions between the different tools at its disposal; it must also make 
a strategic use of its wide toolbox. Strategic documents on specific matters should inform 
all measures of EU external action falling within their scope, including across different 
policy areas, and thus ensure coherence at the level of individual measures. By 
establishing the Union‘s priorities on particular matters, common strategies should also 
maximise the effectiveness of the EU action. For instance, The EU‘s comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises (2013) claims:87   
‗The EU is stronger, more coherent, more visible and more effective in its external relations 
when all EU institutions and the Member States work on the basis of a common strategic 
analysis and vision. This is what the comprehensive approach is about.‘  
The importance of common strategies is not only expressed in policy documents. 
According to Articles 22(1) and 16(6) para 3 TEU: 
 ‗On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council 
shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. 
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union 
shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external 
action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific 
country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the 
means to be made available by the Union and the Member States. (…)‘ 
                                                 
87 Joint Communication: JOIN(2013) 30, page 3  
 30 
‗The Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of 
strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is 
consistent.‘ 
In past few years, there has been a proliferation of common strategies in the field of 
external relations. However, instead of decisions of the European Council, these 
documents are taking the form of Council conclusions or joint communications of the 
HRVP and the Commission.88  
 The importance of common strategic documents in the field of EU external relations 
should not be underestimated. First, since they do not require a legal basis, they can 
bridge the CFSP and non-CFSP divide, providing separate fields of EU action with a 
common direction. Second, given the non-prioritised and open-ended character of EU 
external objectives, these documents are crucial as they express a common understanding 
regarding the priorities (and even the scope) of EU policy areas.89 The strategic direction 
they provide can then inform the development of individual measures. As recalled by 
Simon Duke, ‗a Union without a clear idea of what it is trying to do and where it is going 
will remain incoherent.‘90  
 The distinction between strategic documents and coherent outcomes at the level of 
individual measures, a distinction explicit in EU policy documents, as well as evidenced 
in treaty provisions, reveals that the idea of coherence in EU external relations is thought 
of as a top-down process. It is assumed that, by obeying a predefined shared strategy; the 
Union ensures coherence between the policies and activities that fall within the scope of 
the strategy  
Coherence is not unity 
Coherence in EU external relations cannot mean unity because coherence must be 
sought within a fragmented legal structure. Coherence is an obsession in this area 
precisely because of the existence of a complex legal system characterised by a 
multiplicity of policies and activities, implemented under different instruments and policy 
areas. Fragmentation is intrinsic to the quest for coherence.91 If all policy areas in the 
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91 Marise Cremona states that coherence ‗does not necessarily imply removal of differences‘ (…), 
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external domain were exclusive competences of the Union, there would be no obsession 
with coherence in this field.92 Since the sui generis nature of the CFSP is the main source 
of complexity in EU external relations, reaching coherent outcomes cannot require the 
total ‗communitarisation‘ of the CFSP.93 
 However, a certain link between the notions of coherence and unity can hardly be 
denied.94 Often this association has to do with the notions of coherence and the EU‘s 
actorness on the international scene. To confirm its identity, the Union needs to act 
coherently to show a degree of ‗unity‘ that can render it recognisable as an actor on the 
international scene. This idea of coherence, one that comes close to unity, can take the 
form a ‗unified modus operandi‘, as expressed by AG Tizzano in Hermès:95   
‗The Community legal system is characterised by the simultaneous application of provisions 
of various origins, international, Community and national; but it nevertheless seeks to 
function and to represent itself to the outside world as a unified system. That is, one might 
say, the inherent nature of the system, which, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the 
realities of States and of individual interests of all kinds, also seeks to achieve a unified 
modus operandi.‘ 
The link between coherence and unity is also clear in the notion of unity of international 
representation. In specific contexts, the coherence and effectiveness of the action of the 
Union can only be ensured if there is unity of EU international representation. The latter 
is, then, an expression of the principle of sincere cooperation and it is directed towards or 
instrumental in the coherence and effectiveness of the action of the Union. 96 
Furthermore, the idea of coherence comes close to unity in the context of the CFSP (i.e. 
cohesiveness, convergence).97 This is so because of the sui generis nature of the CFSP as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
but managing the dual structure‘ (…) ‗dualism management means remedying the negative effects of 
dualism without, however, eliminating its sources‘, U. SCHMALZ, op. cit. 48, page 426  
92 Article 3 TFEU 
93 Some authors have even claimed that a real communitarisation of the CFSP ‗would finally make 
discussion of consistency irrelevant.‘ H. G. KRENZLER and H. SCHNEIDER, op. cit. 8, page 148  
94 Article 26(2) para 2 TEU refers to ‗the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union‘, 
which shows that these are linked but not interchangeable terms 
95 Conclusions of AG Tizzano in Case C-53/96, Hermès International v FHT Marketing, [1998] ECR I-
03603, para 21 
96 Article 4(3) TEU. See, for example, C. HILLION, ‗Mixity and coherence in EU external relations: 
the significance of the duty of cooperation‘, CLEER Working Papers 2, 2009, pages 4-7, and the Conclusions 
of AG Poiares Maduro (paras 36-37) in Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, PFOS Case [2010] ECR I-
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97 See Articles 24(3) para 2 and 32 para 1 TEU 
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policy area that is generally subject to the unanimity of the Member States.98 However, 
we must not forget that the CFSP coexists with the 28 foreign policies of the Member 
States. This is why, instead of dreaming of an EU single voice, it is more realistic to 
dream about an EU single message, reproduced by many different voices.99   
Coherence is not effectiveness 
The link between coherence and the Union‘s effectiveness as regards its objectives on the 
international stage is an abstract and indirect one. The Union assumes that, if it does not 
ensure coherence between policies and activities, its international actorness is 
undermined. This impairs its effectiveness in achieving its external objectives, be it 
international peace and security or good global governance. 100  This is why the link 
between coherence and the effectiveness of EU foreign policy should not lead to 
confusion between these two notions. By way of example, coherence may describe the 
Commission Decision on the annual action programme 2012 for Somalia under the 
EDF: e.g. it ensured coherence with the Joint Action by which the Council established 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta. 101  However, analysing the effectiveness of that Commission 
Decision would require assessing the extent to which the measure managed to advance 
its objectives (e.g. sustainable development). 102 While the coherence of an individual 
measure serves the Union‘s effectiveness as an actor, it cannot be judged by examining 
the extent to which the measure is ultimately effective on the ground.  
5 The legal dimension of coherence in EU external relations 
The analysis of the notion of coherence in the external action provides some hints as to 
how the EU legal framework may contribute to vertical and horizontal inter-policy 
coherence. As far as the idea of continued coherence is concerned, we should bear in 
mind that the mere fact that different policies and activities are implemented under the 
same legal framework brings about a certain degree of coherence. Compliance with the 
law, by definition, brings about certainty and continuity. Moreover, the study of the 
                                                 
98 Article 24(1) TEU 
99 For example, the Preamble of the SEA referred to: ‗the need for Europe to aim at speaking ever 
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notion of coherence has clarified the distinction between coherent outcomes and strategic 
coherence. In doing so, it has stressed the role of the treaties in establishing how strategic 
action (considered essential for coherence at the level of individual measures) should 
develop. This section presents the particular approach of the thesis to the legal dimension 
of coherence in EU external relations. It conceptualises what can be considered the four 
main mechanisms foreseen in EU external relations law to secure horizontal and vertical 
inter-policy coherence. These mechanisms are relevant when coherence is analysed at a 
certain point in time but also when analysed over a longer term. If the notion of 
coherence in the external action is context-specific so are these four mechanisms. 
Coherence could be sought in many different ways. The approach to the legal dimension 
of coherence presented in this section is further elaborated on at a theoretical level in 
chapter 2 of the thesis and tested through a case study in chapter 3.103  
 Legal scholars Christophe Hillion and Marise Cremona have developed the idea that 
there is a whole set of legal rules and principles underpinning coherence in the Union‘s 
foreign policy. 104  Their analyses distinguish between different aspects or layers of 
coherence (e.g. negative and positive coherence), and between different relations or 
dimensions of coherence (e.g. vertical and horizontal coherence). These categorisations 
identify certain rules and principles as especially relevant to particular aspects or layers, 
and to specific relations or dimensions of coherence. The approach of the thesis to the 
legal dimension of coherence in the external action clearly draws upon the 
conceptualisations of these two legal scholars. However, it proposes a new way of 
thinking about the role of law in the quest for coherence in EU external relations. This 
approach focuses, specifically, on those treaty provisions and legal principles that are 
important when the notion of coherence in the external action loses its general 
abstraction and is examined in relation to specific policies and activities that are 
implemented in parallel. What does the law of EU external relations do to ensure 
coherence between the policies implemented under the common commercial policy and 
those that fall within the CFSP? How does law secure coherence between the policies of 
the Union and those of its Member States in the field of humanitarian aid? 
 Under this approach, the most important principles for ensuring vertical inter-policy 
coherence are the principles of conferral, mutual solidarity and sincere cooperation. 
From the horizontal perspective, the principles of institutional balance and 
                                                 
103 See section 4 of chapter 2 and section 5 of chapter 3, pages 79-105 and 151-170, respectively 
104 M. CREMONA, op. cit. 4 and C. HILLION, op. cit. 4 
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interinstitutional sincere cooperation are most relevant. The categorisation I propose is 
not based on the distinction between the notions of consistency and coherence in EU 
external relations. Nor does it classify each of the abovementioned principles under either 
consistency or coherence.105 I argue that understanding the principles of mutual solidarity 
and sincere cooperation as essential to the notion of coherence; and conferral and 
institutional balance as concerned with consistency, is misleading. It undermines the role 
of the principle of sincere cooperation in the quest for coherence in EU external relations. 
It also leads to a very narrow conception of the notion of consistency in the EU foreign 
policy. We should recall that delimitation, which is essential to ensuring coherence in EU 
external relations, often results from institutions practicing sincere cooperation, as shown 
in the case of joint programming (EU-Member States) in the field of development 
cooperation. 106  Furthermore, categorising principles in this manner establishes a 
dichotomy between conferral and institutional balance, on the one hand, and sincere 
cooperation and mutual solidarity, on the other hand. This dichotomy implies that the 
role of these principles in the quest for coherence is to be kept completely separate, which 
does not seem to be the case. In the Tanzania Case, the CJEU interpreted the duty of 
information owed by EU institutions to the European Parliament in the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements as important in ensuring coherence between the 
different areas of the external action.107 Noticeably, the Court interpreted this information 
duty as flowing from the principle of interinstitutional sincere cooperation, when it could 
easily have based it on the principle of institutional balance.108  
 The crucial importance of the principle of sincere cooperation for the effectiveness of 
the Union is clear from Article 4(3) TEU:109 
‗The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union‘s tasks and refrain from 
any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union‘s objectives.‘ 
There is nothing new in establishing a link between loyalty principles and the 
effectiveness of the Union‘s action.110 Under public international law, this association 
                                                 
105  For instance, Christophe Hillion establishes a close link between consistency (‗to solve legal 
conflict, a task left to the judiciary‘) and coherence (where the function of cooperation under ex-Article 3 
TEU (now Article 21 (3) TEU) is considered central). C. HILLION, op. cit. 4, pages 16-17  
106 See section 5 of chapter 2, pages 105-115 
107 Article 218(10) TFEU 
108 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 72 
109 See also Article 24(3) TEU (CFSP), Article 210(1) TFEU (development cooperation policy) and 
Article 13(1) and (2) TEU, as regards interinstitutional sincere cooperation   
110 Case C-105/03, preliminary ruling, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-05285, para 42 
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results from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Member States have created the Union 
and vested it with a set of objectives. They consequently need to be loyal to the project 
(show good faith) and work towards those objectives. In a similar direction, Marise 
Cremona has stated that, by respecting the principles of sincere cooperation (and 
compliance), Member States ‗defend the Community interest‘, which is a notion 
elaborated by the CJEU and clearly directed towards the realisation of the Union‘s 
objectives.111 In the context of EU external relations, coherence adds another layer to this 
argument. Because of both legal fragmentation in this field and the need to strengthen the 
international actorness of the Union, between loyalty and effectiveness the EU has added 
the quest for coherence. The link between the sincere cooperation, as it applies to the 
relations between the Union and the Member States, and the notions of coherence and 
effectiveness is evident in the case law of the CJEU: 112  
‗The Court has held that the adoption of a decision authorising the Commission to negotiate 
a multilateral agreement on behalf of the Community marks the start of a concerted 
Community action at international level and requires for that purpose, if not a duty of 
abstention on the part of the Member States, at the very least a duty of close cooperation 
between the latter and the Community institutions in order to facilitate the achievement of 
the Community tasks and to ensure the coherence and consistency of the action and its 
international representation.‘ 
By the same token, institutions need to be loyal to each other to ensure coherence in the 
external action and, ultimately, the effectiveness of the Union as regards the objectives it 
pursues on the international stage.113 
 The approach I propose to the legal dimension of coherence in the external action 
identifies four mechanisms set out in EU external relations law to secure coherence 
across external policies and activities. These mechanisms are the provision of common 
objectives, the definition of common approaches, legal delimitation and inter-policy 
coordination. In the first two the focus is on ensuring that all EU policies and activities 
                                                 
111 ‗If it is to be used as the basis for Member State obligations based on Article 10 EC it [the notion of 
Community interest] should be linked to the demands of the Community legal order (…). These 
imperatives include the autonomy of the Community legal order, its primacy, and a reading of its scope 
and nature based on effet utile: an orientation towards completion of its objectives.‘ (Emphasis added). M. 
CREMONA, op. cit. 33, page 169 
112 Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, PFOS Case [2010] ECR I-03317, para 75 
113 Articles 13(1) and (2) TEU. The case of joint programming in EU development cooperation offers 
a concrete practical example of the sincere cooperation-coherence-effectiveness link, see chapter 2, section 
5, pages 105-115 
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are implemented on the basis of a shared substantive framework. Instead, legal 
delimitation and inter-policy coordination are mechanisms affecting how different EU 
policies and activities, which are implemented under different policy areas and 
instruments, relate to each other. Moreover, relying on the legal principles and treaty 
provisions that are most relevant to each of these mechanisms, there is a distinction to be 
made between coherence through substantive law and coherence through procedural law. 
The definition of common objectives falls under coherence through substantive law, 
because it concerns how treaty provisions frame the substance of policies and activities. 
In contrast, the remaining three mechanisms are expressions of coherence through 
procedural law, because in them the legal framework seeks coherence by designing the 
procedures through which actors should develop EU external relations. Each of these 
four mechanisms is relevant to ensuring both consistency and coherence, except for legal 
delimitation, which concerns the notion of consistency only. While the remaining three 
mechanisms aspire to coherence, they may only lead to consistency between policies and 
activities. Lastly, legal delimitation is the only mechanism where coherence is sought by 
legal means alone, which justifies the emphasis on legal delimitation. 
5.1 Mechanisms for coherence in EU external relations law 
Common objectives 
The single set of objectives in Article 21 TEU provides all political actors involved in the 
development of EU external relations with a single chart explaining what the Union, as 
an international player, aims towards. 114  EU actors are, therefore, to implement the 
different external policies and activities of the Union on the basis of that shared 
substantive framework. Given the level of abstraction and generality of the single set of 
objectives, even when followed with the best intentions, this framework will not totally 
prevent incoherence between specific policies and activities. However, the single set of 
objectives can bring about a certain degree of coherence between policies and activities, 
enabling the Union to show a single identity on the international stage, regardless of the 
policy area or the instrument deployed. It should do so when the Union responds to an 
international matter with different policies and activities, and also when the external 
                                                 
114 The single set of EU external objectives is also enshrined in Article 3(5) TEU but in a much less 
elaborated manner than it is in Article 21 TEU. This is why, throughout the thesis, I mention the latter 
when referring to this legal innovation 
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action is analysed over time. We shall recall that it is more accurate to think of 
consistency and coherence as a continuum than as a zero sum game. 
 In the Tanzania Case, the CJEU referred to the single set of objectives (Article 21(2) 
TEU) and to the notion of coherence in the external action (Article 21(3) TEU) as 
justifying why compliance with the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect for 
human dignity, is required of all EU policies and activities:115 
‗As regards, in particular, provisions of the EU-Tanzania Agreement concerning compliance 
with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect for human dignity, 
it must be stated that such compliance is required of all actions of the EU, including those in 
the area of the CFSP, as is clear from the provisions, read together, set out in the first 
subparagraph of Article 21(1), 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU.‘ 
From this perspective, coherence can be perceived as a commitment to the founding 
principles of the Union, which must be observed in the external action, both as regards 
what the EU upholds (as shown in the Tanzania Case) and what the Union promotes at the 
international level. The first sentence of Article 21 TEU, which establishes the single set 
of external objectives and constitutes the most important provision regarding coherence 
in the external action, reads as follows: 
‗The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world‘. 
While the objectives established in Article 21 TEU are open-ended, we ought to bear in 
mind that, as argued by Joris Larik, this provision constitutes an exceptionally explicit 
statement of external objectives in comparative law. According to the author, the EU 
treaties are ‗in the vanguard of a global trend‘. He writes:116 
‗Without doubt, they are among the most verbose in terms of foreign policy objectives, 
covering all main substantive areas outlined here, and furthermore putting forward 
additional emphases not usually found in national constitutions.‘ 
Article 21 TEU is obviously the most important treaty article as regards the provision of 
common objectives in EU primary law. However, there are other treaty articles that 
                                                 
115 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 47 
116 J. LARIK, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law, Oxford Studies in European Law, 
2016, page 124 
 38 
define external objectives and policy priorities. These provisions are also part of the idea 
of coherence through substantive law. For instance, the requirement to consider 
development objectives in all policies affecting developing countries can be read in this 
light.117 
Common approaches 
That the provision of common objectives does not rule out the possibility of incoherence 
at the level of individual action explains why the treaties foresee how strategic action 
(what I call common approaches) shall be defined.118 The idea of a certain degree of 
flexibility or political discretion in the design of strategic action is essential to the 
development of international politics. As long as strategic instruments are elaborated on 
the basis of the common objectives set out in the treaties, EU actors retain remarkable 
room for manoeuvre in deciding on the Union‘s strategic partners and interests. This 
includes prioritising certain EU objectives over others and choosing a mixture of policies 
depending on the geographic and material scope of each strategic instrument. Strategic 
documents can also include references implying when the Union ought to use each of its 
tools (e.g. CSDP or development cooperation?). They can thus contribute to delimitation, 
as they may indicate when acting on the basis of specific policy areas and instruments is 
most adequate.  
 Like the provision of common objectives, the definition of common approaches 
provides a shared substantive framework for policies and activities implemented in 
different strands of EU action. Whether or not these common approaches exist depends 
on the extent to which EU actors practice sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity.119 
This is why the definition of common approaches is an expression of coherence through 
procedural law, instead of a case of coherence through substantive law. As strategic 
policy documents are not directly enforceable before the CJEU, one may think of them as 
long pages filled with EU platitudes. By the same token, one may argue that they are a 
                                                 
117 In fact, the requirement of Article 208(1) TFEU is an expression of the ‗Policy Coherence for 
Development‘ agenda 
118 See, for example, Articles 22 and 16(6) para 3 TEU  
119  In her categorisation of coherence, Marise Cremona considered the importance of strategic 
documents as expressions of the principle of sincere cooperation. This is why I argue that Leonhard den 
Hertog and Simon Stross misinterpreted her argument when they defended the need of a ‗fourth category 
of rules of coherence: rules of substantive guidance‘. According to them, in the three layers of coherence 
proposed by Marise Cremona: ‗the content of policies as such is not touched by those types of rules‘, L. 
HERTOG, and S. STROSS, ‗Coherence in EU External Relations: Concepts and Legal Rooting of an 
Ambiguous Term‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, 18, 2013, page 379. See also M. CREMONA, op. cit. 4 
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matter of simple political will, rather than concrete expressions of the principles of 
sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity. However, if we recall the extent to which the 
case law of the Court of Justice concerning the Union‘s foreign policy relies on strategic 
policy documents in this area to define the scope of EU policy areas, we will probably 
approach these documents in a different manner. Perhaps the most relevant example is 
the extent to which the CJEU relies on the European Consensus on Development (2006) 
to stress the existence of an agreement between the EU institutions and the Member 
States over the broad scope of EU development policy. The Court does not question the 
content of the document. Instead, it emphasises the wide consensus reached around it.120 
In fact, the CJEU has found in this policy document guidance for interpreting the scope 
of the development cooperation policy not provided by the treaties. In doing so, the 
Court has almost attributed a ‗legal status‘ to a policy document. Likewise, by stressing 
the idea of a consensus around the European Consensus on Development, the CJEU 
indirectly reminds EU actors to be loyal to what they committed to together. Another 
example is the Court‘s use of the European Council Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism (2004)121 to argue that the Instrument for Stability could contribute to the fight 
against terrorism. In short, there are indirect ways in which strategic policy documents, 
as expressions of the principles of sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity (designed to 
advance coherence in EU external relations) can be important in the reasoning of the 
CJEU. When assessing the impact of common approaches on coherence we must not 
only take account of whether they inform individual action, we must also consider if they 
are relevant in defining the scope or the priorities of EU policy areas.  
 In the context of the CFSP, strategic policy documents, like Council conclusions on 
a specific international matter, can be considered constitutive of the CFSP. By exercising 
mutual solidarity, Member States reach common approaches, and thus create CFSP 
positions regarding particular questions.122 These approaches should then foster vertical 
coherence because Member States should reproduce them in their own foreign policies. 
Finally, even though, strictly, there is no chronological order between the four 
mechanisms for coherence, strategic policy documents precede the choice of the policy 
area and the instrument to be used, as they should inform all action falling within their 
substantive scope.  
                                                 
120  See the European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01) and, for all, Case C-377/12, 
Commission v Council, Philippines II Case, para 19 
121 Brussels European Council 25 and 26 March 2004: Presidency Conclusions (9048/04) 
122 See Article 32 para 1 TEU  
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Legal delimitation 
Legal delimitation refers to how the law of EU external relations defines the scope of 
policy areas and instruments, as well as the role of EU actors, in certain procedures that 
are particularly relevant to the Union‘s external action, such as the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements. Firstly, legal delimitation is relevant to ensuring 
substantive coherence between EU policies and activities, which corresponds with the 
general obsession with coherence in the external action. Secondly, legal delimitation is 
crucial to ensuring procedural coherence, as it mainly affects how the Union acts 
internationally, as opposed to what it does at the international level (e.g. the policies it 
implements).123 Being able to answer the question ‗who does what?‘ minimises the risk of 
contradictions and overlaps. Obeying the same rules in response to this question ensures 
continuity in how the Union acts internationally. This is how legal delimitation 
contributes to coherence in the external action.    
 Whenever the Union acts through legal measures, rules for choosing the adequate 
legal basis are an essential part of legal delimitation. These choices, which are 
expressions of the principles of conferral and institutional balance, determine the policy 
area that the Union will use to act internationally. According to the Court, these choices 
must rest on objective factors, which must include the aim and content of the measure 
that is being adopted.124 The clarity of the legal framework in defining the scope of policy 
areas is essential to ensuring consistency (i.e. continuity) over the choice of the legal 
basis. By way of example, the list of EU competences introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is 
designed to clarify when the Union is empowered to act, and when doing so remains a 
competence of Member States.125 In the Mauritius Case, the Court refers to how the 
existence of rules underpinning the choice of the legal basis ensures legal certainty and 
coherence in these choices. The CJEU, thus, implies that these rules bring about 
continuity over how the Union acts internationally:126  
‗That interpretation is justified particularly in the light of the requirements relating to legal 
certainty. By anchoring the procedural legal basis to the substantive legal basis of a measure, 
                                                 
123 Note that the distinction between substantive/procedural coherence is not to be confused with the 
idea of coherence through substantive/procedural law. The former refers to the context coherence is 
analysed (e.g. coherence over the choice of the legal basis and coherence as regards policy choices). The 
latter refers to the nature of legal norms designed to advance coherence (e.g. coherence through Article 21 
TEU (common objectives) and through Article 40 TEU (legal delimitation) 
124 See section 4 of chapter 2, pages 85-98 
125 Articles 2-6 TFEU 
126 Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case, para 60 
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this interpretation enables the applicable procedure to be determined on the basis of objective 
criteria that are amenable to judicial review, as noted in paragraph 43 of the present 
judgment. That ensures consistency, moreover, in the choice of legal bases for a measure. By 
contrast, the interpretation advocated by the Parliament would have the effect of introducing 
a degree of uncertainty and inconsistency into that choice, in so far as it would be liable to 
result in the application of different procedures to acts of EU law which have the same 
substantive legal basis.‘ 
However, the EU legal framework does not offer a clear-cut solution as regards the 
choice of the substantive legal basis, which is evident from the many judgements of the 
CJEU on this matter. 127  This is why delimitation is also sought through other 
mechanisms, namely the definition of common approaches and inter-policy 
coordination. That the law of external relations is not conclusive in relation to the choice 
of the legal basis also explains why there is no consistency over these choices.128 
 Furthermore, we shall bear in mind that the choice of the legal basis also determines 
the specific instrument that the Union will use to respond to an international matter (e.g. 
a CSDP military operation or the IcSP). Given the variety of instruments in the external 
action, the clear definition of the scope of each instrument is also important to avoid 
overlaps and contradictions between the policies and activities implemented under 
different instruments. In certain cases, the scope of instruments is defined in the treaties 
(e.g. CSDP military operations). In other instances, this issue is a matter of secondary 
law (e.g. IcSP).129  
 Besides the choice of the legal basis, rules clarifying the duties of EU actors in the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements are also part of legal delimitation. 
In the Inland Waterways Cases, coherence guided the Court‘s interpretation of Member 
State duties flowing from the principle of sincere cooperation.130 The CJEU found that 
Luxembourg and Germany had breached this principle because they ignored ‗concerted 
Community action at the international level‘. This was so because the Commission had 
started to negotiate an international agreement on behalf of the Union. By taking 
unilateral action, Germany and Luxembourg rendered it impossible to ensure the 
coherence in the Union‘s action. The single procedure for the negotiation and conclusion 
                                                 
127 See, for all, Case C-130/10, Parliament v Council, Sanctions Case, paras 42-49 and Case C-658/11, 
Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case, para 52    
128 See section 5 in chapter 3, pages 160-165 
129 See Annex 2 of this thesis 
130  Case C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-04805, para 60 and Case C-433/03, 
Commission v Germany, [2005] ECR I-06985, para 66 
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of international agreements, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, is designed to clarify the 
roles of each EU actor in this complex procedure.131 In the Tanzania Case, the Court 
extended its case law on the duties of Member States flowing from the principle of 
sincere cooperation, which it established in the Inland Waterways Cases, to the principle 
of interinstitutional cooperation within the single procedure of Article 218 TFEU:132  
‗Indeed, the European Union must ensure, in accordance with Article 21(3) TEU, 
consistency between the different areas of its external action, and the duty to inform which 
the other institutions owe to the Parliament under Article 218(10) TFEU contributes to 
ensuring the coherence and consistency of that action (see, by analogy, as regards the 
cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member States, judgment of 2 June 
2005, Commission v Luxembourg, C-266/03‘.  
The question of how the EU acts internationally (i.e. procedure) is obviously relevant to 
the image that the Union presents to the outside the world. The negotiation of 
international agreements is a negotiation with external partners. However, this question, 
as opposed to what the Union does at the international level (i.e. substance), seems to be 
important only in the legal dimension of the quest for coherence. References to coherence 
in EU policy documents do not refer to coherence as a continued way of proceeding 
internationally. This is perhaps the clearest piece of evidence that coherence is not only a 
political ambition. It is a legal ambition too. Together with an obsession with substantive 
coherence between policies and activities, there is an obsession with legal delimitation as 
a means to ensure procedural coherence across EU policy areas and instruments. Legal 
delimitation is considered essential in securing the coherence of EU action and its 
international representation (Inland Waterways Cases), and coherence between the 
different areas of the Union‘s external action (Tanzania Case).  
Inter-policy coordination 
Inter-policy coordination refers to the processes through which the different actors 
responsible for policies that are closely linked on the ground organise their action. By 
coordinating, EU actors minimise the existence of contradictions and overlaps between 
their respective policies and, therefore, maximise the complementarity and efficiency of 
their action. While the definition of common approaches precedes the choice of the policy 
                                                 
131 Article 218 TFEU 
132 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 72 
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area and the instrument that the Union shall use to tackle a specific international matter, 
inter-policy coordination follows these choices. In the development of common 
approaches, the focus is on providing substantive guidance for all policies and activities 
falling within the scope of the approach. Inter-policy coordination aims at avoiding 
contradictions and overlaps between specific actions that are being implemented in 
parallel. As far as horizontal inter-policy coherence is concerned, coordination is 
important because the choice of the legal basis does not prevent the existence of overlaps 
and contradictions between policies and activities. Moreover, since explicit external 
competences are often shared and not subject to preemption, EU and Member States 
policies are implemented in a truly parallel manner. This is why vertical inter-policy 
coordination is essential to ‗promote the complementarity and efficiency‘ of EU and 
Member State action.133  
 Inter-policy coordination takes essentially two forms. The first form is institutional 
coordination, where the different actors responsible for the development of policies 
coordinate their action. For example, vertical institutional coordination in the field of EU 
development cooperation is conducted directly between the Union and its Member States. 
In particular, it mainly happens between EU delegations and Member State embassies 
where development assistance is provided. 134  The second form of inter-policy 
coordination is what I call ‗awareness‘. The treaties require all EU objectives to be taken 
into account to ensure coherence between EU policies and activities, as well as 
complementarity between EU and Member State action.135 These requirements remind 
EU actors that, when developing a specific measure, they must show awareness 
regarding other actions of the Union that are relevant to the current measure and seek to 
complement them. 
 The law of EU external relations shows a preference for entrusting important tasks 
regarding vertical and horizontal inter-policy coordination to actors that can be 
considered ‗intermediaries‘. 136  For instance, the HRVP shall ensure horizontal inter-
                                                 
133 Article 210(1) TFEU 
134 Articles 210 and 221(2) TFEU. See section 5 of chapter 3, pages 151-170 
135 See Articles 7, 210(1) and 214(6) TFEU 
136 When referring to the Lisbon Treaty reforms that had not yet entered into force, Marise Cremona 
stated: ‗Not only will there be a number of different actors to coordinate, a number of different actors will 
have responsibility for that coordination‘, M. CREMONA, ‗Coherence through Law: What Difference will 
the Treaty of Lisbon make?‘, Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, 3, 1, 2008, page 34. Note that I do not 
intend to present a comprehensive overview of the coordinating roles of EU actors in the external action, 
but to offer certain examples supporting the claim that there is a predilection for mediation in inter-policy 
coordination   
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policy coordination between CFSP and non-CFSP policies, although she is not the main 
actor responsible for these policies. This is why Article 21(3) para 2 TEU reads as 
follows: 
‗The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that 
consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.‘ 
The President of the European Council and the HRVP shall facilitate vertical inter-policy 
coordination by, respectively, presiding and taking part of the work of the European 
Council, which consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States.137 In 
its role as President of the Foreign Affairs Council, the HRVP also facilitates vertical inter-
policy coordination in the particular context of the CFSP.138 
 Besides, there is another way in which the HRVP (and the EEAS as her assisting 
body) play a role in inter-policy coordination. The HRVP (assisted by the EEAS) 
conducts the CFSP, for instance by preparing proposals to the development of this policy 
area.139 On the other hand, the EEAS contributes to the programming and management 
cycle of certain external assistance instruments falling within the development 
cooperation policy.140 Because of their nature, by entrusting the HRVP and the EEAS 
with specific tasks over CFSP and non-CFSP policy areas, it is assumed that horizontal 
and vertical coherence across policy areas is strengthened. 141  For example, in the 
programming process of development assistance instruments, the EEAS should bring in 
CFSP considerations. We must not forget that the HRVP is elected by the European 
Council and conducts the CFSP as mandated by the Council.142 The EEAS, which was 
established in a Council decision, is composed of officials coming from the Commission 
and the Council, and it includes personnel from the diplomatic services of Member 
States.143 In this case the focus is not on how the HRVP and the EEAS mediate between 
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the actors that are mainly responsible for EU external policies. Instead, the assumption is 
that the HRVP and the EEAS, by nature, ‗embody‘ these actors, and the policies they are 
responsible for.  
5.2 Coherence and ‘Too much constitutional law in the European Union’s Foreign 
Relations?’ 
The four mechanisms for coherence foreseen in the treaties are underpinned by legal 
rules and principles. However, the law of EU external relations does not play the same 
role in all of them. As regards the provision of common objectives and the establishment 
of legal delimitation rules, EU primary law seeks to actively contribute to coherence. It 
clarifies the legal framework and it establishes rules that should have a direct impact on 
coherence. In the definition of common approaches and inter-policy coordination, EU 
primary law establishes how coherence should be developed. However, in these two 
mechanisms, the law takes a more passive role, leaving ample room for manoeuvre to 
political actors to decide how coherent they want their action to be. This explains why I 
argue that EU primary law is mainly concerned about ensuring consistency between 
policies and activities implemented in parallel in the Union‘s foreign policy. In the two 
mechanisms where EU external relations law is most active, the idea of bringing about 
clarity in the legal framework is essential. In fact, coherence can be considered one of the 
reasons why treaty provisions concerning the Union‘s external action are particularly 
lengthy. The quest for coherence can be said to explain, at least partly, why, as stated by 
Bruno de Witte, there might be ‗too much constitutional law‘ in EU foreign policy.144 
The single set of objectives, which is an exceptionally explicit statement of international 
objectives in comparative law,145 clarifies what EU actors shall aim for, regardless of the 
policy area. The single procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements clarifies how EU actors must act within this procedure. It establishes certain 
duties that must be complied with regardless of the substantive legal basis chosen to 
conclude an international agreement (and, by extension, the policy area that the 
agreement falls within). In the Mauritius Case, the Court recognised that the single 
procedure of Article 218 TFEU was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in order ‗to satisfy 
                                                 
144 B. DE WITTE, ‗Too much constitutional law in the EU‘s Foreign Relations‘, in M. CREMONA 
and B. WITTE (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: constitutional fundamentals, Hart, 2008   
145 See J. LARIK, op. cit. 116, page 124  
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the requirements of clarity, consistency and rationalisation‘.146 It is unquestionable that 
behind the over codification of EU external relations law lies the Member State fear that 
the EU may encroach upon their competence to conduct their own foreign policies. 
However, I claim that legal reforms aimed at clarifying the scope of EU competences are 
essential to ensuring coherence in EU external relations. 
 Arguing that there are many treaty provisions and legal principles underpinning the 
idea of coherence in EU external relations is the same as saying, in reverse, that if 
coherence in the external action results from respecting these provisions and legal 
principles, it amounts to a commitment to the law. If this commitment concerns the 
substantive legal framework, coherence is mainly a commitment to promoting the 
principles the Union is founded on. 147  When the focus is on how the Union acts 
internationally, regardless of the substance of its policies and activities, the focus is on 
upholding what the Union is founded on in the development of its external relations (i.e. 
respect for the rule of law). By continuously acting according to legal norms, the Union is 
in a better position to persuade its interlocutors that they should also do so. It is, 
therefore, better placed to be ultimately effective as regards its external objectives (e.g. 
respect for the rule of law). By repeatedly negotiating and concluding international 
agreements on the basis of the rules set out in Article 218 TFEU, the Union acts 
coherently and with an identity recognisable to its international partners. It shows, 
undoubtedly, a complex and inflexible modus operandi. But it also shows that the EU is an 
international organisation that acts according to legal rules.148 The same can be said 
regarding an arrangement to organise the action of the Union and its Member States 
within an international organisation. Such an arrangement, which is an expression of the 
principle of sincere cooperation, ensures continuity over the way in which the Union acts 
within the organisation.149 Other actors may complain about the arrangement, but the 
Union confirms its identity as an actor bound by rules.   
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6 Coherence in EU primary law: a legal principle? 
The question as to whether coherence qualifies as a principle of EU law, as opposed to 
simply a principle guiding political action, is a matter of debate. It is a deliberate choice 
to leave discussing this issue until near the end of chapter 1. After a long time reflecting 
about the notion of coherence, alone and with other students and professors, I take the 
view that the legal debate attributes too much relevance to the question of the legal 
nature of coherence. By desperately attempting to establish a clear-cut separation 
between what falls within and lies outside the legal sphere, the debate misses the 
opportunity to discuss the really interesting questions about the role of law in the quest 
for coherence. If coherence is not a legal principle, the notion of coherence is still relevant 
from a legal perspective, as it influences legal reform and it is used in the case law of the 
CJEU. If coherence is a legal principle, and even if it were a principle imposing 
obligations of a substantive nature, coherence would still contribute to the broad political 
ambition of coherence in EU external relations, as many issues will always escape the 
legal domain. That being said, a legal study on coherence in EU external relations cannot 
omit the question of the legal nature of coherence. 
 Coherence is obviously not a technical legal principle pertaining to the legal sphere 
only. It is not a principle like legal certainty or proportionality. However, there are formal 
and functional arguments defending the idea that coherence constitutes a principle of EU 
external relations law. As for the formal argument, the location of coherence under 
Article 7 TFEU indicates that it is a principle of general application to the Union.150 
Coherence can also be found in Article 21(3) TEU, on general provisions on the EU 
external action. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these two provisions are 
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.151 The lack of a clear legal concept of 
coherence and the fact that the Court has referred to coherence as a requirement are not 
conclusive arguments against the notion of coherence as a legal principle.152 We must 
recall that there are other values and principles of EU law, such as the rule of law, for 
                                                 
150  Article 7 TFEU falls under Title II (‗Provisions having a general application‘) of Part I 
(‗Principles‘). For an interpretation in the same direction, see: C. HILLION, op. cit. 4, page 4  
151 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the most prominent provision regarding the 
principle of coherence, old Article 3 TEU, was excluded from the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Notice that 
Christophe Hillion refers to the principle of coherence as a ‗principe justiciable’. C. HILLION, op. cit. 9, 
pages 5-7 
152  ‗One of the characteristics of the principle of coherence is its lack of legal nature: the term 
coherence is in common usage and does not for the time being designate a specific legal concept‘, P. 
GAUTTIER, op. cit. 3, page 24  
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which there is no clear legal notion. On the other hand, as in the case of coherence, the 
Court has referred to legal certainty, a general principle of EU law, as a requirement.153 
 Besides formal considerations, the functional argument for considering coherence as 
a principle concerns its role in directing the law of EU external relations. Coherence 
provides a shared sense of direction to certain legal norms that are essential in advancing 
coherence in this field.154 It explains the existence of certain legal provisions and guides 
the interpretation of certain legal norms, as opposed to simply guiding political action. 
Perhaps the greatest example of the claim that coherence guides the interpretation of 
legal rules and principles can be found in the Tanzania Case.155 The CJEU interpreted the 
duty of information owed by EU institutions to the Parliament in the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements as flowing from the principle of interinstitutional 
sincere cooperation.156 While, if analysed in isolation, any legal scholar would consider 
this duty an expression of the principle of institutional balance, the Court connected it to 
sincere cooperation. It did so because it looked at this information duty from the 
perspective of its role in ensuring coherence between different areas of the external 
action. Moreover, coherence is an obsession, not only with what the Union does 
externally (i.e. the substance of its policies and activities), but also with how it acts 
internationally (i.e. the procedures it uses to implement policies and activities). The 
obsession with the procedure is specific to the legal dimension of coherence, as the idea 
of coherence as a broad political ambition is only interested in what the Union does. It 
confirms that coherence is, not only a broad political objective, but also a principle 
concerning the way in which the Union develops its external relations. Furthermore, the 
obsession with coherence does not only justify the existence of provisions in the treaties 
calling for coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy. According to the Court, legal 
innovations like the single procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements have been introduced ‗to satisfy the requirements of clarity, consistency and 
rationalisation‘.157 Perhaps the greatest example of the idea that coherence guides the 
interpretation of legal norms   
                                                 
153 Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case, para 60 
154 For Christophe Hillion, coherence is a ‗function of other EU legal principles‘. According to Marise 
Cremona, coherence provides ‗a context and rationale‘ for the functioning of other legal principles in EU 
external relations. C. HILLION, op. cit. 4, page 18 and M. CREMONA, op. cit. 4, page 59 
155 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 72 
156 Article 218(10) TFEU 
157 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case, para 68 
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 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, coherence is within the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU. The question is whether the Court may ever enforce it as a qualitative 
obligation, linked to the substance of EU policies and activities. This possibility should 
not be underestimated.158 That the link between the idea of coherence and the Union‘s 
objectives is an abstract one, as well as the general non-interventionist role of the CJEU 
in the field of EU external relations (where the Court is reluctant to decide on policy 
choices), are arguments to think that the Court will avoid enforcing coherence as a 
qualitative obligation.159 A case like Dermoestética, where the CJEU used coherence as a 
benchmark against which to assess the adequateness of certain restrictions to freedom of 
establishment and to provide services, is difficult to imagine in the area of external 
relations. The Court found that the restrictions introduced by the Italian Government 
were not appropriate to guarantee the protection of public health since they were 
inconsistent.160 References to coherence in recent cases concerning the Union‘s foreign 
policy, like the Tanzania Case, seem to indicate that the CJEU is more inclined to use 
the strengthened position of coherence in the current treaty framework to reinforce its 
guiding character in the interpretation of other procedural and substantive treaty 
provisions and legal principles, rather than to create new obligations for EU actors.  
7 Coherence and the EU’s comprehensive approach  
Jan Wouters et al have written about the comprehensive approach as the likely successor 
to coherence as the preferred ‗rhetorical device‘ in EU external relations. 161  Indeed, 
references to coherence linked to the Union‘s wide array of tools to tackle certain 
international concerns are increasingly replaced by references to the EU‘s comprehensive 
approach to these matters. For instance, when the EU claims that it takes a 
                                                 
158 Christophe Hillion argues that the principle could be enforced as a qualitative obligation linked, 
inter alia, to the substantive content of instruments. He recalls that, like coherence, the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality were also considered eminently political guidelines but they have 
nevertheless bee central in the reasoning of the CJEU. C. HILLION, op. cit. 9, pages 5-7 
159  See M. CREMONA, ‗A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the Court of Justice‘, in M. 
CREMONA and A. THIES (eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional 
Challenges, Hart Publishing, 2014 
160  According to the CJEU, Italy ‗introduced a prohibition on advertising medical and surgical 
treatments on national television networks while at the same time making it possible to broadcast such 
advertisements on local television networks.‘ Case C-500/06, Corporación Dermoestética, [2008] ECR I-
05785, para 39. In the same direction, see for instance Case C-243/01, Gambelli and others, [2003] ECR I-
13031, paras 26 and 67  
161  ‗Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, 
Challenges and Opportunities‘, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, PE457.111, 
AFET, 2013, page 28 
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comprehensive approach in Somalia, it essentially refers to the fact that it deploys 
multiple tools to tackle the problems affecting Somalia.  
 In fact, we must distinguish between two different uses of the expression the ‗EU‘s 
comprehensive approach‘ in the field of external relations. The ‗EU‘s comprehensive 
approach‘ names certain strategic policy documents (i.e. common approaches) in the 
area of external relations. By way of example, we can refer to the EU‘s comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises to allude to a strategic document on a matter 
whose implementation will require, inter alia, CFSP, development cooperation policy and 
humanitarian aid actions. This concrete idea of the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘ has 
rapidly led to the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘ as an abstract idea linked to the 
Union‘s wide toolbox. When the EU‘s comprehensive approach is referred to in this 
sense, it directly appeals to the role of the EU as an international actor. That the EU 
connects its wide toolbox to its added value and, ultimately, effectiveness as an 
international actor has already been discussed in this chapter. The wide toolbox is part of 
what the Union perceives as its quantitative added value as an international actor. The 
idea of the EU‘s comprehensive approach is the next step in this perception. There are 
two circumstances that can be said to explain the emergence of the idea of the EU‘s 
comprehensive approach. The first one is internal and refers to the fact that, after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has an institutional structure (namely, the 
HRVP and the EEAS) that is designed to bridge the CFSP and non-CFSP divide, and to 
strengthen the actorness of the Union as a global actor. This institutional set-up has 
brought about a proliferation of integrated strategies to external concerns under the 
heading ‗comprehensive approach‘. Be it through Council conclusions or joint 
communications, comprehensive approaches in the field of external relations can be 
linked to the HRVP and the EEAS.162 The second circumstance that explains the EU‘s 
comprehensive approach is external as it refers to how States and international 
organisations perceive today‘s world. The Union realises that there is a general 
understanding of today‘s world as a complex world. For instance, before the adoption of 
the Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (2016), the EEAS website claimed:163  
                                                 
162  The Joint Communication: The EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
(JOIN(2013) 30) explicitly refers to the existence of a new institutional framework, whereby the EU has 
‗the increased potential and the ambition (…) to make its external action more consistent, more effective 
and more strategic‘, page 2  
163 The Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (2016) refers to the world as a ‗complex world‘ 
in 4 cases (note 17) 
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‗Our world today is more connected, contested and complex. (…). An EU Global Strategy on 
Foreign and Security Policy will enable the Union to identify a clear set of objectives and 
priorities for now and the future. On this basis the European Union can align its tools and 
instruments to ensure that they have the greatest possible impact.‘ 
With the narrative of the ‗EU‘s comprehensive approach‘, the HRVP and the EEAS have 
turned the Union‘s complex system for EU external relations into the EU‘s best 
characteristic. They have turned the EU‘s wide toolbox into the distinctive feature of the 
Union as an international actor. The Union tells the world that it is in a unique position 
to present integrated responses to international matters:164    
‗The European Union and its Member States can bring to the international stage the unique 
ability to combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from 
diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and human rights, as well as 
justice and migration. This contributes greatly to the Union‘s ability to play a positive and 
transformative role in its external relations and as a global actor.‘  
This idea of uniqueness seems to really have had an impact on EU officials. In an 
interview with an EEAS official, he claimed that the EU is better placed than the 
majority of its Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach to security and 
development concerns. He founded this claim on the observation that most Member 
States no longer deploy military and civilian operations alone, and take part instead in 
EU and NATO efforts.165  
 Given the benefits of the idea of the comprehensive approach to the Union‘s 
actorness, the question arises, then, as to whether EU comprehensive approaches (as 
specific documents) are really based on the need to tackle different concerns in an 
integrated manner or if the Union is exploiting this for its own purposes, among others to 
legitimise itself as a particularly or even uniquely well-placed actor.166 That the Council 
has adopted Conclusions on the EU‘s comprehensive approach (2014), without referring 
to any particular context, points to the idea that it is certainly at least as much about us as 
                                                 
164  Council Conclusions: The EU‘s Comprehensive Approach (9644/14), page 2. This idea of 
uniqueness is nothing new in public international law. See A. BRADFORD and E. POSNER, ‗Universal 
Exceptionalism in International Law‘, University of Chicago Law School: Chicago Unbound, 2011 
165 Interview with an EEAS official, 2.4.2014 
166  This constitutes a fundamental critique of Niagalé Bagoyoko and Marie V. Gibert to the 
incorporation of the security-development nexus in EU external relations. N. BAGOYOKO, M. V. 
GIBERT, ‗The linkage between security, governance and development: the European Union in Africa‘, 45, 
Journal of Development Studies, 5, 2009 
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about the world. Even if we assume that this is the case, comprehensive approaches are 
not only about how the Union projects itself in the world. Closer attention to the idea of 
the EU‘s comprehensive approach in policy documents shows a broader notion than the 
one presented so far. The comprehensive approach is not only about having a wide 
toolbox; it is also about using it in a coherent manner. We can consider this the third use 
of the EU‘s comprehensive approach. We must not forget that:167  
‗The European Union and its Member States can bring to the international stage the unique 
ability to combine, in a coherent and consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from 
(…)‘. 
From this perspective, the comprehensive approach is not simply describing a fact (i.e. 
the Union has different tools). It is showing an aspiration, as policy documents recognise 
the legally fragmented nature of EU external relations. In The EU‘s comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises (2013), the HRVP and the Commission 
highlighted:168 
‗The approach is based on the full respect of the different competences and respective added 
value of the EU's institutions and services, as well as of the Member States, as set out in the 
Treaties.‘ 
 Although there are certainly reasons to argue that the Union is exploiting the generally 
held perception of global challenges as interconnected and complex, it is not only doing 
so to legitimise itself as a particularly well-equipped actor. The EU is also using this 
perception to justify, internally, the need for integrated strategies that it considers 
essential to ensuring coherence between its different policies and activities. This is why 
the EU‘s comprehensive approach is, fundamentally, the new word to refer to the role of 
strategic policy documents in the attempt to use the toolbox in a coherent manner.169 
Each comprehensive approach (i.e. strategic policy document) is directed at advancing 
coherence at the level of individual measures:170 
                                                 
167 Council Conclusions: The EU‘s Comprehensive Approach (9644/14), page 2 
168  Joint Communication: The EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
(JOIN(2013) 30), page 4 
169 In an interview with an EEAS official (2.4.2014) he repeatedly used the expressions ‗strategic 
coherence‘ and ‗comprehensive approach‘ in an interchangeable manner 
170 Council Conclusions: The EU‘s Comprehensive Approach (9644/14), page 1 
 53 
The Council stresses that the comprehensive approach is both a general working method and 
a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common 
strategic vision and drawing on its wide array of existing tools and instruments, collectively 
can develop, embed and deliver more coherent and more effective policies, working 
practices, actions and results. 
Comprehensive approaches correspond to the definition of common approaches as one 
of the mechanisms foreseen in EU external relations law to advance coherence between 
policies and activities. They are the result of legal institutional reforms, and expressions of 
sincere cooperation (i.e. joint communications of the HRVP and the Commission) and 
mutual solidarity (i.e. Council conclusions), which are essential to adopt them. They 
should inform EU action when a specific international event arises and also ensure 
continued coherence. 
8 Chapter conclusions 
There are essentially four conclusions to chapter 1 of this thesis. The first conclusion is 
that the obsession with coherence in the Union‘s external action, as manifested in 
primary law and policy documents, responds to the legally fragmented system for EU 
external relations. It is an obsession with ensuring coherence between policies and 
activities that are implemented under different policy areas and instruments. For 
example, the ambition to make a coherent use of the wide toolbox to tackle international 
concerns, which is recurrent in policy documents, is a disguised reference to the 
challenges created by the fact that the EU‘s tools form part of separate strands of action. 
In other words, the legal framework is a fundamental cause (i.e. the internal factor) behind 
the quest for coherence in the Union‘s foreign policy. 
 The second conclusion of the chapter is that the notions of consistency and 
coherence are multidimensional. This is why it is most accurate to think about these 
concepts as a continuum than as specific stages to reach. There are many elements to 
take into account when assessing whether two activities are consistent and/or coherent. 
For instance, common approaches can bring about consistency across EU activities over 
the understanding of the scope of the development cooperation policy. However, it may 
be the case that common approaches do not prevent substantive contradictions between 
specific activities. In fact, this is why I argue that not only coherence, but also 
consistency is a matter of degree in EU external relations. Furthermore, efforts aimed at 
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ensuring complementarity between different policies and activities, like EU and Member 
State coordination between development programmes, may only manage to ensure 
consistency. 
 The third conclusion is that there are different ways in which EU primary law 
contributes to ensure coherence between policies and activities, which can be categorised 
under four mechanisms for coherence: common objectives, common approaches, legal 
delimitation and inter-policy coordination. If the first conclusion claims that law is a 
fundamental cause behind the quest for coherence, the third conclusion argues that law 
tries to be part of the solution. The fact that EU primary law takes a more active role in 
providing common objectives and defining legal delimitation rules, than in the remaining 
two mechanisms for coherence explains why I state that EU external relations law is 
fundamentally concerned about ensuring a certain degree of consistency across policies 
and activities.   
 Besides, the chapter argues that there is an external factor that is equally important as 
the internal one in understanding the obsession with coherence. It is assumed that, by 
acting in a coherent manner in the development of its external relations, the Union 
strengthens its international actorness, which is indispensable for it to be effective as 
regards its external objectives. The fourth conclusion of this chapter is that, in fact, there 
are two ways in which coherence contributes to the EU‘s effectiveness as an external 
project. A close analysis of the notion of coherence in primary law and policy documents 
reveals a difference between what I call ‗soft power coherence‘ and ‗pragmatic 
coherence‘. Both are important in ensuring that the different policies and activities of the 
EU do not appear as though they result from totally separate strands of Union‘s action. 
The distinction between soft power and pragmatic coherence refers to the different 
purposes coherence serves and is, thus, important in understanding why coherence is 
important for the EU. However, it does not affect the notion of coherence and the four 
mechanisms for coherence, which are relevant to both soft power and pragmatic 
coherence.  
 Soft power coherence allows the EU to show what it considers its qualitative added 
value as an international actor. The assumption is that, by acting on the basis of the 
principles the Union is founded on, the EU shows its identity as an external project. This is 
considered important for the Union to be well positioned to influence its external 
partners in the direction of its external objectives. To put it bluntly, soft power coherence 
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corresponds to the Union practising what it preaches in the development of its external 
relations. Article 21 TEU is the best expression of this idea in the treaties. On the other 
hand, the function of pragmatic coherence is to show that the Union is an actor that can 
deliver. The link between coherence and the EU‘s effectiveness as regards its external 
objectives is more straightforward in pragmatic coherence than in soft power coherence. 
By way of example, if the Member States reach a CFSP common approach on an 
international matter (and respect it in the development of their foreign policies), the 
Union, as an actor, is taken more seriously by other international powers. If the EU and 
its Member States ensure complementarity between their respective development 
programmes, the efficiency of EU funds is maximised. This increases the potential of the 
EU to make a real difference as regards its development objectives. In the Global 
Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016), the HRVP states 
that:171 
‗The EU‘s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power 
of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values.‘   
She confirms that this is a reference to soft power coherence when she claims, in the 
following sentence that: 
‗In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: we must enhance our credibility in security 
and defence. To respond to external crises, build our partners‘ capacities and protect Europe, 
Member States must channel a sufficient level of expenditure to defence, make the most 
efficient use of resources, and meet the collective commitment of 20% of defence Budget 
spending devoted to the procurement of equipment and Research & Technology.‘ 
Federica Mogherini is not ignorant of the fact that, in times of EU crisis, the emphasis on 
soft power coherence of the days of the Lisbon Treaties needs to be complemented with a 
strong focus on pragmatic coherence. 
                                                 




The CFSP-development cooperation nexus 
1 Introduction to chapter 2 
The security-development nexus is a widely accepted policy approach under which 
security and development challenges affecting many countries in the world are perceived 
as closely intertwined. It assumes that conflict leads to poverty, and vice versa. The 
Union has not been an exception in adopting this viewpoint. References to the vicious 
cycle between poverty and conflict are common in EU policy documents. Beside the 
explicit allusions to the security-development nexus, there are also less obvious ways in 
which the idea of the nexus can be said to have an important impact in the EU external 
action. This is so at the policy level, and also as far as the law of EU external relations is 
concerned. Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter focus on the idea of the security-development 
nexus as a policy approach. They explore the notion and its emergence on the 
international stage. They also analyse how the EU has adopted the security-development 
nexus in its external agenda, as well as the position of the thesis as regards the nexus. In 
section 4, I refer to the security-development nexus in the case law of the CJEU. Chapter 
3 shows the extent to which the security-development nexus is important in the overall 
action of the Union is Somalia, as well as in concrete legal acts concerning the 
engagement of the EU in this country. The security-development nexus in the external 
action of the Union cannot be understood without also considering the quest for 
coherence in this field. In fact, the idea of the nexus justifies efforts aimed at advancing 
horizontal coherence between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy, which 
are implemented in parallel. This is why the security-development nexus is a paradigmatic 
case for studying inter-policy coherence in EU external relations. It also explains why, 
within the EU legal framework, the security-development nexus essentially corresponds 
to the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. 
 Section 4 is the backbone of this chapter. It applies the four mechanisms for inter-
policy coherence foreseen in EU external relations law, presented in chapter 1, to the 
context of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. The idea presented in chapter 1 
mainly focuses on EU primary law. This section also takes into consideration relevant 
legal innovations in secondary law for inter-policy coherence, like the Instrument 
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contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). It also considers the case law of the CJEU 
over the choice of the legal basis in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. Since the 
thesis is interested in vertical inter-policy coherence, it also analyses the parallel 
coexistence of EU and Member State development policies. This explains why section 5 
focuses on joint programming in EU development policy as an example of a concrete 
exercise aimed at ensuring complementarity between the development policies of the 
Union and those of its Member States. The last section of chapter 2 is somehow a bridge 
between the rather theoretical approach of chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis, and the more 
empirical character of chapter 3. Although still at a theoretical level (i.e. the analysis does 
not focus on any particular country or region), the examination of joint programming 
offers concrete examples of important arguments put forward, at a rather abstract level, 
in chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis. 
2 The security-development nexus as a global policy approach  
The security-development nexus is, today, a widely accepted approach to two 
fundamental challenges in many countries of the world: the need to tackle security 
concerns and to promote long-term development. States and international organisations 
alike have adopted the view that these two challenges are interdependent, and they 
repeatedly emphasise the importance of designing common strategies covering both. By 
way of example, the 5th principle of the OECD Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) emphasises the need to recognise the 
links between political, security and development objectives. The Resolution of the UN 
General Assembly establishing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2015) 
includes as one of its goals ‗peace, justice and strong institutions‘.172 It is assumed that 
measures promoting development have spill over effects over security objectives and vice 
versa, which justifies the need for integrated approaches. 
 Although often referred to as self-evident, this view is the result of a specific 
international context. After the Cold War, the notions of development and security were 
both broadened. As explained by Christian Buger and Pascal Vennesson, development 
was widened to include – together with economic issues – institutional change, as a result 
                                                 
172  UNGA Resolution: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(A/RES/70/1) and OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations 
(2007), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/38368714.pdf 
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of the limited success of previous development policies. Similarly, beside the threat of 
war between nations, the idea of security incorporated the need to ensure a certain degree 
of economic and political stability. 173  This change in perception put the focus on 
developing countries as, in the last decades, stability concerns (e.g. internal conflict or 
civil war) have been more pronounced in these countries. In fact, the broadening of the 
notions of security and development shows a fundamental shift in the understanding of 
the root causes of security and development shortcomings. These challenges start being 
conceived as partly a result of the inability or unwillingness of States to serve their 
citizens, which is referred to as weak governance in the less severe cases and State 
fragility in the most complex ones. For example, David Cammack et al refer to fragile 
states as lacking:174 
‗Capacity or will to perform certain functions that contribute to the security and well-being 
of a country‘s citizens.‘ 
The European Commission claims that ‗governance concerns the state‘s ability to serve 
its citizens‘, and it considers that state fragility refers to:175 
‗Weak or failing structures and to situations where the social contract is broken due to the 
State‘s incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and 
responsibilities.‘ 
The security-development nexus is, therefore, linked to the perception that the reasons 
that ultimately explain security and development shortcomings are connected.  
 In fact, we must distinguish between a formal or limited approach to the security-
development nexus, and a practical or far-reaching approach. The limited approach 
simply refers to what is considered a descriptive analysis of reality, i.e. the vicious cycle 
                                                 
173 C. BUGER and P. VENESSON, ‗Security, Development and the EU‘s Development Policy‘, EUI, 
2009, page 8. As for the redefinition of the notions of development and security after the Cold War see 
also: D. CHANDLER, ‗The security-development nexus and the rise of ‗anti-foreign policy‘, Journal of 
International Relations and Development, 10, 2007, page 367; and A. HURWITZ and G. PEAKE 
(rapporteurs), ‗Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice 
Since the 1990s‘, International Peace Academy, 2004, pages 1-2     
174 D. CAMMACK, K. CHRISTIANSEN, D. LEOD and A. ROCHA MENOCAL, ‗Donors and the 
fragile state agenda: a survey of current thinking and practice‘, Report submitted to the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2006, pages 16-18    
175 Communication: Governance and Development (COM(2003) 615), page 3 and Communication: 
Towards an EU response to situations of fragility (COM(2007) 643), page 5. The Commission has also 
referred to governance as concerned with: ‗the rules, processes and behaviour by which interests are 
articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society.‘ Communication: Governance in the 
European Consensus on Development (COM(2006) 421), page 3   
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between poverty and conflict. The idea is very simple: conflict leads to poverty, and vice 
versa. Instead, the far-reaching or practical approach addresses the question as to how the 
vicious cycle can be broken. It concludes that the only possible way of breaking the cycle 
is to tackle governance shortcomings, which are at the root of both security and 
development challenges. The practical approach to the security-development nexus has 
two fundamental consequences. First, it leads to a situation where governance support is 
a central part of security and development policies alike. This means that the dividing 
line between these two policies is no longer clear. Second, even in areas where security 
and development policies keep their fields of action separate (e.g. education is clearly a 
development policy), the security-development nexus stresses the need to ensure 
complementarity between development and security policies. This is so because the 
activities that tackle security challenges contribute to development objectives, and vice 
versa. The far-reaching approach to the security-development nexus justifies why 
common strategies guiding security and development policies are considered crucial. 
This is so whenever the main focus is on governance support (e.g. strategies on 
statebuilding and peacebuilding), but also when it is not (e.g. strategies on crisis 
management and conflict prevention). 
As shown in these examples, many notions concerning the different ways in which 
external actors engage in situations of fragility are linked to the idea of the security-
development nexus. Statebuilding, peacebuilding, crisis management and conflict 
prevention are frameworks grouping certain problems affecting the most vulnerable 
States in the world. Often these notions imply a certain idea of chronological order. For 
instance, while conflict prevention mainly addresses situations where conflict has not yet 
emerged, statebuilding generally tackles the problems resulting from conflict. What these 
notions undoubtedly share is the assumption that no conflict prevention, crisis 
management, statebuilding or peacebuilding strategy will succeed if it does not consider 
the role of security and development policies in each of these particular situations. This is 
why these notions are often in the title of strategies designed to inform the 
implementation of security and development policies. They can be considered 
expressions of the security-development nexus approach.  
The idea of a nexus between the notions of security and development is subject to 
fundamental critiques. For example, it is argued that there is not enough evidence to 
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claim that there is a casual link between poverty and conflict (and vice versa).176 We shall 
recall that the limited approach to the security-development nexus is generally used as a 
description of reality. Moreover, the nexus is often perceived as an excuse to tackle the 
security concerns of Western States. That the nexus developed at the end of the Cold 
War, when Western States stopped being concerned about the threat of war between 
nations, supports this critique. If the security-development nexus describes a reality, this 
reality predates the fall of the Berlin Wall. This position has obviously been intensified 
since the September 11 attacks and the Global War on Terror.177 By addressing poverty 
and conflict wherever they occur, Western States tackle the threat of global terrorism. For 
example, they minimise the risk of terrorists taking control over certain territories, where 
they can get organised and commit attacks, both in the territories that they control and 
abroad. The presence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq is a clear example of why Western States 
may be interested in tackling security and development concerns outside their borders. 
That the security-development nexus is an excuse to protect Western interests abroad 
corresponds to one of the two ways in which the security-development nexus is criticised 
as a ‗securitisation of development‘. It is argued that Western States provide development 
aid to ensure their own security at home. Probably alluding to this idea, Mark Duffield 
has claimed that the nexus constitutes a ‗reproblematisation of underdevelopment as 
dangerous‘.178 However, we must not forget that the provision of development assistance 
has always been instrumentalised for the strategic objectives of actors providing it, be it 
security objectives or objectives of a different nature. For instance, through political 
conditionality, States use development aid to pressure governments receiving it to 
comply with the rule of law, promote democracy and respect human rights. Likewise, 
States use development aid as part of geopolitical strategies.179 By way of example, the 
considerable external support given to development in Ethiopia, which justifies its 
consideration as an ‗aid darling‘, partly results from the fact that external actors perceive 
Ethiopia as the only stable State in the Horn of Africa. From this perspective, the 
                                                 
176 See, for instance: D. CHANDLER, op. cit. 173, pages 365-366  
177 See, for all: J. BOONSTRA and N. SHAPOVALOVA, ‗Thinking security, doing development? 
The security-development nexus in European policies towards Tajikistan‘, EUCAM, 12, 2012, page 7. As 
for the same critique in the particular context of the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks see: W. HOUT,  
‗Between Development and Security: the European Union, governance and fragile states‘, in W. HOUT 
(ed.), EU Strategies on Governance Reform: Between Development and State-building, Routledge, London, 201, 
page 141 
178 M. DUFFIELD, Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security, Zed 
Books, 2001, page 28 
179 See, for all: D. CHANDLER, op. cit. 173, page 365 
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securitisation of development is nothing new. That being said, the narrative of the 
security-development nexus is generally presented as focusing on the security and 
development challenges of the developing country concerned alone. This is why, if the 
nexus is used as an excuse to legitimise external involvement in developing States to 
actually tackle the security concerns of external powers, it constitutes an especially 
hypocritical expression of the securitisation of development. Besides, the security-
development nexus brings about a shift in the understanding of the responsibility for 
poverty and conflict in developing countries. Global inequalities and the effects of 
colonisation are no longer at the root of these problems. Instead, poverty and conflict in 
developing countries are perceived as the result of internal deficiencies. For instance, 
Mark Duffield argues that this shows a ‗reworking of imperialism‘, since it legitimates 
outside involvement.180 In particular, it legitimises the intervention of external powers in 
developing countries and the provision of advice to their governments. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of the nexus in the resolution of development and security concerns is 
debated. Some authors point out that integrated strategies may not be the most effective 
way to address development and security shortcomings. The most important concern is 
that these approaches tend to rely on generalisations and often overlook the specific 
problems in the context where concrete measures are implemented. It is also argued that 
integrated strategies underestimate how development and security, as distinct policies, 
differ in their ultimate objectives, as well as in their time frames for action and working 
processes. 181  Criticism of the security-development nexus as the ‗securitisation of 
development‘ often highlights that the nexus subverts the specific nature of development 
objectives. 
3 The security-development nexus in the EU agenda 
The EU is no exception in adopting the security-development nexus. The formal or 
limited approach to the nexus is often mentioned in policy documents. Likewise, as an 
expression of the far-reaching approach to the security-development nexus, support of the 
governance sector is essential in the agendas of the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy. Furthermore, the proliferation of strategic documents designed to 
                                                 
180 M. DUFFIELD, op. cit. 178, pages 28, 32 and 42 
181 In this direction see: C. BUGER and P. VENNESSON, op. cit. 173, page 5 and W. HOUT, op. cit. 
177, page 152 
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guide the implementation of CFSP and development cooperation measures is also linked 
to the far-reaching approach to the nexus.  
3.1 Incorporation as a policy approach 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, explicit references to the security-development nexus 
have been constant in strategic instruments regarding the development cooperation 
policy and/or the CFSP. The European Security Strategy (2003) stated that ‗security is a 
precondition for development‘, and also claimed that ‗a number of countries are caught 
in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty‘. 182  The European Consensus on 
Development (2006) established:183 
‗Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and 
without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur‘.  
This definition of the nexus in the European Consensus on Development (2006) has 
become commonplace in policy documents. 184  From the Council Conclusions on 
Security and Development (2007) onwards, the EU refers literally to the security-
development nexus185 and even devotes particular sections of policy documents to the 
idea of the nexus.186   
 Not surprisingly, alongside the first explicit references to the security-development 
nexus, the Union also started focusing on (good) governance as being fundamental to 
security and development challenges. In its Communication on Governance and 
Development (2003), the Commission claimed:187 
‗The structures and the quality of governance are critical determinants of social cohesion or 
social conflict, the success or failure of economic development, the preservation or 
deterioration of the natural environment as well as the respect or violation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.‘  
                                                 
182 European Security Strategy (15895/03), page 2 
183 European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), page 7 
184 See, for all, the Council Conclusions: Security and Development (15097/07), page 2 and the 
Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (17104/08), page 8  
185 Council Conclusions: Security and Development (15097/07), page 3 
186 See, for instance, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (17104/08), 
page 1 and the Communication: An Agenda for Change (COM(2011) 637), page 6 
187 COM(2003) 615, page 3. Similar examples can be found in the Communication: Governance in the 
European Consensus on Development (COM(2006) 421) and in the 6th recital of the preamble of the 
Development Cooperation Instrument. Regulation (EC) no 1905/2006 establishing a financing Instrument 
for Development Cooperation 
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Likewise, under the heading ‗State Failure‘, the European Security Strategy (2003) 
established:188 
‗Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – 
and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the 
collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the 
best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, 
such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that 
undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability. 
Alongside the increased focus on governance issues to explain security and development 
shortcomings, the notion of governance itself broadened. In 2003, the Commission 
recognised that the approach of Member States and other third States providing 
development aid to governance was:189 
‗Shifting from an initial focus limited on economic processes and administrative efficiency 
towards greater concern for issues of democracy, justice and participation‘. 
The way in which the EU defines governance in strategic documents in the field of 
external relations is far from being systematic. However, we can find, what can be 
considered a comprehensive notion of (good) governance, often called democratic 
governance:190  
‗As the concepts of human rights, democratisation and democracy, the rule of law, civil 
society, (…), and sound public administration gain importance and relevance as a society 
develops into a more sophisticated political system, governance evolves into good 
governance.‘ 
In other instances, the Union refers to a fairly thin idea of governance, together with 
other elements (e.g. democracy, rule of law) that are part of the comprehensive notion of 
governance. For instance, the European Consensus on Development (2006) claims:191   
                                                 
188 European Security Strategy (15895/03), page 6 
189 Communication: Governance and Development (COM(2003) 615), page 18 
190  Communication: Governance and Development (COM(2003) 615), page 4. In the 
Communication: Governance in the European Consensus on Development (COM(2006) 421), the 
Commission referred to ‗democratic governance‘, page 6 
191 European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), page 8. Find more examples of the non-
comprehensive approach to governance in the European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), 
page 15, the Communication: Towards an EU response to situations of fragility (COM(2007) 643), page 9 
and the Council Conclusions: Security and Development (15097/07), page 8 
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‗The Community development policy will have as its primary objective the eradication of 
poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the MDGs, as well as 
the promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights‘.  
The thin idea of governance emphasises that certain elements of the comprehensive 
notion of governance are, in themselves, founding principles of the Union and an 
essential part of its external objectives. 192  According to Laurent Pech, through 
governance reform, the EU aims at promoting democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights as three ‗intertwined and mutually reinforcing principles‘.193 The extent to which 
governance reform has been prioritised in the development cooperation policy194 has led 
the Commission to claim:195 
‗While governance and capacity building should indeed be high on the development 
cooperation agenda, poverty reduction and the other MDGs remain the overriding objectives 
of EU development policy, as laid down in the European Consensus on Development. Good 
governance, though a complementary objective, is basically a means towards the ends 
represented by these priority objectives.‘ 
Mostly recently, the HRVP and the Commission have claimed:196 
‗Insecurity and instability are frequently generated or exacerbated by a lack of effective and 
accountable security systems. Helping partner countries to reform their security systems 
supports the EU‘s objectives of peace and stability, inclusive and sustainable development, 
state-building and democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of 
international law.‘ 
The governance agenda can be considered one of the consequences of the far-reaching 
approach to the security-development nexus. Another such consequence is the 
development of strategic policy documents that, by virtue of their thematic or geographic 
                                                 
192 Article 21(1) and (2)(b) TEU. This provision also refers to ‗good global governance‘ as an external 
objective of the EU. However, this objective refers to the ‗international system‘, not so to good governance 
in specific third States (Article 21 (2)(h) TEU)    
193 L. PECH, ‗Rule of law as a guiding principle of the European Union‘s external action‘, CLEER, 
Working Papers 2012/3, page 3 
194 Governance was already identified as a priority area of the development cooperation policy in the 
Communication: The European Community‘s Development Policy (COM(2000) 212) 
195 Communication: Governance in the European Consensus on Development (COM(2006) 421), 
page 20. See also the European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), page 2. We must not forget 
that Article 208(1) TFEU establishes that the development cooperation policy ‗shall have as its primary 
objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.‘ 
196 Joint Communication (JOIN(2016) 31), page 2 
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scope, cover policies and activities implemented under the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy. The EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
(2013) and the EU Sahel Strategy Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 (2015) are two 
obvious examples in this regard.197 I analyse the role of strategic documents covering 
CFSP and development cooperation measures in section 4 in this chapter.  
3.2 Critiques and the approach of the thesis 
The security-development nexus in the EU external action can be questioned from at 
least three different perspectives. Firstly, the answer to the question regarding ‗whose 
security‘ the Union is protecting with the security-development nexus approach is 
unclear. Is the Union securitising its development cooperation policy to protect its internal 
security? There are remarkable examples in strategic documents stressing the idea that, in 
its involvement in the developing world, the EU is very much worried about its own 
security. For instance, the European Security Strategy (2003) recognised ‗State Failure‘ 
as a ‗Key Threat‘ to the security of the Union and it also claimed:198  
‗The best protection of our own security is a world of well-governed democratic states.‘ 
The European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism of 25 March 2004, which 
was adopted following the Madrid train bombings (2004), called for counter-terrorist 
objectives to be integrated into external assistance programmes, while emphasising ‗the 
threat posed by terrorism to our society‘. 199  Moreover, according to The EU‘s 
comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (2013), conflict prevention:200  
‗Helps protect EU interests and prevent adverse consequences on EU security and 
prosperity.‘  
Secondly, there are reasons to argue that the nexus is leading to a situation where EU 
actors perceive the CFSP and the development cooperation policy as interchangeable 
tools. If one defends the idea that security and development policies have distinct 
natures, with their own modus operandi and objectives, this is obviously problematic. In an 
interview with a DEVCO official in April 2014, he explained that Member States were 
interested in closing the two CSDP missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (i.e. 
                                                 
197 Joint Communication (JOIN(2013) 30) and Council Conclusions (7823/15), respectively 
198 European Security Strategy (15895/03), pages 6 and 12  
199 Brussels European Council 25 and 26 March 2004: Presidency Conclusions (9048/04) 
200 Joint Communication (JOIN(2013) 30), page 6 
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EUPOL and EUSEC Congo).201 In response, the Government of Congo expressed its 
concern about the possibility of no longer receiving the support provided by these two 
missions. In light of this situation, he claimed, the Member States and the EEAS were 
trying to convince the Commission to replace these two missions with equivalent 
development cooperation funding. This seems to indicate that the Member States and the 
EEAS think of the CFSP and the development cooperation policy as interchangeable EU 
tools to tackle certain external objectives. 202  Thirdly, we may argue that the Union 
exploits the existence of interconnected challenges on the ground in order to legitimise its 
role as an international actor. In fact, the security-development nexus allows the Union 
to appear as a particularly well-equipped actor to respond to the idea of the nexus. The 
nexus allows the Union to present the wide array of tools at its disposal to address 
security and development challenges.203  
 While the thesis does not aim to make a contribution in the fields of political science 
and international relations, it is useful to explain the position it takes to the security-
development nexus. The idea of the nexus as a self-evident truth (i.e. the vicious cycle) 
constitutes an over-simplification of reality. Underdevelopment is not necessarily 
dangerous.204 Moreover, it can hardly be denied that, in its engagement in developing 
countries, the Union is concerned with protecting its own security. It is also true that the 
idea of the nexus suggests that conflict and poverty in developing countries are the 
responsibility of these countries alone. The nexus legitimises outside involvement, not 
because Western States feel a certain responsibility for the effects of colonisation and 
global inequalities, but because Western States (as ‗well governed States‘) feel entitled to 
tell the governments of developing countries what to do. Furthermore, there are 
arguments to defend that the nature of the CFSP and the development cooperation policy 
are, indeed, different and that the idea of the nexus creates a risk for the specific character 
of these policy areas. I also believe that the Union is exploiting the idea of the security-
development nexus to present what it considers its quantitative added value as a global 
actor (i.e. its wide toolbox to tackle international matters).  
                                                 
201  Interview with a DEVCO official, 1.4.2014. These two CSDP missions were ‗completed‘ in 
January 2015 
202 See section 4 of this chapter, pages 85-98 
203 N. BAGOYOKO and M. V. GIBERT, op. cit. 166. See also sections 3 and 7 of chapter 1, pages 13-
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204 I respond here to the idea that the security-development nexus brings about ‗a reproblematisation 
of underdevelopment as dangerous‘, see M. DUFFIELD, op. cit. 178, page 28 
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 Despite all of these caveats, there are reasons to argue that the security-development 
approach is defendable in relation to certain problems affecting developing countries. 
First, although the idea of a vicious cycle is simplistic, there are plenty of concrete 
examples supporting the idea that conflict contributes to poverty and that extreme 
poverty is not conducive to peace. By way of example, extreme poverty can easily lead to 
conflict over the distribution of very scarce natural resources, and conflict will not 
encourage international investment, making it especially difficult to find the way out of 
poverty. If security and development challenges are intertwined, it is justifiable to address 
them in an integrated manner to ensure that CFSP and development cooperation 
measures reinforce each other. Second, it is undeniable that the EU is concerned with its 
own security when it refers to the security-development nexus. However, it is also true 
that, whenever policy documents become less general and instead focus on specific 
regions and countries, references to security and development concerns in developing 
countries become context-specific. For example, in the Conclusions on a Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa (2011), the Council claimed:205  
‗Persistent poverty, often the result of conflict, destroys the stability on which economic 
growth and investment depend, has denied many of the people of the region the hope of the 
better future that they deserve.‘ 
Even when strategic documents are not confined to particular countries or regions, policy 
documents also include references to notions where the idea of the security-development 
nexus is presented as primarily focusing on the challenges faced in third States. This is 
the case for references to human security, energy security and food security in developing 
countries. For instance, the ‗Report on the European Security Strategy‘ (2008) stated:206 
‗We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting 
good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of 
conflict and insecurity‘. 
Furthermore, Article 21 TEU, which enshrines the EU‘s single set of external objectives, 
explicitly establishes that one of the objectives of the external action is to safeguard the 
security of the EU.207 In the context of the CFSP, the treaties explicitly refer to the duality 
                                                 
205 Council Conclusions: Horn of Africa (16858/11), page 7  
206 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (17104/08), page 3 
207 Article 21(2)(a) TEU 
 69 
between the promotion of international security and that of the Union‘s own security. 
While the TEU refers to the security of the EU as an integral part of the CFSP, it also 
establishes that the Union may use CSDP civilian and military missions to strengthen 
international security.208 As long as the security-development nexus is not based on the 
EU‘s security alone, that the Union also protects its own security with this policy 
approach is consistent with the treaties. Finally, the Union has been criticised for 
exploiting the existence of an international consensus around the security-development 
nexus to legitimise its role as an international actor. As long as this is not the only reason 
behind the adoption of the approach, this criticism does not seem enough of an argument 
to reject the idea of a nexus between the notions of security and development.  
4 The legal dimension of coherence in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus 
According to the Council, the security-development nexus:209 
‗Should inform EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU 
external action, whilst recognising that the responsibilities and roles of development and 
security actors are complementary but remain specific.‘  
This statement establishes a direct link between the security-development nexus and the 
quest for coherence in the external action of the Union. The Preamble of the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) explicitly refers to this statement of the 
Council. Moreover, Article 1(1), on the subject matter and objectives of the IcSP, 
states:210  
‗This Regulation establishes an instrument (the ‗Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace‘) which provides, for the period from 2014 to 2020, direct support for the Union's 
external policies by increasing the efficiency and coherence of the Union's actions in the areas of 
crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness, and in addressing 
global and trans-regional threats.‘  
In fact, the link between the security-development nexus and the obsession with 
coherence in EU external relations provides yet another argument against the 
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incorporation of the nexus in the EU agenda. Adding to the criticism presented in section 
3, one may also claim that the Union is instrumentalising the idea of a nexus between the 
notions of security and development to defend steps towards horizontal inter-policy 
coherence (i.e. CFSP-development cooperation).211 Because of the non-affectation clause 
between CFSP and non-CFSP policy areas, 212  ensuring complementarity between 
policies and activities implemented under the CFSP and development cooperation is 
especially challenging. This is why the existence of an international consensus around the 
security-development nexus helps the Union to justify efforts towards complementarity 
between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy. Determining the relative 
weight of the security-development nexus, on the one hand, and the quest for coherence, 
on the other hand, in the adoption of an instrument like the IcSP is outside the scope of 
the thesis. What is relevant is that the Union has incorporated the nexus as a policy 
approach, that it connects it to its quest for coherence, and that together these two 
concerns justify legal developments. This is why the security-development nexus is a 
paradigmatic case to use in analysing horizontal inter-policy coherence in the Union‘s 
foreign policy. 
 In this section, I examine four mechanisms in EU external relations law to secure 
inter-policy coherence in the context of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. These 
mechanisms are introduced at a general level (i.e. without focusing on particular policy 
areas or instruments) in chapter 1 of the thesis.213 First, the treaties provide common 
objectives for all policies and activities forming part of the EU‘s external action. Second, 
the treaties indicate that common approaches (i.e. strategic policy documents) covering 
policies and activities implemented under different policy areas and instruments will be 
drawn up. Third, the framework of the treaties (complemented by the case law of the 
CJEU) establishes legal delimitation rules, which determine the scope of EU policy areas 
and instruments. Legal delimitation rules also establish the role of each EU actor in 
procedures that are especially important in the external action, like the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements. Fourth, the treaties foresee how inter-policy 
coordination (e.g. CFSP-common commercial policy) ought to happen.  
                                                 
211 Note the parallelism between the instrumentalisation of the security-development nexus for the 
purposes of advancing coherence, and the instrumentalisation of the idea of the ‗EU‘s comprehensive 
approach‘, which is also designed to promote coherence in EU external relations. As regards the latter, see 
section 7 of chapter 1, pages 49-53  
212 Article 40 TEU 
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 Following from these four mechanisms, the current section proposes four theoretical 
claims that can be inferred from EU primary law. In fact, these claims are based on 
certain expressions used in the treaties and case law of the Court, but they do not 
reproduce these expressions literally. For example, under inter-policy coordination I 
present the claim ‗the Council and the Commission shall ensure consistency between the 
different areas of its external action and shall cooperate to that effect‘, which recalls the 
terminology used in Article 21(3) TEU. The four claims I propose are not exhaustive, 
which means that other questions could have been considered. However, the four 
theoretical claims are especially representative of the function the mechanisms in the 
treaties to secure coherence in the external action are supposed to fulfil. The analysis 
focuses only on the CFSP and the development cooperation policy, but the claims are 
presented at a general level to emphasise that they are extensible to other policies and 
activities coexisting in parallel in the external action. The idea of organising the analysis 
around four theoretical claims aims to stress how the case study of chapter 3 tests, in light 
of practice, the legal framework presented in this section. Furthermore, the difference 
between single event coherence and continued coherence is relevant to the examination 
conducted in this section. The main focus is on single event coherence, that is: coherence 
between policies and activities analysed at a certain point in time. However, the analysis 
will also include references to continued coherence, i.e. coherence between policies and 
activities analysed in a long-term perspective.  
 Before addressing the four mechanisms in the context of the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus, it is necessary to define the exact scope of the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus as the thematic case of this thesis to study horizontal (and vertical) 
inter-policy coherence in EU external action. Determining the scope of the nexus is 
relevant for understanding the analysis conducted in the current section. Likewise, this 
definition is crucial for reading the case study in chapter 3, as the latter responds to the 
four theoretical claims of the current section with four empirical claims.   
4.1 Scope of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus as the thematic case of this 
thesis 
By examining the CFSP-development cooperation nexus the thesis studies the horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of the quest for coherence in the EU external action. When 
examining the CFSP and the development cooperation policy, I am also interested in 
understanding inter-policy coherence between the CFSP and the development 
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cooperation policy, on the one hand, and the competences of Member States in the same 
areas, on the other hand.214 In what follows, I present the main features of the CFSP and 
the development cooperation policy as separate policy areas, in order to justify using the 
specific scope of the nexus as the thematic case of this thesis. I reflect on the similarities 
and differences between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy insofar as 
these are relevant to how the mechanisms for coherence operate in each. For example, a 
great deal of the policies and activities implemented under the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy are defined in legal measures. This means that 
mechanisms for coherence, such as legal delimitation, constrain political action in a very 
similar manner in both policy areas. However, I do not undertake a comprehensive study 
of the treaty definition of the CFSP and the development cooperation policy as EU 
policy areas (and competences). Nor do I provide an extensive analysis of the 
institutional landscape of EU external action. 
 The CFSP is a sui generis policy area of the Union. It is subject to specific rules and 
procedures, including the unanimity of votes of the European Council and the Council as 
a general rule, the exclusion of legislative acts, and the limited jurisdiction of the 
CJEU.215 The procedures of the CFSP (and the powers of the institutions within these 
procedures) are to be kept separate from those of other EU policy areas.216 However, the 
specific character of the CFSP substantially changed after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. In the context of the pillar structure, the CFSP was part of the EU legal 
order. It coexisted with the EC, as the legal order integrating most external policy areas 
(e.g. the development cooperation policy). With the abolition of the pillar structure, 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty reforms, all external policy areas (including the 
CFSP) are now part of the EU, as a single legal order.217 This is important from the 
perspective of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice within the CFSP. Given that 
principles of EU law apply to the entirety of EU action, the restricted jurisdiction of the 
Court in CFSP matters excludes adjudication on these principles.218 
                                                 
214 Understandably, studies on the legal dimension of the security-development nexus focus on the 
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 The most important treaty provision regarding the substantive scope of the CFSP is 
Article 24(1) TEU: 
‗The Union‘s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all 
areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.‘ 
Moreover, the treaties refer to certain CFSP instruments, like the appointment of EU 
special representatives and the deployment of CSDP military and civilian missions.219  
 The European Council and the Council, the EU institutions that represent the 
Member States of the Union, are in charge of the development of the CFSP.220 The 
HRVP conducts the CFSP, for instance by chairing the Foreign Affairs Council,221 which 
is the configuration of the Council concerned with the CFSP. Moreover, the HRVP 
(assisted by the EEAS) presents proposals to the Council on CFSP matters, including 
recommendations regarding international agreements.222 Together with the President of 
the European Council, the HRVP represents the Union in CFSP matters.223 Institutional 
structures that are important in the definition and implementation of the CFSP (e.g. the 
EU Intelligence and Situation Centre) are under the EEAS, and thus under the control of 
the HRVP.224 The European Parliament is regularly consulted and informed about the 
CFSP and can address questions and recommendations concerning this policy area.225 
Moreover, the European Parliament plays a role in the negotiation and conclusion of 
CFSP agreements. When international agreements concern exclusively the CFSP, the 
Parliament must be informed at all stages.226 When international agreements concern 
CFSP and non-CFSP matters, the Parliament must, moreover, present its consent in 
certain cases (e.g. association agreements), and be consulted in other instances.227 
 Furthermore, although the CFSP is clearly under the control of Member States, its 
interaction with the foreign policies of Member States can be considered legally 
‗awkward‘. The TFEU defines the CFSP as a Union competence but does not determine 
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which category of competences the CFSP falls within.228 Moreover, the Member States 
attached a Declaration to the Lisbon Treaty stating that the CFSP does not affect their 
responsibilities to conduct their own foreign policies.229 Be it as it may, given the role of 
Member States within the CFSP and the open-ended character of Article 24(1) TEU, it is 
difficult to foresee a scenario where the CJEU would be asked to determine whether a 
CFSP legal act encroaches upon the competences of Member States to develop their own 
foreign policies.   
 Unlike the CFSP, the development cooperation policy is an ordinary policy area of 
the Union. It is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, which means that the 
Parliament and the Council jointly adopt legislative acts that are fundamental for its 
implementation. 230  Moreover, the development cooperation policy is a shared 
competence that is not subject to pre-emption. This means that EU action on 
development cooperation does not prevent Member States from conducting their 
development policies and, thus, exercising their competence in this area.231 Because of 
the open-ended character of development objectives and the non-preemptive nature of 
the development cooperation policy, it is difficult to imagine a case where the Court were 
to decide if the powers of the EU in this field had been misused. On the institutional side, 
the Commission represents the Union on development cooperation matters, and presents 
proposals regarding legislative acts and recommendations on international agreements 
affecting the development cooperation policy.232 The HRVP chairs the Foreign Affairs 
Council, which is the configuration of the Council that is most relevant to the 
development cooperation policy, and it is one of the Vice-Presidents of the 
Commission.233 The Parliament plays an important role (i.e. consultation or consent) in 
the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements concerning the development 
cooperation policy.234 
 Besides, Article 208(1) TFEU refers to the substantive scope of this policy area: 
‗Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction 
and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the 
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objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to 
affect developing countries (…).‘ 
As regards the relations between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy, the 
treaties establish a non-affectation clause.235 The choice of the legal basis (i.e. CFSP or 
development cooperation) protects the procedures to implement CFSP and non-CFSP 
policy areas, and the powers of the institutions within these procedures. The CFSP and 
the development cooperation policy coexist in the Union‘s external action in a truly 
parallel manner. This scenario is fundamentally different from the one in place before the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force. When the EC and the EU constituted separate legal 
orders, the focus was on protecting the scope of Community competences from the 
Union. If a legal act could have been adopted on the basis of EC competences, an EU 
legal basis was not acceptable.236 The abolition of the pillar structure of the Lisbon Treaty 
has eliminated the previous imbalance and led to a situation where the choice of the legal 
basis essentially protects the powers of the institutions, rather than the substantive scope 
of competences.  
 Although seemingly completely different, the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy share important similarities. First, both policy areas coexist with the 
competences of Member States to conduct their own foreign and development policies in 
a parallel manner. The action of the Union does not prevent Member States from 
exercising their competences on foreign and development policy. Second, the treaty 
provisions on the CFSP and those regarding the development cooperation policy refer to 
the commitment of the Union to the UN. CSDP missions and operations are to comply 
with the principles of the UN Charter, and the development cooperation policy ‗shall 
comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives‘ approved in the 
context of the UN.237 This means that both the CFSP and the development cooperation 
policy contribute to objectives determined within other international organisations. Third, 
a single EU institution directs the policies and activities implemented under the CFSP and 
the development cooperation policy: the Council in the CFSP and the Commission in the 
development cooperation policy. As regards the CFSP, this statement is obvious in the 
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treaties. Article 26 TEU states that the European Council is to identify the general 
guidelines and strategic lines of the CFSP. The Council then takes the necessary 
decisions to define and implement the CFSP on the basis of the guidance provided by the 
European Council. Very differently, the treaties establish that the development 
cooperation policy is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, which means that the 
Council and the Parliament are in charge. Indeed, legislative acts define the instruments 
of the development cooperation policy. For example, the EIDHR is the result of a 
Regulation adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, which establishes the 
budget and the scope of the instrument.238 Likewise, the Council and the Parliament play 
an essential role in the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements affecting 
the development cooperation policy. While the Council authorises the opening of 
negotiations and concludes these agreements,239 the Parliament is either consulted or 
must give consent to them. Nevertheless, the Commission makes decisions defining the 
policy priorities of the development cooperation policy in each country where the Union is 
providing development assistance. For instance, should the EU support the governance 
sector in Somalia? If so, should this be done under the EDF or under the IcSP? This 
points to the fourth similarity between the CFSP and the development cooperation 
policy, namely that most decisions on the policies and activities of the Union in CFSP 
and development cooperation are included in legal acts. These legal measures take the 
form of Commission decisions and Commission implementing decisions, in the case of 
the development cooperation policy, and of Council decisions, as regards the CFSP. 
 Lastly, there are two differences between the CFSP and the development cooperation 
policy that are worth mentioning. First, while the development cooperation policy is a 
heavily proceduralised policy area, the CFSP is clearly not. The legal framework for the 
CFSP, including its instruments, is essentially defined in the treaties. In CFSP decision-
making processes, the path between the treaties and the final legal acts where the Union 
defines the main lines of the policy is very short, which makes the CFSP a flexible policy 
area. This situation is substantially different in the case of the development cooperation 
policy, which is an extremely proceduralised policy area, whose instruments are defined 
in secondary law.240 First, the whole repertoire of development cooperation instruments 
are defined in legislative acts, like the Regulation establishing the EIDHR. Second, there 
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is a never-ending list of decisions defining the Union‘s development cooperation policy. 
By way of example, an instrument like the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
has its own programmes, like the pan-African programme and the civil society and 
organisations and local authorities programme. Each of these programmes has its 
strategy paper and its multiannual indicative programme, as well as an annual 
programme, and all of them are adopted under Commission decisions.241 This means that 
a decision to support the education sector of a specific country is not the result of an 
individual act, but of a long decision-making process. 
 The second remarkable difference between the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy is the centre of the decision-making process. In the development 
cooperation policy, crucial decisions regarding the definition and the implementation of 
development programmes are in-country decisions, which means that they are essentially 
taken wherever the aid is provided. The current Union delegations (Commission 
delegations before the Lisbon Treaty) are the focal point in this regard.242 In contrast, 
CFSP decisions are not in-country decisions. Even when the CFSP is implemented on 
the ground, as in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the control of the implementation of 
the CFSP lies elsewhere. For example, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the Union‘s maritime 
operation fighting piracy off the Somali coast, is commanded from Northwood (UK), 
where Atalanta has its operational headquarters. 243 
 The CFSP-development cooperation nexus is ‗a good excuse‘ to examine the 
mechanisms foreseen in EU primary law to ensure inter-policy coherence in the external 
action of the Union. It is an interesting context in which to analyse the four mechanisms 
as regards horizontal inter-policy coherence between the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy. Moreover, it is also a representative case to study the role of two of 
these mechanisms (i.e. the definition of common approaches and inter-policy 
coordination) in advancing coherence between the development policy of the Union and 
the policies of Member States in this area. This constitutes the scope of the CFSP-
development nexus as the thematic case of this thesis.  
 As far as vertical inter-policy coherence is concerned, the common objectives of 
Article 21 TEU should be observed in the development of Member States competences. 
However, this provision mainly refers to the objectives of the Union as an international 
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organisation of conferred powers.244 The choice of the legal basis, which is the crucial 
delimitation rule to decide whether the Union or the Member States are entitled to act 
internationally, is not particularly interesting in the two analysed policy areas. This is so 
because of the truly parallel character of the policies of the Union and those of Member 
States on CFSP and development cooperation. This is why the provision of common 
objectives and the definition of legal delimitation rules play a secondary role in 
advancing vertical inter-policy coherence in these two policy areas. Moreover, in the 
context of the CFSP, inter-policy coordination is not particularly relevant either. 
Common approaches (e.g. Council conclusions) are essential to ensuring vertical inter-
policy coherence over the CFSP. However, the treaties do not refer to common 
approaches within the CFSP as guidelines that shall inform the implementation of the 
CFSP and the foreign policies of Member States as two totally separate areas of action. 
On the contrary, it is assumed that whenever there is a CFSP common approach 
Member States will simply reproduce this approach in their foreign policies. Once a 
common approach exists, the role of actors like the HRVP is to remind Member States of 
the common approach, rather than to ensure coordination between the CFSP and their 
foreign policies.245 This is why the quest for coherence in the CFSP context is, above all, 
a quest towards reaching common approaches, as the expression of Member State 
mutual solidarity and sincere cooperation. The process that precedes the existence of a 
common approach is essentially an institutional matter (e.g. does the HRVP manage to 
convince Member States?). The thesis is interested in common approaches insofar as they 
are an interim step towards ensuring coherence between concrete policies and activities 
implemented under different policy areas, not so the finish line of the quest for 
coherence. This is why coherence within the CFSP (i.e. between EU and Member States 
on CFSP-related topics) is outside the scope of the thesis.246  
 Finally, under the CFSP and the development cooperation policy the Union deploys 
plenty of different instruments. This is an intrinsic part of legal fragmentation in EU 
external relations. These instruments will be an important part of the analysis, especially 
in chapter 3. However, the choice of the CFSP-development nexus as the thematic case 
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of this thesis puts the emphasis on coherence between the policies and activities 
implemented under different policy areas (and competences), instead of on the 
interaction between different instruments.  
4.2 Mechanisms for coherence in EU external relations law: theoretical claims   
Theoretical claim no 1: the principles and objectives set out in Article 21 TEU ensure 
consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action  
The single set of EU external objectives established in Article 21 TEU responds to the 
Union‘s impetus to advance coherence and strengthen its actorness on the international 
stage, through the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Following the abolition of 
the pillar structure, the EU has become a single international actor.247 In line with this 
important change, Article 21 TEU provides the institutions responsible for the 
implementation of EU policy areas with a single chart stating what the Union should aim 
at outside its borders. From this perspective, the different policy areas and instruments 
interacting in the external action are mere tools through which the Union promotes its 
external objectives. Article 21(3) TEU explicitly claims:  
‗The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 
2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external 
action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.‘ 
This statement is immediately followed by: 
‗The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies.‘  
This justifies theoretical claim no 1, which must be read under the provision of common 
objectives as one of the mechanisms foreseen in the treaties to advance coherence in the 
CFSP-development cooperation nexus. 
 Together with the specific policy objectives defined in the provisions regulating the 
CFSP and the development cooperation policy, EU actors must consider the general 
objectives of Article 21 TEU. For example, while the primary objective of the 
development cooperation policy is the eradication of poverty, the implementation of this 
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policy field must also ‗promote an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance‘. 248  Moreover, the requirement to consider 
development objectives in all policies affecting developing countries is important in the 
CFSP-development cooperation nexus. In fact, this requirement is the legal translation of 
the long-standing agenda of the Union on policy coherence for development.249 
 Reflecting on how external objectives were defined before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty provides interesting insight into the security-development nexus in the EU 
agenda, as well as into the purpose that Article 21 TEU serves. Before the Lisbon Treaty, 
CFSP and development cooperation objectives were listed under the treaty provisions 
regulating these policy areas. However, there were certain objectives that these two 
policy areas shared. The treaty articles on the development cooperation policy and those 
regarding the CFSP included:250 
‗The general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and 
to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.‘ 
Although referred to as ‗a general objective‘, the only external policy areas where the 
treaties mentioned these objectives were the CFSP, the development cooperation policy 
and the area of economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries.251 
Treaty provisions regulating other policy areas, like the common commercial policy, did 
not refer to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. That the 
CFSP and the development cooperation policy came together around these objectives 
can be considered an expression of the governance agenda that characterises both. In 
fact, the definition of the elimination of poverty as the main objective of the development 
cooperation policy, which was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, can be read as a 
response to the central (and perhaps too central) character that the governance agenda 
has acquired in the development cooperation policy.252   
 Furthermore, attention to the legal framework that preceded the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty provides arguments to claim that Article 21 TEU is designed to 
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strengthen the international actorness of the Union. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, external 
policy areas of the EC were listed together with its internal policy fields. For example, 
Title XX of the TEC, on development cooperation, followed Titles XVIII and XIX on 
research and technological development and the environment, respectively. This means 
that the difference between the internal and the external dimensions of the European 
project were not clearly defined. Once this distinction became clear, as in the current 
legal framework, Article 21 TEU was introduced to determine what the external 
dimension of the European project is about. In particular, paragraph 1 establishes that 
the external objectives of the Union correspond to the principles upon which the EU is 
founded on and ‗which it seeks to advance in the wider world‘. Moreover, paragraph 3 
establishes that the Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in 
paragraphs 1 and 2. Therefore, there is a clear duality between what the Union shall 
uphold and promote in its external action, and both should mirror what the Union is 
founded on. This is substantially different than the situation that preceded the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. Ex-Article 6 TEU referred to the principles the Union is 
founded on. However, there was no explicit reference to the idea that the EU‘s external 
objectives mirror its founding principles. Neither was there a reference to the need to 
uphold the principles the Union is founded on in the external action. The way in which 
Article 21 TEU is supposed to ensure coherence between policy areas coexisting in the 
Union‘s foreign policy is very much linked to what the EU considers its qualitative added 
value as an international actor. Namely, that it is an international organisation that is 
founded on certain principles, and that it shows its commitment to them by upholding and 
promoting these principles (objectives) in its external action.   
 The single set of external objectives would not be problematic if it were not the case 
that it is settled case law of the Court of Justice that the choice of the legal basis (i.e. 
CFSP or development cooperation?) must be based on the aim and content of the 
measure that is being adopted. There is a clear conflict between two different 
mechanisms foreseen in the treaties to advance horizontal inter-policy coherence. The 
provision of common objectives is clearly in tension with the choice of the legal basis as a 
fundamental part of legal delimitation. The latter is examined under theoretical claim no 
3.    
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Theoretical claim no 2: the Union identifies its strategic interests and objectives 
relating to the CFSP and to other areas of the external action of the Union 
Immediately after providing all EU actors with a single set of objectives, the treaties 
establish that common approaches covering CFSP and non-CFSP matters shall be 
elaborated. Article 22(1) TEU reads as follows: 
‗On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 21, the European Council 
shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. Decisions of the European 
Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common 
foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such 
decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be 
thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available 
by the Union and the Member States. (…)‘ 
Because of the level of abstraction of the single set of objectives, even if observed with the 
best intentions, the objectives of Article 21 TEU cannot prevent the existence of 
inconsistencies between policies and activities concerning a specific country or topic. By 
defining common approaches, the European Council can mitigate this problem. Article 
22 TEU justifies theoretical claim no 2, which falls under the definition of common 
approaches as a second mechanism for inter-policy coherence foreseen in the treaties.  
 Common approaches covering CFSP and development cooperation matters are 
commonplace. However, instead of in decisions of the European Council, these 
approaches are generally included in joint communications of the HRVP and the 
Commission, and in Council conclusions. This is not against the spirit of Article 22 TEU, 
as paragraph 2 of this provision establishes that the HRVP (for the CFSP) and the 
Commission (for other areas of external action) may submit joint proposals to the 
Council. For example, the EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
(2013) was reflected in a joint communication from the HRVP and the Commission, and 
later confirmed in conclusions of the Council.253 Another example can be found in the 
Council Conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 (2015), which refer to 
the Joint Communication of the HRVP and the Commission on ‗Supporting closer 
cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb/Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia‘.254 The most recent expressions of horizontal common approaches 
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to the security-development nexus are the Joint communications of the HRVP and the 
Commission on Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (April 2015) 
and Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform (July 
2016).255 
 Since common approaches are defined in documents that are devoid of legal effects, 
their real impact on inter-policy coherence is often questioned. The fact that these 
documents are essential in the case law of the Court of Justice and in the preambles of 
secondary law measures supports that they indeed play an important role in the Union‘s 
quest for coherence. The European Consensus on Development (2006) is central to the 
Court‘s definition of the scope of the development cooperation policy.256 Likewise, the 
CJEU alluded to the European Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism (2004) to 
decide that the Instrument for Stability could contribute to the fight against terrorism.257 
The Preamble of the IcSP explicitly refers to the Council Conclusions on Security and 
Development (2007) to justify why the new instrument is needed.258 We should also bear 
in mind that the title of a policy document is not conclusive of its scope. The recent 
Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016), which has 
the signature of the HRVP, includes many references to the development cooperation 
policy.259 
 From the perspective of vertical inter-policy coherence in development cooperation 
(i.e. EU-Member States), EU common approaches concerning development objectives 
should inform the policies of Member States. For example, this is the case of the Council 
Conclusions on the EU‘s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises 
(2014).260 The policy coherence for development agenda, which is always included in 
development cooperation strategic documents, is not only a commitment of the EU but 
also of the Member States. The Council Conclusions: Increasing the Impact of EU 
Development Policy: an Agenda for Change (2012) claimed:261  
‗In the light of these challenges and new realities, the Council welcomes the Commission 
Communication on ―Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for 
Change‖ which builds on the European Consensus on Development, and on the EU 
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commitments to eradicate poverty and to aid volumes, aid and development effectiveness 
and Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).‘ 
Common approaches that are relevant to ensuring vertical inter-policy coherence in 
development cooperation are not always defined within the EU. The EU and most of its 
Member States are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
OECD.262 The DAC is an international forum bringing together many of the largest aid 
providers. The US, Norway and Japan are also DAC members. The IMF, UNDP and 
the World Bank participate as observers. Being part of the DAC has far-reaching 
consequences regarding the implementation of development policies. For instance, in the 
implementation of their development cooperation policies, DAC members shall respect 
DAC recommendations and follow DAC guidelines. Moreover, DAC members commit 
to reaching a certain threshold of Official Development Assistance (ODA). To qualify as 
ODA, development aid must fulfil certain criteria, like having economic development 
and welfare as its main objective, and being directed to certain countries (ODA 
recipients). Furthermore, DAC members are subject to peer-review of their development 
policies, and they participate in OECD DAC high-level meetings. DAC members 
commit to principles agreed in these high-level meetings, like the principles for good 
international engagement in fragile States and situations. 263  Furthermore, the OECD 
leads the international agenda on aid effectiveness (currently named Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation), which means that it organises high-level 
meetings on aid effectiveness, where commitments and principles are set out. For 
example, the Paris High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2005) gave place to the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This Declaration establishes principles that are very 
important in the implementation of EU and Member State development cooperation 
policies. Two examples are the principles of ownership and alignment, which establish 
that developing countries shall set their own strategies, and that donor countries must 
align with these strategies. The Busan Partnership Agreement, which resulted from the 
Fourth High Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in 2011, sets out the 
latest commitments within the aid effectiveness agenda. Lastly, on 25 September 2015 
the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution establishing the 2030 Agenda or 
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Development. This Agenda replaces the MGD and sets 17 goals, including ‗no poverty‘ 
and ‗peace, justice and strong institutions‘.264 
 The fact that vertical inter-policy coherence does not only take place within the 
Union is not surprising. Articles 208(2) and 211 TFEU read as follows:265 
‗The Union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of 
the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent 
international organisations.‘ 
‗Within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member States shall 
cooperate with third countries and with the competent international organisations.‘ 
Finally, joint programming in development cooperation, which is analysed in section 5 
of this chapter, falls partly under the definition of common approaches and partly under 
inter-policy coordination. Joint programming refers to the process through which the 
Union and its Member States coordinate their development programmes towards a 
specific third State. It falls under two different mechanisms for coherence because it 
consists of three different stages. While the first stage defines a common approach, stages 
two and three are better placed under inter-policy coordination. In stage one, the EU and 
the Member States agree upon a joint strategy towards the development challenges faced 
in a particular country. Stages two and three are considered under theoretical claim no 
4b. There is a second argument for considering joint programming under the definition of 
common approaches. Joint programming is a commitment of the Union within the 
OECD-led aid effectiveness agenda, and it is strongly underpinned by principles 
developed in this context, like the principles of ownership and alignment.  
Theoretical claim no 3: the aim and content of a European act determines its legal 
basis 
When the EU decides to act in the external domain, rules to decide on the appropriate 
legal basis (i.e. CFSP or development cooperation?) are important to ensuring an 
adequate division of tasks (‗who does what?‘). This minimises the risk of overlapping 
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policies and activities between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy. The 
absence of a clear idea of what should be tackled under each policy area can lead to 
overlaps, as it can result in the EU responding with CFSP and development cooperation 
measures to the exact same matter and for the exact same purpose. Besides the obvious 
problem of efficiency that overlapping activities cause, whenever CFSP and development 
cooperation measures overlap the risk of substantive contradictions in the action of the 
Union increases exponentially. This is so, because the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy are implemented under different procedures. For example, either the 
Council (CFSP) or the Commission (development cooperation policy) will generally play 
a central role in these procedures. Moreover, from the viewpoint of continued coherence, 
choosing the appropriate tool is important in preventing the EU from appearing as an 
arbitrary actor. By way of example, the Union may operate today under the CFSP, when 
it should do so under the development cooperation policy. If this is the case, it is likely 
that it will rightly respond to the same concern in the future under the development 
cooperation policy. This will give the impression of an incoherent actor. The situation 
described is at odds with the Court‘s statement according to which basing the choice of 
the legal basis on legal rules ensures consistency and legal certainty over these choices.266  
 According to settled case law of the CJEU, the choice of the legal basis ‗of a 
European act (…) must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which 
include the aim and content of that measure.‘267 As far as the relationship between the 
CFSP and the rest of EU policy areas is concerned, the choice of legal basis protects the 
procedures for implementing CFSP and non-CFSP policy areas, and the powers of the 
institutions within these procedures.268 The phrasing used by the Court implies that the 
choice of legal basis can be founded on additional criteria. However, attention to the 
relevant case law in the external domain shows that the aim and content test is the 
fundamental benchmark used by the CJEU to decide on the appropriateness of the legal 
basis. Only if the measure pursues a twofold aim or has a twofold component, without 
one being incidental to the other, must it exceptionally be founded on the different 
corresponding legal bases, as long as the procedures for each legal basis are compatible.269 
Furthermore, EU institutions are subject to the aim and content test every single time 
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that they adopt a legal act. That a measure is the direct implementation of another one is 
not enough of an argument to justify the legal basis chosen. According to the Court:270 
The fact that the contested joint action was implemented by other decisions adopted under 
the TEU, the legality of which the Commission has not challenged, cannot determine the 
outcome of the presented case. For the legal basis for an act must be determined having 
regard to its own aim and content and not to the legal basis used for the adoption of other 
Union measures which might, in certain cases, display similar characteristics.‘ 
In the specific context of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus, the Court has had 
the chance to clarify what it understands by the ‗aim‘ and ‗content‘ of a legal act:271 
While there may be some measures, such as the grant of political support for a moratorium 
or even the collection and destruction of weapons, which fall rather within action to preserve 
peace and strengthen international security or to promote international cooperation (being 
CFSP objectives), the decision to make funds available and to give technical assistance to a 
group of developing countries is capable of falling both under development cooperation 
policy and the CFSP. 
By measure (i.e. content), the Court refers to the activity the Union is supporting. By 
aim, the CJEU alludes to the EU external objective(s) that the measure promotes. The 
analysis of the goals pursued and the means used to attain these goals determines 
whether a single legal basis is needed or if a dual legal basis is required, instead. This test 
assumes that there are certain ‗aims‘ and ‗contents‘ belonging to specific EU policy areas.  
 The non-affectation clause in Article 40 TEU establishes that the choice of legal basis 
(i.e. CFSP or development cooperation) protects procedures and institutional 
prerogatives, rather than the substantive scope of policy areas. However, after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU continues to base its judgements regarding the 
choice of the legal basis on the aim and content test. This means that the CJEU is still 
taking the view that there are ‗aims‘ (i.e. EU external objectives) belonging to specific 
policy areas. Otherwise it would make no sense to claim that the aim and content test 
determines if a single or a dual legal basis is required. That the substance of a measure 
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(i.e. its aim and content) justifies the legal basis chosen is consistent with the Court‘s 
statement according to which: 272 
‗It is the substantive legal basis of a measure that determines the procedures to be followed in 
adopting that measure‘. 
The choice of the legal basis in the context of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus 
is, however, highly problematic. This is so both as far the content and the aim parts of the 
test are concerned. By admitting that security and development challenges are closely 
intertwined, many measures (i.e. content) are perceived as essential both to security and 
development objectives (i.e. aim). The most notable case is the one of measures falling 
within the governance agenda of the Union. In line with the far-reaching effects on the 
adoption of the security-development approach, measures supporting governance support 
are essential in the CFSP and development cooperation alike. Besides, in the ECOWAS 
Case the fight against the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was 
considered to contribute to economic and social development (development objectives, 
according to the CJEU), as well to the preservation of peace and the strengthening of 
international security (CFSP objectives for the Court).273 Once the content part of the test 
is not conclusive, the attention necessarily shifts to the aim, leaving the matter largely 
dependent on how institutions justify their actions. This is surely the reason why the 
Court did not utilise a test considering only the aim in the first place. By way of example, 
the Commission can provide technical assistance to the governance sector in South 
Central Somalia, arguing that it is essential to the recovery and reconstruction of this part 
of the country, and thus to promote sustainable development. At the same time, the 
Council can provide the same type of assistance arguing that it is necessary to ensure 
stability and security in South Central Somalia.274 
 The shared ‗content‘ is the first part of the problem regarding the choice of the legal 
basis in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. At this stage, establishing a 
distinction between the aims of the CFSP and those of the development cooperation 
policy is still possible. As soon as the idea of a nexus between the notions of security and 
development is accepted, it is assumed that any CFSP measure has spill over effects over 
development objectives and vice versa. The main objective pursued should determine the 
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legal basis (e.g. CFSP measure), and the spill over effects should be considered incidental 
effects in the objectives of the other policy area (e.g. poverty reduction). In the ECOWAS 
Case, the Court recognised the existence of specific CFSP and development cooperation 
objectives. It also referred to the difference between main and ancillary objectives in the 
context of the nexus:275  
‗Nevertheless, a concrete measure aiming to combat the proliferation of SALW may be 
adopted by the Community under its development cooperation policy only if that measure, 
by virtue of its aim and its content, falls within the scope of the competences conferred by the 
TEU on the Community in that field. That is not the case if such a measure, even if it 
contributes to the economic and social development of the developing country, has as its 
main purpose the implementation of the CFSP.‘ 
However, the final decision of the Court in the ECOWAS Case did not respect the 
difference between main and incidental objectives. The CJEU concluded that the 
Union‘s support for a financial programme to prevent the accumulation of SALW 
pursued development cooperation objectives because it contributed to the elimination or 
reduction of obstacles to the economic and social development of West African countries. 
Measures addressing obstacles or problems the solution to which is a prerequisite to 
development cooperation objectives do not have as their main aim the promotion of 
development objectives. The main aim of these measures is to pursue security objectives 
that are indispensable for development objectives. This is why I argue that in the 
ECOWAS Case the Court should have decided that CFSP objectives were the main 
objectives, whereas development cooperation ones were incidental. The distinction 
between main and ancillary objectives should be central in the context of the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus. Under the current legal framework, an interpretation 
like the one in the ECOWAS Case would require a dual CFSP and development 
cooperation policy legal basis in a great number of cases. This is especially problematic 
because the Court does not seem to be willing to accept the possibility of dual CFSP and 
non-CFSP legal bases.276 
The shared ‗aim‘ is the second part of the problem regarding the choice of the legal 
basis in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. In recent years, the Union pursues 
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objectives under the development cooperation policy that have traditionally been 
considered objectives of the CFSP. De facto, this was already observable before the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force. By arguing that certain measures are indispensable to pursue 
development objectives, the development cooperation policy had already supported 
measures whose main objective was arguably a security objective. In the ECOWAS 
Case, this reasoning led the Court to conclude that the measure with which the Council 
supported ECOWAS in the fight against the proliferation of SALW should have been 
adopted under the development cooperation policy. 277  The Court provided different 
arguments in favour of a measure like the one in ECOWAS falling under the substantive 
scope of the development cooperation policy. In particular, it referred to Portugal v 
Council and to the Philippines Case, where it defined the broad scope of development 
objectives.278 Moreover, it explicitly mentioned the reference to the security-development 
nexus in the European Consensus on Development (2006). Paragraphs 65 and 66 of the 
ECOWAS Case read as follows: 
‗Articles 177 EC to 181 EC, which deal with cooperation with developing countries, refer 
not only to the sustainable economic and social development of those countries, their 
smooth and gradual integration into the world economy and the campaign against poverty, 
but also to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, as well as 
to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in compliance also with 
commitments in the context of the United Nations and other international organisations‘. 
‗In addition, it follows from the Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Commission on European Union Development Policy, entitled ‗The European 
Consensus [on Development]‘ (OJ 2006 C 46, p. 1) that there can be no sustainable 
development and eradication of poverty without peace and security and that the pursuit of 
the objectives of the Community‘s new development policy necessarily proceed via the 
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights‘. 
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What has changed after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (and the introduction of 
the single set of objectives) is the openness with which development cooperation policy 
instruments admit that they pursue objectives that had classically been considered by the 
Court as CFSP objectives. The clearest example is the Regulation establishing the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which lists among its objectives:279 
‗To address specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and 
stability.‘ 
The IcSP is a sui generis instrument of the development cooperation policy. It is designed 
to complement long-term development cooperation, and it is not managed by DEVCO. 
The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), which is a Commission service 
physically placed under the EEAS and under the authority of the HRVP, manages the 
IcSP. However, the Regulation establishing the IcSP determines as its legal basis Articles 
209(1) TFEU (i.e. development cooperation) and 212(2) TFEU (i.e. economic, financial 
and technical cooperation with third countries). This means that, as far as the Union‘s 
engagement in developing countries is concerned, the IcSP is an instrument for 
development cooperation. The IcSP is designed to tackle certain situations (e.g. conflict 
prevention, crisis management) where security and development objectives are essential. 
In fact, it adds even more complexity to the choice of the legal basis in the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus. The IcSP can be used for certain measures in the 
context of situations, like ‗crisis response, conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis 
preparedness‘, as well as ‗global and trans-regional threats‘.280 Since the coexistence of 
development and CFSP policies and activities is particularly acute precisely in these 
situations, the IcSP has added even more fuzziness (and uncertainty) to the choice of the 
legal basis between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy. 
 In view of this situation, there is no clear notion of the relative contents of the CFSP 
and the development cooperation policy. There is no clear idea either regarding the 
specific aims that these policy areas are concerned about. Therefore, the role of legal 
delimitation rules in ensuring consistency over the choice of the legal basis (i.e. CFSP or 
development cooperation?) is highly debatable. Theoretical claim no 3, according to 
which the aim and content of a measure determines its legal basis, is debatable, to say the 
least. The treaties put the CJEU in a very difficult position, which justifies why the Court 
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cannot be totally blamed for its not so satisfying responses. For example, in the Tanzania 
Case the CJEU does exactly what it argued against in the ECOWAS Case. 281  It 
concludes that the EU-Tanzania agreement falls under the CFSP because it directly 
implements the Joint Action by which the Council established EUNAVFOR Atalanta. 
The latter was adopted under a CFSP legal basis.282 However, when the Court explains 
what Atalanta is about it is implicitly providing evidence to support the idea that the EU-
Tanzania agreement falls within the substantive scope of the CFSP:283 
‗The Agreement constitutes an instrument whereby the European Union pursues the 
objectives of Operation Atalanta, namely to preserve international peace and security, in 
particular by making it possible to ensure that the perpetrators of acts of piracy do not go 
unpunished.‘ 
The Philippines II Case clearly demonstrates that the Court of Justice is still defining the 
scope of policy areas by reference to their specific policy objectives. The CJEU decides 
that the framework agreement between the Philippines and the EU has been adequately 
adopted under a single development cooperation legal basis. This is so because the 
provisions contained in the agreement concerning readmission of nationals of the 
contracting parties, transport and the environment:      
‗Do not contain obligations so extensive that they may be considered to constitute objectives 
distinct from those of development cooperation that are neither secondary nor indirect in 
relation to the latter objectives.‘284 
Although in a less obvious manner, the Tanzania Case provides another argument in the 
same direction. According to the Court:285 
‗As regards, in particular, provisions of the EU-Tanzania Agreement concerning compliance 
with the principles of the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect for human dignity, 
it must be stated that such compliance is required of all actions of the EU, including those in 
the area of the CFSP, as is clear from the provisions, read together, set out in the first 
subparagraph of Article 21(1), 21(2)(b) and (3) TEU. That being the case, the Court must 
also assess that agreement in the light of its aim.‘ 
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Although the rule of law and human rights, as well as respect for human dignity, 
constitute EU external objectives, the CJEU does not consider them as determining 
factors in ascertaining the aim of the EU-Tanzania agreement. The Court seems to draw 
a distinction between two different types of EU objectives in Article 21 TEU. On the one 
hand, the single set of objectives includes objectives that can be central in any measure, 
regardless of the policy area, because they do not define a particular policy area (e.g. rule 
of law). On the other hand, Article 21 TEU includes objectives that are intrinsic to what 
specific policy areas are about. For example, the main concern of the development 
cooperation policy is the campaign against poverty. The objectives that define particular 
policy areas determine the legal basis chosen (i.e. ‗the Court must also assess that 
agreement in the light of its aim‘). We should bear in mind that the Court could have 
referred to Article 21 TEU when deciding that the EU-Tanzania agreement falls under 
the CFSP, and it did not.   
 A comprehensive reading of the treaties provides arguments in favour of the idea that 
the single set of objectives was not introduced to render all treaty provisions including 
specific policy objectives and the whole case law of the Court over the choice of the legal 
basis meaningless. As far as the CFSP-development cooperation nexus is concerned, the 
notion of security mainly concerns the CFSP, while poverty reduction is the main 
objective of the development cooperation policy. Furthermore, we shall recall that, as a 
policy approach, the security-development nexus assumes that security and development 
objectives, while closely intertwined, are promoted under different strands of action, 
which justifies the need for integrated strategies. This is why I read Article 21 TEU as a 
reminder that all external policies and activities of the Union are part of a single external 
action.286 When actors implement specific measures, they shall choose the adequate legal 
basis according to the objectives defined in treaty provisions regulating each policy area, 
complemented with the case law of the Court regarding the scope of EU policy areas. 
Moreover, they shall take account and contribute to other EU objectives.287 When these 
‗other‘ objectives mirror the principles that the Union is founded on (e.g. respect for 
human dignity), EU actors can always make substantive contributions to these 
objectives. The EU-Tanzania agreement, adopted under a single CFSP legal basis, 
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included provisions concerning compliance with the rule of law and human rights, as 
well as respect for human dignity. When the objectives that do not justify the legal basis 
chosen are core objectives of other policy areas, EU actors can (and shall) incidentally 
contribute to these objectives. 288  Article 7 TFEU implicitly supports the idea that 
objectives are essential in determining the scope of policy areas when it refers to the 
objectives of the Union and the principle of conferred powers: 
‗The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its 
objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers.‘ 
Be it as it may, the abolition of the previous imbalance between the EC and the EU 
external competences and the introduction of the single set of objectives encourage actors 
to consider the incidental effects of each measure they adopt over other objectives that 
are mainly promoted under different policy areas. This is why these legal innovations 
have great potential in leading towards inter-policy coherence in the external action of 
the Union. We shall recall that the primacy of the acquis communautaire over EU 
competences discouraged the Council to refer to the incidental effects of its acts over 
other policy areas, like the development cooperation policy. In the ECOWAS Case, the 
fact that the measure of the Council referred to the (incidental) development objectives 
that the CFSP measure contributed to led the CJEU to conclude that the measure should 
have been adopted under the development cooperation policy. The Court protected the 
acquis. Under the current legal framework, this kind of reference should be commonplace.  
 However, the line between what constitutes a main objective and an incidental 
objective is thin. This is why, by not recognising a distinction between general and 
specific policy objectives in Article 21 TEU, the CJEU (willingly or unwillingly) 
promotes efforts towards complementarity between policies and activities implemented 
under different policy fields. It encourages actors to take into consideration the incidental 
effects of their measures over other objectives of the Union, which are mainly 
implemented under different policy areas. From this perspective, the CJEU protects the 
spirit of the non-affectation clause and Article 21 TEU. However, the ambiguity that 
characterises the reasoning of the Court in cases concerning the choice of the legal basis 
under the current legal framework can also bring about other effects. By not clarifying on 
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what exact grounds EU institutions should take these decisions, the Court (willingly or 
unwillingly) supports certain developments in EU secondary law, like the IcSP. The 
CJEU has not clarified whether, on the basis of Article 21 TEU, legal measures adopted 
under a specific policy area (e.g. development cooperation policy) can substantively 
promote objectives that are not contemplated in the treaty provisions regarding this 
policy area. I refer to this phenomenon, whose ‗constitutionality‘ has neither been 
denied, nor confirmed by the Court, as ‗the liberalisation of EU external objectives‘.  
 There are different arguments in favour of the liberalisation of EU external objectives 
in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. First, it ensures a certain degree of 
consistency across EU policy areas, because the CFSP and the development cooperation 
policy can contribute to the same objectives (e.g. international peace and security). 
Second, it brings about flexibility for political actors, because the choice of the legal basis 
becomes less constraining. From this perspective, the liberalisation of objectives has the 
potential to maximise the cases in which the Union responds to international matters. It 
can increase the room for manoeuvre of actors to decide what tool (i.e. policy area or 
instrument) they want to use in each case. Therefore, it can contribute towards 
strengthening the presence and visibility of the Union at the international level. Third, 
the liberalisation of objectives seems to be leading to a situation where the development 
cooperation policy integrates traditional CFSP objectives, and not vice versa. Because of 
the sui generis nature of the CFSP, from an EU integrationist perspective this can be 
considered great news.  
 However, there are also many reasons for deep concern about the liberalisation of 
EU external objectives. First, the fact that there are no clear rules for determining the 
appropriate legal basis creates doubt as to whether these choices can effectively protect 
the procedures and the institutional balance between CFSP and non-CFSP policy 
areas.289 Second, that development cooperation funds are used to address ‗transnational 
threats to international security and stability‘ puts into question whether the development 
cooperation policy has as its main objective the campaign against poverty. Security and 
stability at the international level have an impact on poverty. However, can measures 
promoting these objectives be justified as having poverty reduction as their main 
objective? That the development cooperation policy incorporates security objectives that 
were classically considered as CFSP objectives may be applauded from an EU 
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integrationist perspective. However, it is also leading to a situation where the treaty-
defined nature of the development cooperation policy is challenged. Third, as regards the 
Union‘s quest for coherence between the CFSP and the development cooperation policy, 
we shall distinguish between coherence in a specific context (i.e. the Union‘s action in a 
particular third State), and coherence as a commitment to acting consistently over time. 
As for the former, we may argue that what the Union gains in terms of coherence by 
providing actors in charge of different policy areas with responsibility over the same 
objectives, gets lost as soon as it becomes evident that these actors operate under 
completely different procedures. Because of legal fragmentation in EU external relations, 
entrusting all actors with the same responsibilities is prone to overlaps and 
contradictions. In fact, assuming that, because of the single legal order, the different 
policy areas of the Union are simply different tools to be used in the most convenient 
manner (i.e. the question as to ‗who does what‘ is no longer relevant) can be considered 
naïve. Lastly, not having clear rules to decide on the choice of the legal basis leads to a 
situation where there is no certainty as to when the Union will use the CFSP or the 
development cooperation policy.  
Military boots under the development cooperation policy  
The analysis of the choice of legal basis in the context of the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus cannot overlook the recent Joint Proposal of the HRVP and the 
Commission to modify the IcSP. The main objective of the proposal is to amend the 
Regulation establishing the IcSP, so as to be able to use this instrument to fund military 
activities.  
 In April 2014, in two separate interviews with an EEAS and a DEVCO official, I 
inquired about the choice between CFSP/development cooperation, without referring to 
any treaty provision. 290  Both officials mentioned Article 41(2) TEU as the key to 
elucidating whether military aid can or cannot fall within the scope of the development 
cooperation policy. This was, for them, the only grey area where it was not clear whether 
the development cooperation policy could operate. Article 41(2) TEU reads as follows: 
‗Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be 
charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having 
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military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides 
otherwise.‘ 
The official from DEVCO referred to this provision to argue that military training cannot 
be financed by the development cooperation policy, because it falls within the exception 
mentioned in Article 41(2) TEU (i.e. military aid cannot be charged to the Union 
budget). In contrast, the official from the EEAS claimed that the exception of Article 
41(2) TEU refers to CSDP military operations. The Joint Proposal of the HRVP and the 
Commission to modify the IcSP, if adopted, will clarify the doubts expressed by the 
interviewed officials. The Joint Proposal intends to include the following paragraph 
under Article 1 of the IcSP:291  
‗Where Union assistance is provided to the security sector actors, this may also include 
military actors under exceptional circumstances as provided for in Article 3a, in particular in 
the context of a wider security sector reform process and/or capacity building in support of 
security and development in third countries, in line with the overarching objective of 
achieving sustainable development.‘ 
According to the proposal, the Union needs to be able to directly support military actors 
in third countries when the EU objectives concerning security sector reform cannot be 
promoted by supporting non-military actors.292 The proposal confirms that, despite its sui 
generis character, the IcSP is an instrument of the development cooperation policy, 
whenever it affects developing countries: 
‗The legal basis of this legislative proposal is Article 209(1) and Article 212(2) of the TFEU. 
Considering the broad scope of development cooperation, the financing of capacity building 
(training and equipment support) in the security sector on the basis of Article 209/212 TFEU 
is not per se excluded only because of the military nature of the beneficiary. Taking into 
account the objectives of the Union‘s development cooperation, i.e. to contribute to the 
pursuit of the sustainable development of developing countries, financing of the military is 
possible under exceptional circumstances‘. 
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While the proposal refers to the ‗overarching objective of achieving sustainable 
development‘, it establishes that the EU shall provide assistance to contribute, in 
particular, to the achievement of stable, peaceful and inclusive societies.   
Theoretical claim no 4a: the Council and the Commission ensure consistency between 
the different areas of the Union’s external action and cooperate to that effect 
Article 21(3) para 2 TEU establishes: 
 ‗The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that 
consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.‘ 
This provision can be considered an ‗updated version‘ of the oldest expression of 
coherence in EU primary law. Article 30(5) of the SEA (1987) stated:  
‗The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in European 
Political Co-operation must be consistent. The Presidency and the Commission, each within 
its own sphere of competence, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that such 
consistency is sought and maintained.‘ 
When the EPC was created in 1970, legal fragmentation in EU external relations began 
to materialise. The EPC, which can be considered the initial version of the CFSP, had to 
coexist with the external policies of the EC. The reference to coherence in Article 30(5) 
SEA responded to the duality brought about by the EPC (i.e. EC-EPC). Although the 
scenario has changed significantly since 1970, the sui generis nature of the CFSP shows 
that the duality that the EPC created persists. Article 21(3) para 2 TEU is influenced by 
the divide between CFSP and non-CFSP policy areas. We shall recall that Articles 7 
TFEU and 13(1) TEU, which are of general application to the entirety of EU action, 
refer to coherence between policies and activities/actions. In a very different manner, 
Article 21(3) TEU refers to coherence ‗between the different areas of its external action 
and between these and its other policies‘.293 
 The reference to coherence in Article 21(3) TEU is the most important expression of 
the horizontal dimension of the Union‘s quest for coherence in the external action. It 
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applies to the four mechanisms for coherence foreseen in the treaties. For example, I 
have referred to it under theoretical claim no 1, regarding the provision of common 
objectives. However, there is a reason why Article 21(3) TEU justifies theoretical claim 
no 4a, concerning horizontal inter-policy coordination as the last mechanism of the 
treaties to advance coherence. Article 21(3) TEU identifies the Council and the 
Commission as the actors that are mainly responsible for ensuring horizontal inter-policy 
coherence in the EU foreign policy. As far as the CFSP-development cooperation nexus 
is concerned, the Council and the Commission are the main actors responsible for 
developing and implementing the CFSP and the development cooperation policy 
respectively. This is why, as an expression of the principle of interinstitutional sincere 
cooperation enshrined in Article 21(3) TEU, the Council and the Commission will have 
to coordinate CFSP and development cooperation action. Otherwise they will not ensure 
coherence between the policies and activities implemented under these policy areas, as 
required by the treaties. Together, the Council and the Commission shall coordinate their 
actions. Independently, when adopting specific CFSP or development cooperation 
measures, they are to show awareness regarding measures implemented under the other 
policy area and seek to complement them. There is a difference between strengthening 
coherence by showing ‗awareness‘, on the one hand, and by and expressing the 
incidental objectives of a measure, on the other hand.294 When showing awareness (i.e. 
cross-referencing), EU actors may (or may not) refer to the objectives pursued in the 
measure they seek to complement. The focus is on ensuring complementarity between 
concrete measures. For example, a development cooperation measure supporting 
capacity building within the ministry of security cannot ignore the existence of a CSDP 
civilian mission, which is supporting the same ministry in the development of a national 
security strategy. On the contrary, by mentioning the incidental objectives of a measure, 
EU actors show that they have considered how their measure contributes to other 
external objectives of the Union. The latter does not assume the existence of two 
measures implemented in parallel. For example, a development cooperation measure can 
mention that education support in Somalia addresses the root causes of piracy, conflict 
and instability.295  
                                                 
294 Ideally, however, references to the incidental objectives of a given legal measure should take into 
consideration existing EU measures promoting these objectives, as otherwise coherence between policies 
and activities, as envisaged in Articles 7 TFEU and 21(3) TEU, will not be ensured     
295 Decision C(2015) 5034 
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 The treaties show a preference for entrusting coordinating activities in the external 
domain to ‗intermediaries‘ like the HRVP, as shown in Article 21(3) TEU. For example, 
the HRVP chairs the FAC.296 Moreover, the law of EU external relations entrusts the 
HRVP and the EEAS with responsibilities over the design of external policies and 
activities. As far as the CFSP-development nexus is concerned, the HRVP (assisted by 
the EEAS) prepares proposals for the development of the CFSP.297 Moreover, the EEAS 
contributes to the programming and management cycle of certain external assistance 
instruments falling within the development cooperation policy, like the EDF and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).298 Either as an embodiment of the policy 
areas where it plays a role (e.g. CFSP and development cooperation) or of the institutions 
it brings together (e.g. Council, Commission, Member States), the EEAS responds to the 
Union‘s quest for coherence. That the EEAS, as a body that is directly under the HRVP, 
was going to assist the HRVP in conducting the CFSP was clear from the treaties.299 
However, the role of the EEAS in non-CFSP policy areas was debated, both before and 
after the Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010) was adopted. What follows 
provides an overview of the legal discussion that surrounded the creation of the EEAS. 
In the context of the thesis, this discussion is particularly interesting in what concerns the 
role of the EEAS within the development cooperation policy and the security-
development nexus.   
The development cooperation policy and the EEAS 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty provided the legal basis for the creation of the 
EEAS. The treaties envisaged the establishment of a European External Action Service 
to assist the HRVP in fulfilling her mandate. 300  During the first months of 2010, 
negotiations took place between the EU institutions involved in the constitution of the 
new body. As a result, on 26 July 2010, the Council Decision establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the EEAS was finally adopted.301 On 1 January 2011, the 
first transfer of staff was carried out and the new body started operating.302 The scope of 
the EEAS gave rise to important debates before the adoption of the Council Decision 
                                                 
296 Article 18(3) TEU  
297 Article 18(2) TEU and Article 2(1) of the Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU) 
298 Article 9 of the Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU) 
299 Article 27(3) TEU 
300 Article 27(3) TEU 
301 Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU)  
302 A new step in the setting-up of the EEAS: Transfer of Staff on 1 January 2011 (IP/10/1769) 
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establishing it and also afterwards. According to Sophie Vanhoonacker and Natasja 
Reslow,303 before the adoption of the Council Decision there was an important debate 
between those who defended a ‗maximalist‘ approach and those who wanted a 
‗minimalist‘ solution for the EEAS. Maximalists thought that the EEAS should have 
responsibilities over the CFSP, the common commercial policy, the development 
cooperation policy and other policies like the neighbourhood and the enlargement 
policies. Minimalists believed that the scope of the EEAS should be restricted to the 
CFSP. What was generally agreed from both perspectives was that the EEAS should 
include DG Relex (from the Commission) and the Policy Unit, together with DG 
External and Political-Military Affairs (from the General Secretariat of the Council).304 
As regards the positions held by Member States, Sophie Vanhoonacker and Natasja 
Reslow explain the content of a Joint Progress Report of the HRVP and the Commission 
to the European Council of 2005.305 According to this Report, while a few Member States 
considered that the EEAS should be restricted to the CFSP, an equally small number 
argued that the body should also have a say on policy areas such as the European 
neighbourhood policy, the development cooperation policy and enlargement. The 
majority of Member States were in favour of an in-between solution, and there was 
consensus over the non-inclusion of the common commercial policy. Sophie 
Vanhoonacker and Natasja Reslow also mention the decision regarding the inclusion of 
military bodies and the EU Situation Centre as a source of confrontation in the 
preparatory works on the establishment of the EEAS. For instance, the Presidency 
Report to the European Council on the EEAS (2009) stated that, in order to enable the 
HRVP to conduct the CSDP, military issues and the EU Situation Centre should be part 
of the EEAS. This position was also defended by Simon Duke who claimed that 
excluding military staff from the EEAS ‗would have the effect of bifurcating the civilian 
and military aspects of crisis management‘.306 
                                                 
303  S. VANHOONACKER and N. RESLOW, ‗The European External Action Service: Living 
forwards by understanding backwards‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, 15, 2010 
304 DG Relex was the DG for external policy of the Commission. It ceased to exist with the launch of 
the EEAS. The Policy Unit was part of the General Secretariat of the Council, and was under the 
responsibility of the HR. DG External and Political-Military Affairs of the General Secretariat of the 
Council was the DG in charge of CFSP matters. The entire staff of DG External and Political-Military 
Affairs was transferred to the EEAS on 1 January 2011   
305 Joint Progress Report to the European Council by the HR and the Commission (9956/05) 
306 Swedish Presidency Report to the European Council: The EEAS (14930/09) and S. DUKE, ‗The 
Lisbon Treaty and External Relations‘, 2008/1, EIPASCOPE    
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Once the Council Decision on the EEAS was adopted, controversy mainly focused 
on whether including the development cooperation policy under the scope of the EEAS 
was the right decision. On the one hand, it was argued that if development cooperation 
were not included under the scope of the EEAS, the impetus for coherence of the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms would fall short. For instance, Steven Blockmans and Simon Duke 
claimed:307 
‗Attempts to hermetically seal development cooperation under a Commission blanket would 
fly in the face of the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, which remains the creation of a more 
coherent, effective and visible Union on the international scene‘. 
On the other hand, the development community argued that the development 
cooperation policy should not be subject to CFSP objectives. The fear was that 
development cooperation policy funds would be instrumentalised for security purposes. 
Moreover, it was argued that the short-term objectives of the CFSP and the long-term 
objectives of the development cooperation policy are irreconcilable. 
Besides the political debate, the inclusion of the development cooperation policy 
under the scope of the EEAS led to a legal discussion as to whether the treaties provided 
the necessary legal basis for the EEAS to play a role over the development cooperation 
policy. As explained by Steven Blockmans and Simon Duke, a coalition of almost the 
entire community of development NGOs asked the law firm White&Case to elaborate a 
legal analysis of the Council Decision on the EEAS.308 According to this analysis, the 
Lisbon Treaty extends no powers to the EEAS or to the HRVP to implement stages of 
the development cooperation policy, so the role of the EEAS should be confined to the 
EEAS. The analysis of White&Case also claimed that Article 17(1) TEU establishes that 
it is an exclusive power of the Commission ‗to execute the budget and manage the 
programmes, to exercise coordinating, executive and management functions and to 
initiate the Union‘s annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving inter-
institutional agreements‘. In a very different manner, Steven Blockmans and Simon Duke 
argued that the Council Decision on the EEAS attributes the EEAS particular (not 
exclusive) responsibilities in the preparation of Commission decisions in the 
programming cycle of external assistance instruments. Therefore, it does not encroach 
                                                 
307 S. BLOCKMANS and S. DUKE, ‗The Lisbon Treaty stipulations on Development Cooperation 
and the Council Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service‘, CLEER Legal Brief, 2010, page 14 
308 Ibid, page 2 
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upon the management functions of the Commission. The authors also stressed that the 
campaign against poverty, which constitutes the main objective of the development 
cooperation policy, is also a general external objective of the Union, so it applies to all 
areas of EU external action.309 In their view, because of Article 21 TEU, it is not the 
intention of the treaties to limit action in the development cooperation policy solely to 
the Commission.   
Theoretical claim no 4b: the Commission promotes complementarity between the 
policies of the Union and the Member States on development cooperation  
Article 210 TFEU reads as follows: 
‗1. In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the 
Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult 
each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during 
international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute 
if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes. 
2. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the coordination referred to in 
paragraph 1.‘ 
This provision implies that vertical inter-policy coherence (i.e. complementarity) in the 
field of development cooperation requires coordination between the Union and its 
Member States. It also establishes that the Commission will take the lead in organising 
this coordination. In the case of horizontal inter-policy coordination, the treaties entrust 
important responsibilities to actors that can be considered ‗intermediaries‘. The role of 
the Commission under Article 210(2) TFEU cannot be read in the same direction. The 
Commission is the main actor responsible for the development and implementation of 
the development cooperation policy. This is why the Commission is no ‗intermediary‘. It 
will seek coordination between the policies it is responsible for and those of the Member 
States. Article 210(1) and (2) TFEU justify theoretical claim no 4b, under vertical inter-
policy coordination.  
 Given that the development cooperation policy is a shared and non-preemptive 
competence, coordination, as an expression of the principle of sincere cooperation 
                                                 
309 Articles 208(1) TFEU and 21(2)(b) TEU 
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between the Union and the Member States310 is especially relevant in this context because 
the policies of the Union and those of the Member States in this field are implemented in 
a truly parallel manner.311 Furthermore, the centre of the decision-making process in the 
development cooperation policy is wherever the assistance is provided. This is why the 
role of Union delegations and Member States‘ diplomatic and consular missions is 
central to ensuring vertical inter-policy coordination in EU development cooperation.312 
That coordination takes place mainly on the ground facilitates this process enormously, 
as the institutional set-up on the ground is much simpler than the complex institutional 
structures in Brussels. 
 Joint programming in development cooperation, which is analysed in section 5 of 
this chapter, is a particularly good example of vertical inter-policy coordination in EU 
development cooperation led by the Commission. It fits perfectly into the spirit of Article 
210 TFEU. Joint programming consists of three steps. In step one, the EU and the 
Member States agree on a joint strategy regarding the development challenges of a 
specific partner country. In step two, they determine ‗who will do what‘ as regards their 
joint strategy. In step three, they define indicative allocations per sector and per donor. 
We shall note how step two stresses the character of the development cooperation policy 
as a non-preemptive shared competence. Because of the truly parallel nature of EU and 
Member States‘ competences in development cooperation, legal delimitation rules do not 
respond to the question ‗who does what‘. This is why delimitation, which is essential for 
avoiding substantive contradictions and overlaps, is a matter of inter-policy coordination. 
When joint programming exercises lead to stage three, they are best placed under inter-
policy coordination as one of the four mechanisms of the treaties for securing coherence 
in the external action. However, it is often the case that joint programming does not go 
beyond the definition of a joint cooperation strategy. This is why I have also considered 
joint programming under theoretical claim no 2, regarding the definition of common 
approaches. 
                                                 
310 Article 4(3) TEU. As regards the general application of the principle of sincere cooperation, see 
Case C-266/03, Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-04805, paras 57 and 58 
311 According to Marise Cremona: ‗if the EC acts in a field of non-pre-emptive shared competence, 
such as development cooperation, the need for coherence clearly emerges and is recognised in the Treaty‘. 
M. CREMONA, op. cit. 4, page 17. In his Conclusions in Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, PFOS 
Case [2010] ECR I-03317, AG Maduro stated: ‗the duty of loyal cooperation between the Community and 
the Member States has particular significance in the exercise of competences under the Treaty: this is all the 
more so where those competences are shared‘ 
312 Notice that Article 221(2) TFEU establishes that EU delegations ‗shall act in close cooperation 
with Member States‘ diplomatic and consular missions.‘ See also: Articles 3(1) and 5(9) of the Council 
Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU)  
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 Lastly, inter-policy coordination between the Union and its Member States in 
development cooperation does not only take place within EU delegations and Member 
States‘ diplomatic and consular missions. Because of the commitments of the Union (and 
its Member States) within other international organisations, such as the OECD and the 
UN, coordination between the EU and the Member States will also be facilitated by these 
other international organisations. For example, the fact that the EU and most of its 
Member States are members of the OECD DAC has important consequences for how 
inter-policy coordination is organised on the ground. 
 We shall note that close attention to Article 210(1) TFEU shows that the quest for 
vertical inter-policy coherence in development cooperation is a quest for complementarity, 
as an essential requisite for maximising the efficiency of EU and Member State 
development programmes. The link between the coherence and effectiveness of the 
Union‘s action in EU primary law is often connected to the abstract idea that, by acting 
in a coherent manner, the Union strengthens its actorness on the international stage (i.e. 
its autonomy, its identity), which renders it more effective as an actor. The 
complementarity-efficiency link in Article 210(1) TFEU is a much less abstract idea. 
Complementarity ensures that EU and Member State development funds are invested in 
the most efficient manner. This is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of the Union as an 
actor whose development assistance has a real impact on the ground. However, the 
emphasis on the term efficiency in Article 210(1) TFEU explains why third actors, like 
OECD DAC members and the UN, are also crucial for coordination. In fact, the OECD 
welcomes joint programming between the EU and its Member States. While the 
strengthened actorness of the Union is not a major concern for the OECD, increasing aid 
effectiveness is.  
5 Joint programming in EU development cooperation  
Joint programming is a recent development in EU development cooperation that 
illustrates many issues discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis. Above all, it is a 
concrete example of vertical inter-policy coordination. It also shows that the centre of the 
decision-making process in the field of development cooperation lies wherever aid 
programmes are going to be implemented. Moreover, the case of joint programming 
provides an insight into Union (and Member States) commitments within the OECD-led 
aid effectiveness agenda. It also shows the role of the EEAS in promoting vertical inter-
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policy coordination in the field of development policy. Furthermore, this section offers a 
concrete case of the sincere cooperation-coherence-effectiveness link, which is presented 
at an abstract level in chapter 1 of the thesis. It also reflects on the perceived tension 
between strengthening the coherence of the Union as an actor and protecting the 
autonomy of Member States as independent international actors.   
5.1 A commitment to the international aid effectiveness agenda 
Joint programming in development cooperation refers to the process through which the 
Union and its Member States jointly prepare their aid programmes for a specific 
developing country. Joint programming processes should be operational in 40 or more 
partner countries by 2017.313 According to the Global Strategy for the European Union‘s 
Foreign and Security Policy (2016):314 
‗A strong EEAS working together with other EU institutions lies at the heart of a coherent 
EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include policy innovations such as the 
―comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises‖ and joint programming in development, 
which must be further enhanced.‘ 
The Council Conclusions for Busan (2011) establish that joint programming comprises 
three different steps. The first step is the joint analysis and joint response to the national 
development strategy of the partner country identifying priority sectors of intervention. 
The second step is the in-country division of labour (i.e. identification of who is working 
in which sectors). The third step is the indicative financial allocation per sector and per 
donor.315 
 The first element of joint programming concerns the identification of the specific 
needs of the partner country and the definition of the overall lines of the EU‘s response. 
The Union promotes the use of the development strategy or plan of the partner country 
as the basis of joint programming, as an expression of the principles of ownership and 
alignment. Whenever possible, the choice of the EU‘s strategic sectors of intervention 
should be based on national policy documents.316 Once the main lines of the EU (and 
                                                 
313 Mexico High Level Meeting Communiqué, 16 April 2014, page 12, outcome document of the First 
High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, available at: 
http://effectivecooperation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/ENG_FinalConsensusMexicoHLMComm
unique.pdf (last visited: 29 August 2016) 
314 Global Strategy for the European Union‘s Foreign and Security Policy (2016), page 49 (note 17) 
315 Council Conclusions (16773/11), page 27  
316 Communication: An Agenda for Change (COM(2011) 637) 
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Member State) response have been drawn, the question as to ‗who does what‘ becomes 
central. The second step of joint programming consists in a division of labour between 
the different actors involved (EU, Member States and ‗like-minded‘ donors).317 Each 
actor should focus on a limited number of sectors, according to its comparative 
advantages.318 Prior to carrying out the division of tasks, ‗mapping‘ exercises are essential 
to have a clear picture about who is doing what and how. The first and second stages 
should finally lead to the definition of indicative financial allocations, in stage three of 
the process. In the third stage, donors commit to allocating certain sums of money to the 
sectors where they will operate and within the framework of the agreed strategy. 
Furthermore, joint programming cannot succeed without a certain degree of 
synchronisation of the programming and planning cycles of all actors involved (i.e. 
donors and partner country). This is so because if the EU and its Member States decide 
to jointly address the needs of a State by sharing a strategy and dividing the work among 
themselves they will necessarily have to operate on the basis of similar timeframes.319 
In the best-case scenario, the three core elements of joint programming, which I refer 
to as the three steps of the process, should be included in a single joint programming 
document. In the context of the programming process of the 11th EDF and the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) for 2014-2020, the joint programming 
documents should have been agreed upon before EDF and DCI programming 
documents were concluded. This would have allowed these programming documents to 
incorporate the results of the joint programming exercise. In practice, however, this 
proved difficult.320 In the case of Ethiopia, for example, a Joint Cooperation Strategy was 
signed in 2013, but the second and third steps of the initiative were not concluded before 
the 11th EDF programming documents were adopted. 321  Consequently, the national 
indicative programme (NIP) for Ethiopia‘s 11th EDF was not able to reflect on the 
                                                 
317 Notice that joint programming is open to ‗like-minded‘ non-EU donors. Council Conclusions for 
Busan (16773/11), page 28 
318 See, for example, the EEAS-Commission Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European 
Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) – 2014-2020, 15 May 
2012, pages 9 and 13, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/14_05_11_progr_instructions_cover_page_clean.p
df (last visited: 30 August 2016) 
319 Instructions for 11th EDF and DCI programming, page 12 (note 318) 
320 Notice that the EEAS and the Commission even considered the possibility of joint programming 
documents replacing EDF and DCI multi-annual indicative programmes (MIPs) if they contained ‗all the 
elements required for a MIP‘, Instructions for 11th EDF and DCI programming, page 15 (note 318) 
321  European Union+ Joint Cooperation Strategy for Ethiopia, 27 January 2013, available at: 
http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/joint-programming/document/eu-joint-cooperation-strategy-ethiopia-
27012013-0 (last visited: 29 August 2016) 
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specific financial commitments resulting from joint programming. Besides the exchange 
of information accompanying joint programming, other benefits of the initiative include 
the reduction of aid fragmentation, overlapping activities and funding gaps, as well as the 
lowering of transaction costs for donors and partner countries alike.322 This is why, for 
joint programming to have a real impact, its three core elements must be completed. 
Nevertheless, in line with its gradual and multi-step character, joint programming can be 
said to occur in a partner country as soon as the EU and its Member States have decided 
to work towards a joint programming document.323  
The ambiguous boundaries between joint programming and joint implementation in 
EU policy documents are probably the main cause of confusion regarding the initiative. 
Commitments to joint programming are often accompanied by references to joint 
implementation. For instance, in the Mexico Communiqué, under the heading ‗EU Joint 
Programming: Helping to Manage Diversity‘, the EU committed to foster joint 
implementation.324 However, the Council Conclusions for Busan should mitigate any 
conceptual fuzziness since they clearly indicate that ‗joint programming does therefore 
not encompass bilateral implementation plans.‘ 325  Indeed, the limits of joint 
programming are in indicative financial allocations per sector, where the projects chosen 
by the EU and its Member States in the sectors where they are active are not specified. 
Despite the clear dividing lines between joint programming and joint implementation, no 
one should be surprised if both are referred to together, since the former clearly paves the 
way for the latter.326 By way of example, if joint programming leads to an effective 
division of labour between EU donors, it will make sense for the actors that remained 
active in a given sector to work together, for instance through co-financing and delegated 
cooperation arrangements. 327  Finally, despite not being an integral part of joint 
programming, a common results framework should accompany the initiative.328 If, based 
on the results of joint programming, a donor phases out of a specific sector this donor 
                                                 
322 On the problems that joint programming is called to mitigate, see the Communication on an EU 
Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy (COM(2007) 72), page 3 
323 Instructions for 11th EDF and DCI programming, page 12 (note 318) 
324 Mexico High Level Meeting Communiqué, 16 April 2014, page 12 (note 313) 
325 Council Conclusions for Busan (16773/11), page 27 
326  Notice that Article 210(1) TFEU, which provides the legal basis for joint programming in 
development cooperation policy, refers to the possibility of Member States contributing to the 
implementation of Union programmes    
327 See, for instance, the European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01), para 31. ‗Delegated 
cooperation is a practical arrangement where one donor (a lead donor) acts with authority on behalf of one 
or more other donors (the delegating donors or silent partners). Communication on an EU Code of 
Conduct (COM(2007) 72), page 7 
328 Communication: An Agenda for Change (COM(2011) 637), page 11 
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will have to be satisfied with the way the actors that remained active in the sector 
measure their success. 
The promotion of certain elements of joint programming, such as joint studies and 
analyses and the division of work in the context of country strategies, can be found in 
development cooperation policy documents from the early 2000s. These activities were 
presented in the framework of the EU‘s efforts to maximise the effectiveness of its 
external action, following the increase in the number of external partners, instruments 
and financial resources in the development cooperation policy. 329  The first explicit 
reference to ‗joint multi-annual programming‘ in development cooperation policy 
appeared in the Report of the Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation (2004).330 In it, 
joint programming was listed among the recommendations put forward by the working 
party in the context of the Union‘s preparation for the Second High Level Forum on 
Harmonisation and Alignment for Aid Effectiveness (Paris, 2005). In the subsequent 
European Consensus on Development (2006), the EU confirmed its commitment to 
working towards joint programming as a means of pushing the international aid 
effectiveness agenda forward.331 That joint programming efforts were not intended to stop 
at the level of joint studies and analyses of the situation in the partner country was clearly 
addressed in the Commission Communication on country strategy papers and joint 
programming (2007).332  The Commission referred to a possible second stage of joint 
programming, whereby the actors involved could share a joint response strategy 
including common cooperation objectives, division of labour and financial allocations. 
However, in practice joint-programming exercises did not move beyond the rather vague 
phase of joint analyses. Following the scant success of previous initiatives, and convinced 
that ‗who does what‘ was the key issue to address in order to enhance complementarity 
among EU donors, the Union designed an EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour 
                                                 
329  Statement by the Council and the Commission of 20 November 2000 on the European 
Community‘s development policy and Guidelines for strengthening operational co-ordination between the 
Community, represented by the Commission, and the Member States in the field of External assistance 
(5431/01) 
330 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Party on Harmonisation: Advancing Coordination, Harmonisation 
and Alignment: the contribution of the EU (14670/04) 
331 European Consensus on Development (2006/C 46/01) 
332 Communication: Increasing the impact of EU aid: a common framework for drafting Country 
Strategy Papers and Joint Multiannual Programming (COM (2006) 88) 
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in Development Policy. This code presented joint programming as a ‗pragmatic tool‘ to 
advance the division of labour.333  
The real commitment to joint programming as the main EU contribution to the 
international aid effectiveness agenda materialised in the Council Conclusions for Busan 
(2011):334 
‗In order to show leadership in Busan and beyond (…), the EU will improve and strengthen 
joint programming at the country level.‘  
While acknowledging that joint programming is not an exclusive EU initiative, the 
Council mentioned that the Union would be its driving force. As to why there was 
renewed momentum to commit strongly to joint programming in international fora at 
this point in time, three reasons can easily be identified. These reasons appear in the 
introductory pages of the Agenda for Change, adopted just one month before the Council 
Conclusions for Busan. First, the EU was convinced that the work towards the MDG 
needed to be accelerated as the 2015 target was approaching. Second, HRVP and the 
EEAS provided ‗new opportunities for more effective development cooperation‘. Third, 
as a result of the economic and financial crisis, aid effectiveness was considered more 
important than ever before. The EU commitment to joint programming put forward in 
Busan was confirmed in the Mexico Communiqué, resulting from the First High Level 
Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2014). Under 
the section ‗voluntary initiatives‘, the EU committed to promoting the extension of joint 
programming and indicated that the initiative ‗should be operational in 40 or more 
partner countries by 2017.‘335  
The close ties between policy developments on joint programming within the EU 
development cooperation policy and the Union‘s commitment to the international aid 
effectiveness agenda show that joint programming cannot be understood without the 
latter. In fact, joint programming gives effect to a set of principles designed in 
international aid effectiveness fora (e.g. alignment, synchronisation, concentration, 
ownership), it is open to like-minded donors, and it does not require that all of its 
                                                 
333  Communication: An EU Code of Conduct (COM(2007) 72) and Council Conclusions: An 
Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (15912/09) 
334 Council Conclusions (16773/11) 
335 Mexico Communiqué (see note 313) 
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Member States take part.336 Furthermore, it is listed as one of the commitments of all 
signatories to the Busan Partnership Agreement and the Mexico Communiqué.337   
5.2 A striking example of vertical inter-policy coordination  
Joint programming fits perfectly with the spirit of Article 210 TFEU. Since it is an in-
country exercise, Union delegations (qua Commission) are taking the lead. One could 
argue that the shift from Commission to Union delegations  is irrelevant as far as joint 
programming is concerned, because the Commission is still the actor that is leading the 
exercise.338 However, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Union delegations 
are an integral part of the EEAS. As a consequence, delegations chair meetings between 
heads of mission and heads of cooperation, where joint programming is mainly 
discussed.339 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the chair of these meetings 
rotated between the Commission delegation and the embassies of Member States. The 
fact that Union delegations now chair these meetings allows a persistent attempt to 
convince Member States about the added value of joint programming. They can include 
joint programming in the agenda of each and every meeting with the diplomatic missions 
of Member States touching on development aid matters. This why, if joint programming 
becomes the rule in the near future, the initiative might turn into an example of the 
impact of the EEAS in promoting vertical inter-policy coherence in the field of 
development cooperation. We must not forget that joint programming in development 
cooperation policy has been on the agenda for around a decade, with little success in 
terms of specific commitments until very recently. 
 The central character of Union delegations within joint programming does not mean 
the EEAS and DEVCO (Brussels) are not involved in joint programming. In fact, they 
provide support to delegations throughout the process. For example, they elaborate the 
guidelines on the basis of which joint programming is conducted, and they organise joint 
                                                 
336 See, for instance, the Council Conclusions for Busan (16773/11), page 28 
337 Outcome documents of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 2011) and the 
First High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Mexico City, 
2014), respectively  
338 Ex-Article 20 TEU and Article 221 TFEU 
339 Meetings of heads of mission bring together the ambassadors of Member States and the head of the 
Union delegation, whereas meetings of heads of cooperation reunite the heads of cooperation of the 
embassies of Member States and the head of cooperation of the Union delegation, who is a DEVCO 
official  
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programming workshops where best practices are shared. 340  The headquarters of the 
EEAS and DEVCO are essential in the endorsement and adoption phases of agreed joint 
programming documents. 341  However, the responsibility to reach all the necessary 
agreements that can ultimately lead to a joint programming document lies with Union 
delegations. 
 Furthermore, joint programming matches perfectly the nature of development 
cooperation policy as a non-preemptive shared competence. 342  The initiative is an 
attempt to coordinate EU and Member State development policies, and it can never 
result in Member States being prevented from exercising their competence in the field of 
development cooperation. Despite the leadership of Union delegations and the use of the 
EU framework, in heads of cooperation and heads of mission meetings on joint 
programming Member States exercise their national development cooperation policies. 
They coordinate certain aspects of these policies collectively and with the Union‘s 
development policy.343 Nevertheless, Member States are very reticent to engage in joint 
programming exercises. The leading role of the Union and confusion regarding the limits 
between joint programming and joint implementation has led to questioning whether the 
initiative respects the character of development cooperation as a non-preemptive shared 
competence. In this regard, we should bear in mind that Member States are totally free to 
decide on the arrangements they want to enter to.344 Furthermore, there is also a case to 
argue that, given the broad interpretation of the Court regarding Member States‘ duties 
flowing from the principle of sincere cooperation, a Member State could be found in 
breach of the principle if it disregards its commitments in joint programming documents. 
For example, we can imagine a case where the EU modifies its EDF programming 
                                                 
340 See, for example, the Instructions for 11th EDF and DCI programming, page 13 (note 318). For 
example, a regional joint programming workshop was held in Addis Ababa on 13-14 March 2014 bringing 
together Union delegations from Central, East and Southern Africa  
341 On the procedure spanning from the in-country agreement on a joint programming document until 
its final adoption and formalisation, see the Instructions for 11th EDF and DCI programming, page 13 
(note 318) 
342 Article 4(4) TFEU. More proof that joint programming makes sense for non-preemptive shared 
competences is that the other policy field in which it is being developed is the European Research Area, 
which falls into the exact same category of EU competences (Article 4(3) TFEU) 
343 Notice that in Case C-316/91, Parliament v Council, [1994] ECR I-00625, the CJEU established 
that, due to the distribution of powers in development cooperation policy, Member States were free to 
provide the financial cooperation required by the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention by setting up the 7th EDF 
and directly assuming responsibility over it. The fact that both the Community and the Member States 
were part of the Convention, the decision-making process by which the EDF had been established, and the 
responsibilities of Community institutions over its administration were not considered determining factors 
for the expenditure to qualify as of the Community  
344 ‗Joint programming respects Member States sovereign decisions e.g. on choice of partner countries 
and level of financial allocations in these countries‘, Council Conclusions for Busan (16773/11), page 27 
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documents following commitments made in joint programming documents (e.g. phases 
out in a specific sector), while a Member State does not act accordingly. There is a case 
to argue that the Court could determine that the Member State failed to comply with the 
principle of sincere cooperation by not respecting an agreement by which it ‗intended to 
enter into a binding commitment‘ towards the other Member States and the EU. 345 
Interestingly, in this context the principle of sincere cooperation appears as an expression 
‗of Community solidarity‘ not only between the Member States and the EU, but among 
Member States.346 
 There are reasons to argue that Member States‘ uneasiness regarding joint 
programming is best explained by non-legal arguments. Member States fear that joint 
programming undermines their individual visibility in the partner countries where it is 
implemented. The so-called ‗visibility challenge‘ has two dimensions. First, Member 
States are concerned about the visibility of their actions, which may be diluted if these 
actions need to recognise that they are part of a joint EU strategy. The visibility challenge 
was addressed at the ‗EU Joint Programming Guidance Workshop‘, held in Stockholm 
in 2014. In this Workshop, it was explained that Member States could claim credit for 
the whole EU strategy, and keep ‗national stickers‘ on their projects and programmes, 
while mentioning that they are part of a common strategy.347 Besides, there is another 
dimension to the visibility challenge, which is less explicit but perhaps even more 
important. As a result of the division of tasks conducted in stage two of joint 
programming, each donor is only active in a limited number of sectors. This means that 
that not all donors will sit at the table with the relevant counterparts from the partner 
country. For example, if a donor has phased out of the education sector, this donor will 
not participate in meetings with the minister of education. In fact, both dimensions of the 
‗visibility challenge‘ show that Member States see a tension between strengthening the 
actorness of the Union and protecting their autonomy as independent international 
actors. By engaging in joint programming, Member States promote complementarity 
                                                 
345 Note the clear parallelism between the possible scenario presented and the FAO Case, where the 
Council was found to have breached the duty of cooperation, by disregarding an arrangement with the 
Commission on a coordination procedure regarding Community and Member States‘ action within the 
FAO Conference. According to the Court, the arrangement was ‗a fulfilment of that duty of cooperation 
between the Community and its Member States within FAO‘, by which ‗the two institutions intended to 
enter into a binding commitment towards each other‘. Case C-25/94, Commission v Council, FAO Case 
[1996] ECR I-01469, para 49 
346 C. HILLION, op. cit. 96, page 8  
347 Joint Programming Workshop: State of Play, Stockholm, 11-12 September 2014, EEAS, 
Development Cooperation Coordination Division and DEVCO, Aid and Development Effectiveness and 
Financing   
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between their development policies, and those of the Union. They make it possible for 
the Union to be recognised at the international level as a single actor, despite its legally 
fragmented nature. However, there is a price to be paid. Strengthening the international 
actorness of the Union may come at the cost of not sitting at all tables and, and having to 
include the EU flag next to the national flag.348   
5.3 A test case for the sincere cooperation-coherence-effectiveness link 
The link between the principle of sincere cooperation and the coherence and effectiveness 
of the Union‘s action is recognised in the treaties and by case law of the CJEU.349 The 
case of joint programming stands out as a particular example of this three-dimensional 
link. By exercising sincere cooperation and ensuring complementarity between their 
respective development policies (which is what joint programming is about) the EU and 
the Member States reinforce the role of the Union as an actor. When the EU and the 
Member States act in a coordinated manner, the political weight of the Union (now 
considered together with its Member States) in partner countries is strengthened. 
According to the Council:350   
‗Joint EU approaches (…) will collectively leverage more progress that can be achieved 
individually by Member States and the Commission‘. 
When the actorness of the Union is strengthened, it gains the leverage to be effective as 
regards its objectives, be these development objectives or not. 351  By ensuring 
complementarity, as a particular expression of coherence, the Union and the Member 
States appear to the partner country as a block. When this is the case, the persuasiveness 
of the Union to convince the third State to act in the direction of the EU objectives 
increases significantly. This can be essential in the promotion of democracy and the rule 
                                                 
348  Notice that the Member States fears as regards joint programming support the idea that the 
development cooperation policy is not only a non-preemptive competence because of the idea of the more 
aid the better. Development cooperation has a very sensitive political nature in the foreign policies of 
Member States. Interestingly, Stephan Klingebiel et al have interestingly referred to the existence of a limit 
or ‗right level‘ of aid coordination that Member States will be ready to accept. S. KLIENGEBIEL, P. 
MORAZAN, M. NEGRE, ‗Scenarios for Increased EU Donor Coordination: What Is the Right Level of 
Aid Coordination?‘, 7 DIE Briefing Paper 2014 
349 See chapter 1, section 3, pages 19-23 
350 Council Conclusions: An Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness (15912/09) 
351 ‗A Europe that delivers more, better and faster in the fight against global poverty; a more vocal 
Europe, with a political impact that matches the level of its financial generosity‘, Communication: An EU 
Code of Conduct (COM(2007) 72), page 3 
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of law, as well as respect for human rights, which are essential objectives of the Union 
within the governance agenda.  
 From a slightly different perspective, by exercising sincere cooperation, Member 
States divide their tasks, an exercise which is fundamental in avoiding contradictions, 
overlaps and funding gaps. Complementarity between EU and Member State 
development policies maximises the efficiency of these policies. Complementarity (i.e. 
coherence) ensures that EU and the Member States funds have the greatest impact 
possible as regards the objectives pursued (i.e. effectiveness). From this perspective, the 
sincere cooperation-coherence-effectiveness link is better understood when read in the 
reverse direction (i.e. effectiveness-coherence-sincere cooperation). The attempt to make 
the most efficient use of EU funds leads the Union to realise that it needs to coordinate 
(internally) it if it really wants to have an impact on the ground. We shall recall that the 
origins of joint programming can be found in the OECD-led aid effectiveness agenda. 
 Whether joint programming will become commonplace in the years to come largely 
depends on the extent to which Member States are willing to assume the costs of the 
initiative over the visibility of their own development policies. Even if they are reluctant 
to strengthen the international actorness of the Union, Member States should sign joint 
programming documents as a response to their commitments within the international aid 
effectiveness agenda.   
6 Chapter conclusions  
There are four conclusions to chapter 2 of this thesis. The first and most important 
conclusion is that the quest for coherence in the Union‘s external action is undermining 
the importance of legal delimitation in EU law. In fact, there is a clear tension between 
the definition of the scope of policy areas, which is part of legal delimitation, and the 
provision of common objectives, as another mechanism for coherence in EU external 
relations law. Legal delimitation is not only important for coherence. It is essential to 
protect the procedural scope of policy areas, and thus to comply with the principles of 
conferral and institutional balance. Likewise, legal delimitation is necessary to protect the 
treaty-defined substantive scope of policy areas. For example, legal delimitation should 
provide the framework to answer the questions: what are the objectives of the 
development cooperation policy, and what is the role of the European Parliament in 
promoting these objectives? From the perspective of coherence, underestimating the 
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importance of legal delimitation can be considered naïve. First, by not having clear rules 
to define the scope of policy areas, the legal framework cannot ensure consistency over 
the choice of the legal basis (i.e. CFSP or development cooperation?). Instead of 
appearing as an actor that is bound by legal rules, the Union portrays the image of an 
arbitrary actor whose way of acting is unpredictable. Second, providing all actors with the 
same objectives does not necessarily lead to complementarity across policies and 
activities. Instead, it can alter the substantive scope of EU policy areas and lead to the 
absolute dominance of one objective (i.e. security?), to the detriment of others, across 
policy areas. Third, since policy areas and instruments have their own procedures, 
providing all actors with the same objectives increases the risk of overlaps and 
substantive contradictions. The case of joint programming in development cooperation 
shows that the question ‗who does what?‘ is essential in ensuring complementarity (and 
efficiency) of EU and Member State development programmes. Hence it is reasonable to 
claim that the same question should be central in the horizontal relations between EU 
policy areas. In view of these arguments, the Union needs to strike a balance between 
promoting coherence through the provision of common objectives, and defining legal 
delimitation rules. Under the current legal framework, which is unavoidably problematic, 
this balance can be ensured if the single set of objectives is understood as an invitation to 
take account of the incidental objectives of each of the Union‘s actions. From this 
perspective, Article 21 TEU does not enable actors operating within a specific policy field 
to make substantial contributions to objectives that are central to the treaty definition of a 
different policy area. This interpretation protects the procedural and substantive scope of 
policy areas, and contributes to coherence in EU external relations.  
 The second conclusion of this chapter is that the impact of the quest for coherence on 
legal delimitation in EU law is exemplified by the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. 
Besides the tension between common objectives and legal delimitation, the security-
development nexus is a good example of a tension between common approaches and 
legal delimitation. The idea of the nexus was introduced as a policy approach to ensure 
complementarity between the CFSP and development cooperation policy. However, the 
nexus has created serious problems for the functioning of legal delimitation rules, 
rendering consistency over the choice of the legal basis almost impossible. We must not 
forget that the promotion of security objectives under the development cooperation 
policy predates the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Because of the far-reaching 
 117 
effects of the security-development nexus, including its use in the case law of the CJEU, 
it is not easy to defend the notion that the main objective of the development cooperation 
policy is the campaign against poverty. This provides legal arguments to those who argue 
against the security-development nexus as a securitisation of development. Interestingly, 
the HRVP (and the EEAS as her assisting body) are behind the proposal to reform the 
IcSP to include direct contributions to military activities. This also provides legal support 
those who argued that the roles of the HRVP and the EEAS over development 
cooperation would bring about a securitisation of development. Furthermore, the impact 
of the security-development nexus on EU external relations law confirms the importance 
of strategic policy documents in this area of EU law. 
 The third conclusion of this chapter is that vertical inter-policy coherence in EU 
development policy confirms the importance of pragmatic coherence (as opposed to soft 
power coherence). On the one hand, by coordinating their development programmes, 
EU and Member States increase the complementary of their actions. This contributes to 
the efficiency of their funds, and is an expression of the aid effectiveness agenda that the 
EU and most of its Member States are committed to. On the other hand, the case of joint 
programming shows the significance, in terms of EU‘s real power, of having the Union 
and its Member States appearing as a block before a third State.  
 Lastly, the fourth conclusion of chapter 2 of this thesis is that the quest for coherence 
often conflicts with other interests. The case of the CFSP-development nexus provides 
two concrete examples. On the one hand, while the lack of clear rules for defining the 
scope of policy areas cannot ensure consistency over the choice of the legal basis (i.e. 
CFSP or development cooperation?), there are arguments to defend this situation. The 
fact that actors have more room for manoeuvre to choose what tool (i.e. policy area or 
instrument) they want to use in each case can contribute towards strengthening the 
presence and visibility of the Union at the international level. It maximises the cases in 
which the Union responds to international matters. While this flexibility cannot ensure 
coherence, it contributes to a particular understanding of the Union‘s effectiveness as an 
international actor. On the other hand, the case of joint programming demonstrates that 
Member States perceive a tension between the increased actorness of the Union and their 






The Union’s action in Somalia: selected legal acts 
1 Introduction to chapter 3  
The aim of this chapter is twofold. It provides practical examples of both the security-
development nexus in EU external relations and the idea of the Union‘s wide toolbox to 
tackle international concerns. It also presents the findings of the case study, which test 
the mechanisms for coherence set out in the treaties in the context of the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus in Somalia.    
 The results of the case study are presented in the form of empirical claims to 
highlight that they mirror the theoretical claims of chapter 2. Although the theoretical 
claims are based on the CFSP-development cooperation nexus, they are formulated at a 
general level to stress that these claims can be analysed in other contexts. In contrast, the 
empirical claims are confined to the CFSP-development cooperation nexus because this 
is the scope of the case study. In fact, although the CFSP-development nexus provides 
the possibility of drawing conclusions beyond the scope of the nexus, the findings of the 
case study concern the nexus alone. The analysis conducted in chapter 2 is also 
important to understand the specific scope of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus 
as the thematic case of the thesis. For example, the EU humanitarian aid is outside the 
scope of the case study.  
 To conduct the case study, I selected 14 legal acts concerning Union action in 
Somalia between 2008 and 2014. These acts can be easily identified in Annex 2 of this 
thesis because they appear in italics. Seven of these acts have a CFSP legal basis, and the 
remaining seven have been adopted under a development cooperation legal basis. The 
legal acts of the case study constitute a representative sample of the different instruments 
(and programmes) forming the Union‘s toolbox. The legal measures analysed cover two 
years before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2008-2009), five years of the 
current legal framework (2010-2014), and four years since the EEAS was launched (2011-
2014). This is important because the analysis compares the current legal framework to 
the one in force before the Lisbon Treaty was adopted. The relevant context for 
understanding the legal acts of the case study is provided in sections 3 and 4 of this 
chapter.  
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 While the findings of the case study are based on 14 legal acts, they take into 
consideration the analysis of the long list of documents presented in Annex 2. Moreover, 
the case study does not examine policy coherence. The thesis argues that the mechanisms 
for coherence set out in the treaties are aimed at ensuring substantive coherence between 
policies and activities. However, it also claims that ensuring coherence in terms of results 
is not, at least for the time being, a qualitative obligation for political actors. This is why 
this thesis is not interested in examining substantive coherence in terms of results. In 
contrast, it focuses on whether the mechanisms for coherence set out in the treaties are fit 
for purpose. The case study focuses on legal measures. There are two reasons explaining 
this choice. First, the thesis analyses the legal dimension of the Union‘s quest for 
coherence, and it is the case that legal rules and principles are most constraining when 
EU actions require a legal basis.352 Second, the thesis is interested in the role of law as 
regards specific policies and activities interacting in EU external action. Since the Union 
is an organisation of conferred powers, most decisions defining policies and activities are 
contained in legal measures.353    
2 Somalia since the 1960s: main events, fundamental challenges and general 
international response   
The Somali State became independent in July 1960. The new State merged territories 
that were, at the time, controlled by the UK (the north) and Italy (the south). However, 
the idea of a State was new in Somalia, as the identity of its citizens was based on clan 
membership. The crucial importance of clans in Somalia can be considered to be one of 
the fundamental reasons behind State collapse.354 
                                                 
352 However, the mechanisms for coherence can be said to apply to all policies and activities of the 
Union, regardless of the nature of a measure. The Council Note on EU statements in multilateral 
organisations (2011) is an example showing that even legal delimitation is also relevant when the Union 
does not act through legal measures. This Note determines that statements by EU actors responsible for the 
external representation of the EU can only be prefaced by ‗on behalf of the EU‘ if they ‗refer exclusively to 
actions undertaken by or responsibilities of the EU in the subject matter concerned including in the CFSP‘. 
In every other instance, the expression ‗on behalf of the EU and its Member States‘ has to be employed. 
Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations (15901/11) 
353 See section 3 of chapter 1, pages 13-18 
354 According to Neyire Akpinarli: ‗the concept of a state was foreign to the inhabitants. Originally 
Somali society was posed of clans.‘ N. AKPINARLI, The fragility of the failed state paradigm: A different 
international law perception of the absence of effective government, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, page 34. 
For Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosende: ‗clanism lies at the root of the country‘s collapse.‘ W. 
CLARKE and R. GOSENDE, ‗Somalia: Can A Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?‘, R. I. ROTBERG 
(ed.), State failure and State weakness in a time of terror, World Peace Foundation, Booking Institution Press, 
2003, page 132 
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 The attempt to establish a democratic State in Somalia did not last long. In October 
1969, the President of Somalia, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, was assassinated. A military 
dictatorship was then established, under the rule of General Mohamed Siad Barre. The 
Somalia of Barre was highly centralised and had a single political party. The General 
considered the murder of Ali Shermarke a ‗Marxist revolution‘ and announced that 
Somalia would become a socialist State. In the midst of the Cold War, Somalia 
positioned itself under the influence of the Soviet Union, who heavily supported Barre 
until the Ogaden War (1977-1978). For Siad Barre, clan-related groups were an obstacle 
to modernity and were banned. He recuperated an old idea of the Somali nation, 
according to which a part of North-western Kenya, the Ethiopian region of Ogaden and 
the current territory of Djibouti belong to Somalia. In 1977, the General tried to conquer 
what is now Djibouti, as well as the Ethiopian Ogaden. As for the former, with 
important support from France, Djibouti managed to stop Barre and proclaimed its 
independence from France in June 1977. The conflict regarding the Ogaden region led to 
the ‗Ethio-Somali War‘ or the ‗Ogaden War‘ between 1977 and 1978. This war is a clear 
example of how external geostrategic interests in the Cold War affected regional and 
national politics in Africa. On the one hand, the Soviet Union, who had supported Barre 
during his first years in power, saw new opportunities in an alliance with Marxist 
Ethiopia (the traditional US ally in the Horn of Africa). On the other hand, the US ended 
its cooperation with Ethiopia, allegedly because of reported human rights violations, and 
became closer to the Somalia of Siad Barre. In the Ogaden War, the Soviet Union and 
Cuba strongly supported the Ethiopian forces, which finally defeated the Somali 
troops.355  
 The defeat in the Ogaden War and the execution of six generals from a major Somali 
clan, accused by Barre of terrorism against the State, offered the right context for 
opposition groups to flourish and organise. A conflict started between Barre and different 
clans trying to control certain parts of the territory. By the end of 1989, having lost all its 
international and domestic allies (including the US), the national government only 
controlled the area around Mogadishu, and Barre was ironically referred to as ‗the mayor 
                                                 
355 Neyire Akpinarli argues that the support given by the Soviet Union and the US to the dictatorship 
of Siad Barre explains the ignorance of the international munity as regards the ‗the corruption, repression, 
and human rights violations‘ under this regime. N. AKPINARLI, ibid, page 36. For Walter S. Clarke and 
Robert Gosende, once the Cold War was over the relevance of Somalia ‗was to be measured only by the 
misery of its people‘. W. CLARKE and R. GOSENDE, ibid, page 139 
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of Mogadishu‘.356 In January of 1991, Siad Barre fled the country, and the State finally 
collapsed. A civil war then started between different opposition groups competing for 
power. In May 1991, the former British protectorate in the north proclaimed its 
independence as Somaliland.357 
 Lidwien Kapteijns provides some relevant information regarding the economic 
situation in which the regime of Siad Barre left Somalia.358 According to the author, the 
civil war disrupted all productive activities, such as the banana production. Water and 
electricity supply in Mogadishu were inexistent. Inflation was so high that, according to 
Kapteijns, government salaries could only cover the needs of a family of a few days of tea 
and sugar. Moreover, inland from Mogadishu, people seemed to live on only sorghum or 
maize porridge with a little bit of tea and milk. The fighting in Mogadishu in 1991-1992 
between clan leaders aggravated the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, and complicated 
enormously the provision of international humanitarian assistance.359   
 In 1992 the conflict and the famine in Somalia became central in the resolutions of 
the UNSC. In January 1992, the Security Council established an arms embargo against 
Somalia.360 In April, after the conflicting parties had signed a cease-fire in New York, the 
UNSC set UNOSOM, a peacekeeping operation to provide humanitarian assistance in 
Mogadishu and the surrounding area and to control the cease-fire.361 A few months later, 
in August 1992, the US, together with a small number of allies, set ‗Operation Provide 
Relief‘, which complemented UNOSOM and focused on airlifting humanitarian 
assistance to particular areas of South-central Somalia, avoiding Mogadishu.362 Soon it 
became evident that, with these interventions, humanitarian aid could not reach those in 
need. In December 1992, the US launched ‗Unified Task Force‘ (UNITAF) or 
‗Operation Restore Hope‘.363 This was a much more robust operation than ‗Operation 
                                                 
356 W. CLARKE and R. GOSENDE, op. cit. 354, page 130 
357 Somaliland is not internationally recognised as an independent State, but functions de facto as such. 
The region of Puntland, in the north-east of Somalia, proclaimed its autonomy within Somalia in 1998 
358 L. KAPTEIJNS, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991, Pennsylvania Studies in 
Human Rights, 2012, pages 93-95 
359 Neyire Akpinarli explains that, according to UN estimates, only 30% of the aid reached those in 
need. N. AKPINARLI, ibid, page 36. Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosende state that the fighting in 
Mogadishu (1991-1992) provoked 35.000 casualties among civilians. W. CLARKE and R. GOSENDE, op. 
cit. 354, page 140 
360 UNSC Resolution 733 (1992), para 5  
361 UNSC Resolution 751 (1992). Later, UNSC Resolution 767 (1992) expanded the mandate of 
UNOSOM to the whole country 
362 UNSC Resolution 775(1992) 
363  According to Neyire Akpinarli, while the centre of the operation was the facilitation of 
humanitarian relief, the use of the phrase ‗use all necessary means‘ in UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) 
implied the use of force under Article 42 of the UN Charter. N. AKPINARLI, op. cit. 359, page 42 
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Provide Relief‘ (it brought together a coalition of around 20 States) and it was also active 
in Mogadishu. The mandate of UNITAF focused on clearing the most important 
roadways in Somalia for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, leaving political 
considerations for a future UN intervention. Consequently, in March 1993 the UNSC 
launched UNOSOM II, whose mandate focused primarily on reconstruction. In two 
separate attacks in June and October 1993, local military groups killed 24 Pakistani 
soldiers and 18 US soldiers. By March 1994, the US had withdrawn its combat forces 
from Somalia. The UNSC first redefined the mandate of UNOSOM II, limiting it to the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, and finally closed the operation in March 1995.364 
 Between 1996 and 2004, external intervention to support peace and reconciliation in 
Somalia mainly focused on the organisation of national reconciliation conferences and 
seminars. After the September 11 attacks, Somalia became of particular interest to the 
international community. It was perceived that the lack of government made Somalia a 
suitable territory for the emergence of terrorism. In 2004, after many failed attempts, the 
Somali national reconciliation conference held in Kenya adopted a transitional federal 
charter, establishing a number of transitional federal institutions. It established a 
parliament, and also a government, appointing a President and a Prime Minister. In 
October 2004, in a meeting held in Stockholm between the transitional federal 
government and the international community, it was agreed that the UN would take a 
leading role in coordinating international efforts to support the transitional federal 
institutions of Somalia. In June 2006, an International Contact Group on Somalia (ICG) 
was established in order to coordinate efforts in the peace and reconciliation process. In 
February 2006, the transitional parliament had its first session on Somali soil, in the city 
of Baidoa.365 
 Despite the results of the 2004 national reconciliation conference, in early 2006 the 
Union of Islamic Courts managed to control Mogadishu and an important part of South 
Central Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts provided justice services to the Somalis on 
the basis of sharia law, as well as other services, like food and health. Under the rule of 
the Courts, checkpoints in Mogadishu disappeared.366 However, justice based on sharia 
                                                 
364 UNSC Resolution 897 (1994) and UNSC Resolution 954 (1994), respectively  
365 Council Conclusions (7650/06), page 2 
366 When writing about his stay in Mogadishu in September 2006, Stig Jarle Hansen states: ‗I was 
happy witnessing the unusual sights and sounds of that autumn: Somali girls walked past us at night 
laughing and gossiping; we drove across the entire city without passing a single checkpoint, with only one 
guard from the Sharia Courts to take care of us.‘ S. J. HANSEN, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and 
Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012, Oxford University Press, 2013, page 2 
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law was brutal. According to Stig Jarle Hansen, the reason why the Courts managed to 
acquire certain support among the Somali population is that all other options, from 
democracy to clanism, had been tried and had failed.367 When Ethiopia declared its 
support for the transitional federal government of Somalia, Libya and Saudi Arabia and 
Eritrea proclaimed their support for the Union of Islamic Courts and the conflict in 
Somalia acquired a regional dimension. Towards the end of 2006, the government of 
Ethiopia, concerned about the risks that the Courts created for its own territorial 
integrity, decided to invade Somalia. Ethiopia was supported by the US, who disliked the 
idea of an Islamist regime in the Horn of Africa.368 The occupation of Ethiopia did not 
end until January 2009.  
 From 2006 to 2016, the security situation in Somalia has been a cause of concern. In 
December 2006 the UNSC authorised a regional peacekeeping operation led by IGAD 
and the AU to protect the transitional government of Somalia. This operation was named 
IGASOM.369 However, it never materialised and was replaced by AMISOM: the AU 
Mission to Somalia, which has been active since 2007.370 In June 2008, piracy attacks in 
the Gulf of Aden led the UNSC to authorise foreign warships to enter into Somali waters 
to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea by all necessary means. Also in the 
summer of 2008, the transitional federal government concluded the Djibouti Peace 
Agreement, as an important step towards establishing dialogue with the opposition. The 
agreement included a set of measures to stop violence and asked the UN to authorise and 
deploy an International Stabilisation Force in Somalia. In fact, AMISOM was designed 
as a short-term operation that would handover to an UN support operation. In its 
Resolution 1910 (2010), the UNSC referred to Al-Shabaab for the first time explicitly. 
Since then it has repeatedly condemned the terrorist attacks perpetrated by the 
organisation. For example, in the Resolution 2297 (2016), the UNSC condemns: 
                                                 
367 ‗Democracy, nationalism, Marxism and clanism had been tried out and had yielded little for the 
Somalis. In the end religion, employed as a political ideology, had only weak rivals to contend with, 
although clanism in different forms remained important.‘ Ibid, page 4 
368 According to Christopher Clapham, Ethiopia ‗was able to gain the support, both military (notably 
through satellite intelligence) and diplomatic, of the United States, to which an overtly Islamist regime in a 
strategically sensitive part of the post-9/11 world was unthinkable.‘ C. CLAPHAM, ‗Peacebuilding 
without a State: the Somali Experience‘, in D. CURTIS and G. A. DZINESA (eds.), Peacebuilding, Power 
and Politics in Africa, Cambridge Series of African Studies Series, Ohio University Press, 2012 
369 UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) 
370 UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007) 
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‗Recent Al Shabab attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing serious concern at the ongoing 
threat posed by Al Shabab, and underlining its concern that Al Shabaab continues to hold 
territory and extort revenue in Somalia.‘ 
In Resolution 2297 (2016), the UNSC also states that the conditions are not yet 
appropriate for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission.371 The UNSC authorises 
AMISOM to maintain the deployment of around 22,000 uniformed personnel until end 
May 2017.372 To the present day, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and other 
African nations have been contributing nations to AMISOM. 
 As an integral part of the fight against Al-Shabaab, between 2014 and 2015 a joint 
military operation between the Somali military, AMISOM and the US was launched in 
Southern Somalia. As part of this operation, on 1 September 2014, a US airstrike killed 
Al-Shabaab leader Moktar Ali Zubeyr. Additional senior Al-Shabaab commanders were 
also killed or died in combat. Moreover, in 2013 the UNSC established a UN Assistance 
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). 373  Its mandate is to help the Government in its 
stabilisation efforts and to assist the Government of Somalia in coordinating 
international donor support on security sector assistance.  
 On the political side, the last decade has also seen important changes. In April 2009 
an international conference on security in Somalia was held in Brussels. It was convened 
by the UN Secretary General and hosted by the EU. In 2012, there were international 
conferences on Somalia in London and Istanbul. In 2012, the transition formally 
concluded with the adoption of a provisional constitution, the selection of a federal 
parliament and the election of a new President. It was agreed that the federal parliament 
would set benchmarks until 2016, when general elections would take place. In February 
2013, there was another international conference in Brussels, co-hosted by the EU and 
Somalia. The Conference focused on building a new political order in Somalia, 
promoting its socio-economic development and establishing the rule of law and security. 
It resulted in the endorsement of the New Deal Compact for Somalia between Somalia 
and the international community. The Compact was designed to guide reconstruction of 
Somalia, based on the Busan New Deal Principles for Fragile States. It is structured 
around five peace and statebuilding goals. The Compact recognises the importance of 
sustained monitoring and foresees a high-level partnership forum to discuss its 
                                                 
371 UNSC Resolution 2297 (2016) 
372 UNSC Resolution 2297 (2016) 
373 UNSC Resolution 2093 (2013) 
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implementation and a central mechanism for strategic coordination. In November 2014, 
the first ministerial high level partnership forum on Somalia was held in Copenhagen, to 
take stock of joint progress and challenges since the New Deal Conference in Brussels 
and agree on the necessary actions and steps required to achieve the Somali Compact 
goals by 2016 (Vision 2016). The Vision 2016: Framework for Action is a plan of the 
Government of Somalia laying down the foundations for a new Somalia and for realising 
the Somali Compact. In July 2015, the second ministerial high level partnership forum 
on Somalia was held in Mogadishu and in February 2016 the third one was organised in 
Istanbul. The meeting in Istanbul reviewed the steps leading to the Vision 2016, 
especially before the elections in September 2016. In Resolution 2297 (2016), the UNSC 
welcomes the steps taken and encourages no more delays for the elections that are 
planned for September 2016:374   
‗President Hassan Sheikh‘s and the FGS‘s commitment to an inclusive and credible electoral 
process in 2016 and underlines the Council‘s expectation that there should not be an 
extension of electoral process timelines for either the executive or legislative branches, 
underlines the importance of implementing the electoral process set out in the 22 May 2016 
Presidential decree without further delay, calls on all parties to engage constructively to 
achieve this and emphasizes that this year‘s electoral process is a critical step towards one 
person one vote elections in 2020 and in this regard urges the National Leadership Forum to 
adopt a roadmap to the 2020 elections.‘ 
3 Union action in Somalia: context 
3.1 EU approach to Somalia in the last decade  
The EU has been a very active player in the response to the challenges faced by Somalia 
over the last few years. Since the adoption of a transitional federal charter in 2004, the 
Union has continuously supported the transitional federal institutions and it has also 
been militarily active in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the EU has been one 
of the main providers of development and humanitarian aid, and it has played an 
important role in coordinating the efforts of international donors. 375  In conclusions 
adopted in July 2016, the Council reaffirmed its commitment to the future of Somalia:376 
                                                 
374 UNSC Resolution 2297 (2016) 
375 In November 2011, the Council referred to the Union as ‗the largest donor in Somalia‘. Council 
Conclusions (16855/11), page 5 
376 Council Conclusions (11238/16) 
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‗The EU reaffirms its strong commitment to a peaceful and prosperous future for Somalia, 
and will continue to support the sustainable development and security of the country in the 
post-electoral period.‘  
The Union has repeatedly expressed its concern regarding the humanitarian situation in 
Somalia, resulting from successive droughts and continuous violence, and the important 
difficulties facing humanitarian organisations.377 In certain instances, the situation has 
been affected by famine. For example, in October 2014 the Council claimed:378  
‗The EU expresses deep concern at the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Somalia due to 
drought, continued conflict, restricted flow of commercial goods into areas affected by 
military operations and surging food prices, and urges all parties to allow safe, timely and 
unhindered humanitarian access to all areas by humanitarian agencies.‘  
As regards specific data on poverty in Somalia, in 2014 the Commission borrowed data 
from the World Bank to state:379 
‗The majority of Somalis today live in poverty and vulnerability. Extreme poverty (less than 
USD 1 person/day) is estimated at 53,4% and general poverty (less than USD 2 
person/year) reaches 73.4%. GDP per capita is estimated to be only USD 288 far below the 
Sub-Saharan average and unemployment is estimated to be 54% with youth unemployment 
(age 18 to 29) reaching 67% - one of the highest rates in the world. 2 More than 1 million 
Somalis are acutely food insecure and in need of emergency humanitarian assistance among 
them 63% of the 1.1 million internally displaced people. 2.4 million Somalis are food 
insecure.‘ 
References to the humanitarian crisis and to the difficult access to humanitarian relief are 
often accompanied by calls to all parties to respect human rights and humanitarian 
law.380 The EU has also stressed the challenges created by the internal displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of Somalis.381 
                                                 
377 In July 2009, the Council claimed: ‗the situation in Somalia remains one of the worst humanitarian 
crises in the world.‘ Council Conclusions (12441/09), page 2 
378 Council Conclusions (14465/14), page 6: ‗the famine has expanded to six regions of southern 
Somalia, including Mogadishu, and threatens to further expand across the south affecting nearly half of the 
population.‘ Council Conclusions (16855/11), page 2  
379 Decision C(2014) 671, Annex 1, pages 2-3 
380 Council Conclusions (8791/07), page 2 
381 Council Conclusions (16855/11), page 4 
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 In December 2007, the Union referred for the first time to the threat of piracy off the 
Somali coast, in the Horn of Africa and beyond.382 In November 2011, the Council 
mentioned Al-Shabaab for the first time, and condemned its attacks in Somalia and in 
neighbouring countries as well as the taking of hostages. The Union considered the threat 
created by Al-Shabaab not only to Somalia and its neighbouring countries but also to the 
international community as a whole:383 
‗The EU condemns the continued attacks on Somali civilians by Al Shabaab, including the 
bomb attacks of 4 and 18 October in Mogadishu. It is particularly concerned about the 
extension of such attacks to neighbouring countries, including Kenya, and the kidnap of 
European citizens and calls for their immediate release. Such attacks threaten not just 
neighbouring countries but the international community as a whole.‘  
‗Instability in Somalia is posing a growing challenge not only to the security of the people in 
Somalia but also to the region and the rest of the world, through terrorism, piracy and the 
proliferation of weapons.‘ 
As regards donor coordination in Somalia, the EU has repeatedly recognised the leading 
role of the UN in coordinating international support to the institutions of Somalia, as 
decided in the Stockholm meeting of October 2004.384 Council conclusions on Somalia 
often refer to UNSC resolutions and to statements of the President of the UNSC. For 
example, in 2007 the Council recognised the leadership of the UNSG‘s Special 
Representative for Somalia: 385 
‗The Council welcomes the reinvigorated role of the International Contact Group on 
Somalia under the leadership of the SRSG and stays committed to participation in this 
mechanism, including at field level.‘ 
The priorities of the Union over the last decade, as expressed in conclusions of the 
Council, have essentially been: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), 
                                                 
382 Council Conclusions (16394/07), page 2 
383 Council Conclusions (16855/11), page 2 and Council Conclusions (7889/11), page 2, respectively 
384 Council Conclusions (15145/04), pages 2-3 
385 Council Conclusions (6252/07), page 3 
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as well as internal reconciliation, security sector reform and reconstruction.386 According 
to the UN:387 
‗DDR activities are crucial components of both the initial stabilization of warn-torn societies 
as well as their long-term development.‘ 
These priorities signal that the Union‘s main objective has been stabilisation and 
governance support, under both the CFSP and the development cooperation policy. For 
example, in 2007 the Council claimed:388 
‗The promotion and protection of human rights, the restoration of the rule of law, 
democracy and good governance in Somalia, is the only effective way to provide social and 
economic recovery and to eradicate the threat of terrorism.‘ 
Hence it is not surprising that the idea of the Union‘s comprehensive approach, covering 
security and development policies, has been central in Somalia. Consistently, there has 
been a clear prioritisation of governance support, as this is considered essential to 
security and development challenges alike. Already in 2006, the Union alluded to its 
comprehensive strategic framework for Somalia.389 In December 2007, it referred to:390 
‗A comprehensive approach to the Somali crisis, covering the political, security and 
humanitarian facets.‘ 
The Union has also stressed that long-term assistance from international partners cannot 
be effective without a stabilisation of the security situation: 391 
‗The Council supports the ambition of the new Transitional Federal Government to focus on 
the development and strengthening of national capacity in the security sector. The security 
sector should be firmly committed to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the 
principles of good governance and accountability.‘ 
                                                 
386 See, for example, Council Conclusions (15145/04), page 2 and Council Conclusions (10157/09), 
page 3 
387 UN peacekeeping website, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr.shtml (last visited: 16 
August 2016) 
388 Council Conclusions (9621/07), page 2 
389 Council Conclusions (7650/06), page 3 
390 Council Conclusions (16394/07), page 2 
391 Council Conclusions (10157/09), page 2 and Council Conclusions (10157/09), page 1, respectively 
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‗The Council notes that a stable security environment in Somalia is vital for building state 
institutions, providing adequate humanitarian aid, kick-starting recovery efforts and reducing 
the threat of piracy.‘ 
Moreover, the EU has recognised that the fight against piracy off the Somali coast forms 
part of the comprehensive approach to Somalia. Linking the fight against piracy at sea to 
on-land long-term development cooperation is a clear example of the security-
development nexus approach:392  
‗Containment at sea will be further strengthened by efforts to tackle the root causes of piracy, 
focused on improving livelihoods, economic opportunities and the rule of law.‘ 
The Union has also referred to its wide toolbox to tackle the challenges faced in 
Somalia:393 
‗Successful EU delivery and responsiveness in the Somali peace process remains essential to 
support a comprehensive political solution which would bring long term stability to Somalia. 
The EU remains ready to make full use of all existing instruments to attain this objective.‘ 
The security-development nexus and the governance agenda in Somalia translate into 
two huge priorities: security sector reform and support for the government of Somalia. 
The Union has been a strong supporter of security sector reform. In fact, the Council has 
recently confirmed its intention to extend the mandates of its current CSDP missions and 
operation in Somalia and the Horn of Africa until December 2018. It has justified this 
decision as a means to enhance the EU‘s comprehensive approach in Somalia (and the 
Horn of Africa), and in particular the security-development nexus.394 
 A clear example of the Union‘s commitment to security sector reform in Somalia 
during the last years is its continued support to AMISOM. Even before this AU 
operation was launched, the EU had already committed 15 million EUR.395 The Union 
has referred to AMISOM as essential for the provision of humanitarian assistance, and 
also in the fight against Al-Shabaab. In 2014, when AMISOM was heavily debated 
because of multiple cases of sexual exploitation by AMISOM soldiers, the EU admitted 
its concerns but defended the operation, nevertheless.396  
                                                 
392 Council Conclusions (7889/11), page 5 
393 Council Conclusions (16394/07), page 4 (emphasis added) 
394 Council Conclusions (11238/16) 
395 Council Conclusions (5546/07), page 3 
396 Council Conclusions (14465/14), page 4 
 131 
 The continued support to the transitional federal institutions (later, the government) 
has constituted the other main priority of the Union in Somalia over the last few years. In 
the first years that followed the adoption of the transitional federal charter in 2004, the 
Union‘s support to the transitional federal institutions was even referred to as 
‗unequivocal‘.397 For example, the EU claimed:398 
‗The EU reaffirms its commitment and stands ready to continue to support Somalia 
throughout the electoral process, in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
political independence and unity of the country.‘ 
‗The Council condemns the use of force by all sides and emphasises that the problems of 
Somalia can only be solved by political means, building on the Transitional Federal 
Charter.‘ 
The Union has repeatedly stressed that the transitional federal institutions should ensure 
that all stakeholders (e.g. clan elders, Islamic leaders, civil society) are engaged in an 
inclusive reconciliation process. It has also mentioned that the government of Somalia 
should be broad-based, and reach out to all sectors of the Somali society.399 However, the 
Union has undoubtedly positioned itself on the side of the transitional federal institutions 
of Somalia. A clear example is the EU‘s response to the role of the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UIC) in 2006. When the UIC controlled certain parts of the territory of Somalia, 
the EU clearly defended the transitional federal institutions. The Union did not even 
refer to the fact that the UIC controlled a part of the territory and were supported by an 
important part of the population:400 
‗The Council expresses its deep concern about the continuing tensions in Somalia between 
the UIC and the TFIs. The Council reconfirms its support to the TFIs as the only legitimate 
political representation in Somalia as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC).‘ 
Likewise, the Union has minimised the role of clan leaders in Somalia and it has avoided 
referring to Somaliland as a de facto independent State. Moreover, although the Union 
                                                 
397 See, for example, Council Conclusions (7650/06), page 2 
398 Council Conclusions (15145/04), page 3 and Council Conclusions (9621/07), page 2 
399 See, for example, Council Conclusions (5546/07), page 3 and Council Conclusions (15145/04), 
page 2 
400 Council Conclusions (12877/06), page 2 
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has acknowledged problems in the action of the government of Somalia, it has 
maintained its support. For instance, in October 2014, the Council claimed:401 
‗The EU remains concerned by continuing reports of humanitarian law and human rights 
violations, including extrajudicial killings, violence against women and children, recruitment 
and use of children, attacks against journalists and arbitrary detentions. The fight against 
impunity for these crimes is essential. The EU encourages the Federal Government of 
Somalia to take concrete measures to implement fully its human rights roadmap adopted in 
August 2013 and to continue implementing its action plans on children and armed conflict.‘  
However, from the ‗unequivocal‘ support in the years immediately after the adoption of 
the transitional federal charter in 2004, the Council moved towards a position where it 
started to demonstrate its perhaps not such unconditional support to Somalia. For 
example:402  
‗The pace and degree of such progress will determine the extent of continued or additional 
EU support to the TFIs.‘ 
‗The EU recognizes that these tasks are interdependent and it is committed to provide 
targeted support for their full implementation, provided the TFIs demonstrate the political 
will to deliver effectively, improve financial transparency and accountability, and take 
effective action to tackle corruption.‘ 
By the same token, while in the first years the Council avoided referring to Somaliland 
and Puntland, it later recognised the need to support regional governments too:403  
‗The Council encourages constructive engagement from all regions of Somalia, including 
Puntland and Somaliland, in building an environment of trust and cooperation to mutual 
benefit.‘ 
‗Regions of Somalia such as Puntland, Somaliland, as well as other local actors, including 
Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama‘a, will be further supported by the EU as long as they continue to 
make progress in providing services, enhancing the Somali reconciliation process, combating 
Al Shabab and developing their cooperation with the TFIs and other regional actors.‘  
                                                 
401 Council Conclusions (14465/14), page 3. Similar concerns were expressed in Council Conclusions 
(12463/13), page 5 
402 Council Conclusions (16855/11), pages 3 and 4 
403 Council Conclusions (12441/09), page 2 and Council Conclusions (16855/11), page 5 
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In fact, there is a slight difference between Council conclusions and Commission 
decisions on development cooperation as regards the support to the institutions of 
Somalia. This difference is a matter of detail, since the support to the governance sector is 
an absolute priority in the EU‘s action in Somalia, including as regards development 
cooperation. However, the Commission admits in a more open manner the deficiencies 
of the transitional federal institutions, and it has been much more critical as regards their 
performance. This may simply be the case because Council conclusions are more public 
than Commission financing decisions in EU development cooperation, which generally 
do not reach the public. In 2008 the Commission claimed:404 
‗Three years into the transition, the TFIs have achieved few tangible results in that regard; 
the conflict has intensified, with various armed groups opposing the TFIs and their 
Ethiopian military supporters.‘ 
Even in 2014, when the transition had formally concluded, the Commission claimed:405 
‗Public sector systems that should provide support and protection to the population are 
almost inexistent due to the lack of a formal unified state and effective governance 
structures.‘ 
Moreover, the Commission is much more explicit about the comparably better situation 
in Somaliland and Puntland:406 
‗Peace and stability pay. Somaliland and Puntland have attracted the majority of 
international development aid due to their capacity to ensure an acceptable level of security 
and their public institutions have some capacity to administer.‘ 
As regards the current political situation, the Commission is also more critical than the 
Council. In 2015, the Commission stated:407 
‗However, political and institutional progress is fragile and many of the actual 'transition' 
tasks still remain to be accomplished, notably the delivery of a final constitution and 
democratic elections by 2016. The government has made initial progress in establishing the 
executive and a better functioning parliament, as well as engaging with sub-national regions 
                                                 
404 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 1, page 1  
405 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 1, page 2 
406 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 1, page 4. The Commission also expressed that Somaliland and 
Puntland were doing better in C(2008) 8403, Annex 1, page 1 and considered the need to coordinate with 
the authorities of Somaliland and Puntland in C(2008) 8403, Annex 2, page 1 
407 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 2, page 2 
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and aspiring Federal Member States (FMS). In the north, political settlements are more 
advanced. Somaliland is reaching its fifth electoral cycle while Puntland is working to re-
establish a democratisation trajectory for its institutions. Challenges still remain in the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms, and in South-Central in particular violations of human 
security, human rights and a high rate of gender based violence including recruitment of 
child soldiers persist with impunity. While many parts of South-Central Somalia remain 
outside of the control of the FGS, the recent recovery of significant territory from Al-
Shabaab (AS) by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia 
National Armed Forces (SNAF) has resulted in a pressing need for increased assistance to 
newly accessible areas. If the population in those areas does not experience tangible ‗peace 
dividends‘ in a short timeframe, there is a high risk that gains will be reversed.‘ 
In contrast, in its conclusions on Somalia adopted in July 2016, the Council claims:408 
‗The forthcoming electoral process in Somalia is a milestone for the Somali people and 
Somali politics. It will have long-lasting implications for the security, stability and 
development of Somalia, and the wider region. The EU welcomes the progress, both at 
central and regional level, since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS) in 2012. This progress reflects the achievements, despite great challenges, of the 
Somali people themselves, and the close relationship with the international community 
through the 2013 Somali Compact.‘  
‗The new Federal leadership emerging from the electoral process will have to take on crucial 
challenges. In this context, the EU highlights the importance of finalising the constitutional 
review process with a clear timeline. The new constitution must ensure a balance of power 
between the bicameral legislature, the President and the FGS, and clarify the relationship 
between the central institutions and the federal member states.‘  
The continued support of the Union to the institutions of Somalia and to its territorial 
unity, as well as to AMISOM, which are especially clear in Council conclusions, are in 
line with UNSC resolutions. Moreover, the Union‘s approach to Somalia can be 
considered a particular example of the security-development nexus approach and the 
governance agenda, which appear rather abstract in policy documents. The approach to 
Somalia shows the implications of prioritising governance reform in EU external action. 
In the case of Somalia, prioritising the governance agenda means supporting a particular 
part of the story, and concentrating on measures that are not necessarily the most 
                                                 
408 Council Conclusions (11238/16) 
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effective way of reducing poverty. The challenges faced by Somalia more than ten years 
after the transition started are reasons to question the international governance agenda. 
When analysing why international intervention failed in Somalia, Christophe Clapham 
claims: 
‗Since there was no State, there was no incentive for clan leaders to moderate their behaviour 
to maintain an instrument of governance they could all use.‘409 
Be it as it may, the overall approach of the Union to Somalia over the last decade is 
consistent with the security-development nexus approach and with the governance 
agenda, which are defined at a general level in EU policy documents. 
3.2 Cooperation under the Cotonou framework 
Somalia is a member of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States and is 
part of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, which was signed in Cotonou on 23 June 
2000 and revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 and in Ouagadougou on 22 June 
2010.410 The Cotonou Agreement, as it is generally known, is a fundamental framework 
for the implementation of the EU‘s development cooperation policy in Somalia. It is a 
mixed agreement bringing together 78 APC States, on the one hand, and the EU and its 
Member States, on the other hand. 411  It constitutes one of the largest financial and 
political frameworks in North-South cooperation.  
 The organisation of the ACP Group of States came into being in 1975 with the 
Georgetown Agreement, which constitutes its fundamental charter. It was created with 
the aim of coordinating cooperation between its members and the EU. Over the years, 
the Group extended its objectives. The Lomé Convention, which can be considered the 
first predecessor of the Cotonou Agreement, was also signed in 1975. However, relations 
between the EU and the ACP date back to before 1975. In fact, the Lomé Convention 
                                                 
409 According to Christopher Clapham: ‗Somalia cannot even properly be characterized as a failed 
State: there is simply no state that could be said to have failed. (…). The elements out of which a state must 
be constructed are equally non-existent. The shells of the burnt-out ministry buildings of what used to 
constitute the Somali government contain no bureaucrats, nor is there any cadre of qualified people, 
waiting in the wings, who could be organized into a new machinery of government.‘ C. CLAPHAM, op. 
cit. 368 
410 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in 
Cotonou on 23 June 2000, as amended in Ouagadougou (OJEU L 287, 4.11.2010)  
411 Cuba is a member of the ACP Group of States but not a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement. Visit 
the website of the ACP Group in: http://www.acp.int/ (last visited: 28 August 2016) 
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replaced the Convention of Yaoundé (1963), which connected the then EEC to former 
colonies of some of its Member States. The objective of the Cotonou Agreement is:412 
‗To promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, 
with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic 
political environment.‘ 
The Agreement is built on three elements: political dialogue, trade and development 
cooperation. First, Article 8 enshrines regular political dialogue between the parties. The 
Agreement also contains essential elements clauses and a consultation procedure aimed 
at finding common solutions when concerns regarding respect for human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law arise.413 Appropriate measures, including the 
suspension of cooperation, are foreseen if no common solutions are found. Second, the 
Cotonou Agreement includes a trade component, which mainly concerns the negotiation 
of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). These agreements, grant special conditions 
to ACP countries to promote their development and gradual integration into the global 
economy, must be compatible with WTO rules. Third, the Agreement has a development 
cooperation leg, which is the oldest purpose of the ACP-EU Partnership. According to 
Article 55, the objective of ‗development finance cooperation‘ is to support ACP 
countries in pursuing the objectives of the Agreement through financial resources and 
technical assistance. The development cooperation component of the Agreement is 
strongly based on the principle of ownership:414   
‗Development finance cooperation shall be implemented on the basis of and be consistent 
with the development objectives, strategies and priorities established by the ACP States, at 
national, regional and intra-ACP levels.‘ 
The security-development nexus is central in the Cotonou Agreement, particularly after 
its 2010 revision. Article 11 is devoted to ‗peace building policies, conflict prevention and 
resolution, response to situations of fragility‘ and it provides the clearest references to the 
nexus that can be found in the Agreement:415   
                                                 
412 Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement (see note 410) 
413 Article 96, Cotonou Agreement  
414 Article 56(1), Cotonou Agreement. See also Article 4, which refers to the principle of ownership of 
ACP countries in the implementation of the three dimensions of the Agreement 
415 See also page 14 of the Preamble of the Cotonou Agreement  
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‗The Parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no 
sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no 
sustainable development.‘ 
‗The interdependence between security and development shall inform the activities in the 
field of peace building, conflict prevention and resolution which shall combine short and 
long-term approaches, which encompass and go beyond crisis management. Activities to 
tackle new or expanding security threats shall, inter alia, support law enforcement, including 
cooperating on border controls, enhancing the security of the international supply chain, and 
improving air, maritime and road transport safeguards.‘ 
The Agreement was signed in 2010 for a 20-year-period, which means that it will expire 
in 2020. This explains why, in the last years, the debate regarding the future of the ACP-
EU Partnership was reached both the ACP countries and the EU. There is a common 
understanding that there is a decline in common interests between the two sides of the 
Partnership, which justifies reconsidering it.416 On the side of the ACP Group of States, 
the increasing relevance of emerging powers is influencing the preferences of developing 
countries regarding who their strategic partners should be. Moreover, within the Group, 
there are crucial differences in the economic and social development of each country and, 
thus, in their priorities. 
 Sandra Bartelt mentions multiple symptoms and causes why the Partnership is 
endangered.417 The fact that the current version of the treaties no longer establishes a 
special status for the ACP Group of States and the tendency of the EU towards 
regionalisation are symptomatic of the decreasing importance of the Partnership. 
Moreover, the fact that the ACP-EU Partnership has never really emerged as an actor in 
international fora is, according to the author, another reason why the Partnership may 
not last. Finally, the general perception that the Cotonou Agreement ultimately results 
from colonial history is also listed as a challenge for the future of the Partnership.418   
                                                 
416 In their Joint Consultation Paper on the future of the Partnership of 2015, the HRVP and the 
Commission claimed that it is necessary to analyse the extent to which the Partnership ‗remains valid for 
the future‘. Joint Consultation Paper from the HRVP and the Commission: Towards a new partnership 
between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries after 2020 (JOIN(2015) 33). 
See also the study on this issue by ECDPM: ‘The future of ACP-EU relations post-2020: an overview of relevant 
analysis by ECDPM’, Version 1, December 2014 
417 S. BARTELT, ‗ACP-EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads? One Year after the Second 
Revision of the Cotonou Agreement‘, European Foreign Affairs Review, 17, 2012 
418  Note that the Lomé Convention resulted from the UK accession into the EU in 1973 and, 
therefore, to the will to extend the existing preferential treatment for former French African colonies to 
countries in the Caribbean and the Pacific     
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Cooperation under the JAES 
Article 2 of the Cotonou Agreement establishes among its fundamental principles: 
‗Particular emphasis shall be put on regional integration, including at continental level.‘ 
In the particular context of peace and security policies, Article 11 of the Agreement 
recalls:  
‗The Parties emphasise the important role of regional organisations in peace building and 
conflict prevention and resolution and in tackling new or expanding security threats with, in 
Africa, a key responsibility for the African Union.‘ 
The tendency towards focusing on continental and regional organisations to address 
problems faced by Africa constitutes one of the challenges for the future of the ACP-EU 
Partnership.419 In fact, together with the ACP-EU Partnership, the Africa-EU Partnership 
has been institutionalised under the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which was agreed 
in Lisbon in 2007.420 
 The JAES is considered a long-term strategic partnership and in involves the 
celebration of regular summits, as well as the adoption of biannual action plans. It 
essentially pursues four objectives and strategic priorities, namely: peace and security; 
governance and human rights; trade and regional integration; and key development 
issues. Under peace and security, which is again listed as one of the main priorities of the 
JAES Roadmap 2014-2017,421 the JAES promotes three intertwined priorities, namely: 
enhanced political dialogue to reach common positions and to implement common 
approaches on challenges to peace, security and stability in Africa, Europe and globally; 
effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address 
peace and security challenges in Africa; and predictable funding for peace support 
operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority. 
                                                 
419 In its recent report on the future of ACP-EU relations, the Committee on Development of the 
European Parliament defended the future of the ACP-EU Partnership but recognised that, while the parts 
that are universal must be maintained (e.g. commitment to good governance), work must be carried out 
according to the principle of subsidiarity. According to the Parliament, work must take place in ‗regional 
agreements that are tailored to specific regional needs and to the mutual interests existing between the EU 
and the respective region.‘ Report on the future of the ACP-EU relations beyond 2020 (2016/2053(INI)), 
Committee on Development, European Parliament, para 1 
420  Relevant information regarding the JAES can be found at: http://www.africa-eu-
partnership.org/en (last visited: 13/08/2016)  
421 The Roadmap 2014-2017 was adopted at the 4th EU-Africa Summit held in Brussels on 2-3 April 
2014 
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 The objective of the APSA, which is a concept that was developed by the AU, is to 
provide a continental-wide framework for solving conflict related issues in Africa. The 
EU is one of the most notable supporters of the APSA. By supporting the APSA, the EU 
aims at addressing peace and security challenges in Africa, including prevention and 
post-conflict reconstruction. Supporting the APSA means, for instance, ensuring 
predictable funding for African-led peace support operations, the effective functioning of 
the Peace and Security Council of the AU and supporting the initial operational 
capability of an African Standby Force.   
4 Union action in Somalia: CFSP-development cooperation toolbox (2008-2014) 
Annex 2 of this thesis provides a long list of legal measures concerning Somalia adopted 
under the CFSP and the development cooperation policy between 2008 and 2014. This 
list is not exhaustive, but it provides an overview of the different EU instruments utilised 
by the Union when acting in a particular third State. The elaboration of this Annex has 
been difficult. While all Council decisions in the list are published in the OJEU, the 
analysed Commission decisions are not. There is no legal obligation for the Commission 
to publish its financing decisions in the field of development cooperation in the OJEU. 
However, making these decisions available online would be desirable.422 According to the 
Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents:423 
‗Institutions shall as far as possible make documents directly accessible to the public in 
electronic form or through a register in accordance with the rules of the institution 
concerned.‘ 
Most financing decisions in development cooperation are not directly accessible in the 
online register of documents of the Commission.424 Some of them are not even listed in 
the register, because they do not have a reference number. In fact, this is why the 
expression ‗reference number missing‘ can be read next to certain decisions in the Annex. 
In certain cases, Commission decisions are not available in the public register, yet they 
can be found through different search channels in the Commission‘s website. Moreover, 
                                                 
422 Article 297(2) TFEU only establishes a duty of publication in the OJEU for decisions that do not 
establish to whom they are addressed 
423 Article 12(1) of Regulation 1049/2001 
424  Commission‘s online register of documents: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/ (last 
visited: 24/08/2016) 
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as a result of document request procedures, I was often provided with unfinished 
documents. If one considers procedural coherence as a continued way of acting on the 
basis of rules and principles (i.e. soft power coherence), the lack of transparency of the 
Commission is a cause for concern. Not only does it create a problem of accountability, it 
also creates a problem of coherence. 
 The objective of this section is to show the many instruments that the Union has at 
its disposal to tackle the problems faced by Somalia and how this wide toolbox creates 
challenges for coherence in EU external action. In fact, policies and activities that are 
intertwined by reason of their subject form part of different instruments, which means 
that they are implemented under different procedures. The idea of the Union‘s wide 
toolbox is generally approached from a political perspective. However, we should keep in 
mind that each and every instrument presented in this section has a legal nature, as it is 
implemented on the basis of specific treaty provisions (e.g. CFSP restrictive measures) or 
based on legal measures resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure (e.g. IcSP). In 
fact, the many tools interacting in the Union‘s external action expressions of the idea of 
legal delimitation, as one of the mechanisms for coherence set out in the treaties. 
Furthermore, the toolbox also illustrates the wide array of interlocutors of the Union in 
the development of external relations. The EU cooperates with Somalia at the national, 
regional, continental and ACP levels.   
4.1 Overview of the toolbox 
Development cooperation under the EDF  
EDF 
The development cooperation element of the Cotonou Agreement is mainly financed 
through the EDF. The analysed period covers two multiannual financial frameworks of 
the EDF. Between 2008 and 2013 the relevant multiannual framework was the 10th EDF, 
and between 2014 and 2020 the relevant one is the 11th EDF. The total amount of these 
two multiannual financial frameworks was decided in Decisions of the ACP-EC Council 
of Ministers: Decision 1/2006, as regards the 10th EDF, and Decision 1/2013, on the 
11th EDF.425 The first of these decisions modified the Cotonou Agreement, inserting a 
new Annex (Annex 1b) on the multiannual financial framework 2008-2013. The second 
                                                 
425 2006/608/EC and 2013/321/EU, respectively 
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one adopted Annex 1c of the Cotonou Agreement regarding the multiannual financial 
framework 2014-2020.  
 Given the sui generis nature of the EDF as an external assistance instrument that 
implements a mixed agreement, the EDF is subject to its own financial rules and 
procedures.426 The EDF is funded outside the EU budget, and directly by Member States. 
The issue as to whether the EDF should be part of the EU budget, which is generally 
known as the budgetarisation of the EDF is debated. For example, in its report on the 
future of the ACP-EU Partnership, the Parliament claims that the expiry of the Cotonou 
Agreement and the 11th EDF in 2020 provides the right context to:427 
‗Finally decide on the budgetisation of the European Development Fund in order to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness, transparency, democratic scrutiny, accountability and the 
visibility and coherence of EU development financing.‘ 
The multiannual financial frameworks of the EDF are divided into three main blocks: 
national cooperation, regional cooperation and intra-ACP/inter-regional cooperation. 
Somalia receives assistance from these three levels of cooperation.  
Somalia and the Cotonou Agreement 
Between 2008 and 2014 Somalia held two different statuses under the Cotonou 
Agreement. Between 2008 and 2013, Somalia was granted special support from the EDF. 
The Cotonou Agreement foresees situations in which ACP States, which were party to 
previous ACP-EU conventions, cannot sign or ratify the Agreement due to the lack of 
normally established government institutions. In these situations, the ACP-EU Council 
of Ministers can accord special support for these countries, which can only include 
institution building and economic and social development activities. In particular, 
Decision no 3/2001 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers accorded this type of support to 
Somalia. In 2007, the EU deemed it necessary to increase the funds allocated to Somalia 
from the 9th EDF ‗to ensure continuation of the support to the population of Somalia 
                                                 
426 The relevant Council regulations on the implementation of the 2008-2013 (10th EDF) and 2014-
2020 (11th EDF) multiannual indicative programmes and regarding their financial regulation are: Council 
Regulations 617/2007 and 215/2008 (the 10th EDF) and 2015/322 and 2015/323 (11th EDF)   
427 Report on the future of the ACP-EU relations beyond 2020 (2016/2053(INI)), Committee on 
Development, European Parliament, para 24 
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until the entry into force of the 10th EDF‘, which gave rise to Decision no 3/2007 of the 
ACP-EU Council of Ministers.428 
 In 2008, the ACP-EC Council of Ministers adopted Decision 2/2008 on an 
allocation of resources to Somalia from the 10th EDF.429 Since Somalia was still not a 
signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, Somali authorities could not sign the regular 
country strategy paper and national indicative plan for Somalia for the period 2008-2013 
(10th EDF). The Commission alone adopted the country strategy paper and the special 
support programme for Somalia for 2008-2013.430 The overall objective of this strategy 
was to help establish a peaceful and secure environment in Somalia, and to reduce 
poverty by providing basic social services and increasing economic activity. In this 
framework, the critical intermediary political goal was to support the delivery of the two 
main outcomes of the transitional period (2005-2009): a new constitution adopted by 
referendum, and democratically elected institutions. 
 In May 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/258/EU on the Union‘s position 
to be adopted on behalf of the EU within the ACP-EU Council of Ministers concerning 
the status of Somalia in the Cotonou Agreement. In particular, the Decision approved 
Somalia‘s request for observer status and subsequent accession to the Cotonou 
Agreement. On the basis of this Decision, in June 2013, the ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers adopted Decision 2013/322/EU accepting Somalia‘s request to accede to the 
Cotonou Agreement.   
 In June 2014, once Somalia had become a full member of the Cotonou Agreement, 
the Government of the Republic of Somalia and the Commission signed the national 
indicative programme for Somalia (2014-2020), approving the allocation for Somalia 
under the 11th EDF. The national indicative programme established that its priorities 
were those of the Somali Compact, namely: 431 
‗Achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somali through inclusive political processes; establish 
unified, capable, accountable and rights based Somali security institutions providing basic 
safety and security for its citizens; establish independent and accountable justice institutions 
capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of Somalia by delivering justice for all; 
revitalise and expand the Somali economy with a focus on livelihood enhancement, 
employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth; and increase delivery of 
                                                 
428 2007/462/EC 
429 2008/951/EC 
430 Decision C(2009) 6794 
431 Decision C(2014) 3715  
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equitable, affordable and sustainable services that promote national peace and reconciliation 
among Somalia's regions and citizens and enhance transparent and accountable revenue 
generation and equitable distribution and sharing of public resources.‘ 
Besides the assistance received under the national programme, Somalia has also 
benefited from EDF funds channelled through regional, continental and all-ACP levels of 
cooperation. Under the category of regional cooperation, the relevant programme for 
Somalia is the ESA-IO regional programme. This programme provides funding for 
regional organisations in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. 432  It 
consists of a cross-regional envelope and a sub-regional one.  
 The ESA-IO regional programme is important for Somalia mainly because, through 
it, the Union cooperates with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD). IGAD‘s mandate focuses on the Horn of Africa region and has a broad scope 
involving regional integration, economic cooperation and social development, peace and 
security, humanitarian affairs and natural resource management. 433  Moreover, 
continental and all-ACP cooperation is funded through the Intra-ACP programme, 
which comprises global, all-ACP initiatives, as well as pan-African initiatives. As far as 
Somalia is concerned, the most important element of the Intra-ACP programme is the 
APF, which was established in 2004 in response to a request by African leaders and is an 
essential EU tool towards strengthening the APSA and implementing the JAES. The 
APF is one of the pan-African initiatives of the Intra-ACP programme. Through it, the 
EU has provided predictable funding to African peace support operations and relevant 
capacity building at the regional and continental level.434 Under the APF, the EU has 
continuously supported AMISOM. 
Development cooperation beyond the EDF 
Although the EDF is the main instrument in the implementation of the development 
cooperation policy in Somalia, the Union provides assistance to Somalia through many 
other thematic instruments and programmes. By way of example, through the EIDHR 
                                                 
432 The ACP countries included in the ESA-IO region are: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, 
DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
433 IGAD‘s activities concern Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and South 
Sudan 
434 Regarding the security-development nexus in the context of the APF, see M. CARBONE, ‗An 
Uneasy Nexus: Development, Security and the EU‘s African Peace Facility‘, European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 18, Special Issue, 2013 
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the EU has supported local stakeholders and civil society organisations in promoting 
positive changes as regards human rights and fundamental freedoms in Somalia.435 EU 
actions implemented under the IfS and the IcSP have also addressed the problems faced 
by Somalia.436 Furthermore, the Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI) is also 
relevant, mainly because the recently created Pan-African programme (PanAf) falls 
under this instrument. The PanAf is the Union‘s instrument specifically devoted to the 
implementation of the JAES. Besides the PanAf, under the Civil Society Organisations 
and Local Authorities programme of the DCI, Somalia has repeatedly received support 
for in-country interventions contributing to governance and development processes. 
Moreover, under the programme Cooperation with third countries in the areas of 
Migration and Asylum (also of the DCI), Kenya, Djibouti and Yemen have received 
funding to improve protection and provide immediate assistance to Somali refugees 
displaced in the Horn of Africa.437  
CFSP 
The Union has also made an extensive use of its CFSP instruments in its action in 
Somalia between 2008 and 2014. It has imposed restrictive measures and appointed EU 
Special Representatives with mandates comprising Somalia.438 Furthermore, under the 
CSDP, the Union has been (and still is) more active in the Horn of Africa than it is 
anywhere else in the world. It has launched EU NAVCO, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, 
EUTM Somalia, EUCAP Nestor and the Operations Centre. All of these are still active, 
with the exception of EU NAVCO, whose activities where absorbed by EUNAVFOR 
Atalanta.  
 In the analysed period, the Union imposed sanctions against Somalia following 
successive UNSC resolutions. These sanctions consisted of a general arms embargo 
against Somalia and of restrictive measures against individuals. The many legal acts on 
restrictive measures adopted between 2008 and 2014 respond to modifications of the 
sanctions regime in successive UNSC resolutions. As regards the arms embargo, the 
Union has included exemptions to accommodate African-led military operations in 
                                                 
435 In fact, Somalia often appears as one of the developing countries receiving the greatest sums under 
the EIDHR. See, for example, Decision C(2010) 1614  
436 As regards the scope of the IcSP, see chapter 2, section 4, pages 91-98 
437 Decision C(2009) 10089 
438 Note that restrictive measure against Somalia are considered CFSP measures because they have 
been adopted on the basis of: CFSP common positions and joint actions (before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty) and CFSP decisions (under the current treaty framework). See ex-Article 301 TEC and 
Article 215 TFEU, respectively   
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Somalia, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance activities. By way of example, in 
February 2007, the Council adopted Common Position 2007/94/CFSP giving effect to 
UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006), which introduced an exemption to the arms embargo 
decided in UNSC Resolution 733 (1992). In view of a planned IGAD military operation 
in Somalia (IGASOM), the UNSC introduced an exemption to the arms embargo for 
such operation. The exemption applied to supplies of weapons and military equipment 
and technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by 
IGASOM. However, IGASOM never materialised and was replaced by AMISOM. In 
June 2007 the Council adopted Common Position 2007/391/CFSP, following UNSC 
Resolution 1744 (2007), which introduced another exemption to Somalia‘s arms 
embargo, in this case in view of the launch of AMISOM. In parallel, the Council adopted 
Regulation 631/2007, translating into concrete terms the common position that had just 
been adopted. An example of an exemption for humanitarian purposes can be found in 
Decision 2010/231/CFSP, implementing UNSC Resolution 1916 (2009). This 
Resolution eased some restrictions and obligations under the sanctions regime to enable 
the delivery of supplies and technical assistance by international, regional and sub-
regional organisations and to ensure the delivery of UN humanitarian assistance. The 
Union has also required extra-efforts from States regarding Somalia‘s arms embargo. In 
March 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/126/CFSP, giving effect to UNSC 
Resolution 1907 (2009), which called upon States to inspect all cargoes in their territory 
coming from or going to Somalia, if a State had information to believe that the cargo 
contained items whose supply, sale, transfer or export was prohibited under the arms 
embargo.  
 As far as restrictive measures against individuals are concerned, in February 2009 the 
Council adopted Common Position 2009/138/CFSP, giving effect to UNSC Resolution 
1844 (2008), which was adopted to punish: 
‗Those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the 
TFIs of Somalia or AMISOM by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia 
or the region‘. 
Later on, the Union adopted successive legal measures approving and then replacing 
annexes containing lists of persons affected by individual sanctions, following the 
updates from the UN Sanctions Committee. For example, in September 2011 the 
Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) no 956/2011 replacing the Annex 
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regarding the list of individuals to whom the restrictive measures would apply following 
the adoption of Decision 2011/635/CFSP. 
 Between 2008 and 2014 the Union also used its CFSP toolbox to appoint and/or 
extend the mandate of Special Representatives (EUSR) with responsibilities over 
Somalia. In December 2007, the Union had appointed an EUSR to the AU,439 whose role 
was essentially to work towards EU objectives regarding support of African efforts to 
build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for the continent as set out in the 
JAES. Gary Quince was the last to fulfil this role and his mandate expired in 2014.440 In 
December 2011, the Council appointed Alexander Rondos as the EUSR for the Horn of 
Africa to provide a regional response by the Union to the challenges in the Horn of 
Africa region.441 The mandate of Mr Rondos is extremely broad and it includes, inter alia: 
to work in close coordination with the UNSG Special Representative for Somalia and the 
AU; to contribute actively to actions and initiatives leading to further stabilisation and 
post-transition arrangements for Somalia; to support the development of the security 
sector in Somalia, including through the CSDP missions and operation in Somalia and 
AMISOM, as well as working closely with Member States; to encourage and support 
effective political and security cooperation and economic integration in the region 
through the Union‘s partnership with the AU and sub-regional organisations like 
IGAD.442 
CSDP 
The Union‘s engagement in the Horn of Africa is a good demonstration of the CSDP 
repertoire as it includes a maritime military operation (i.e. EUNVAFOR Atalanta), a 
military training mission (i.e. EUTM Somalia) and a mission with an important rule of 
law component (i.e. EUCAP Nestor). In 2008, the UNSC stressed:443   
‗The threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery pose to the prompt, safe and effective 
delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and 
international navigation.‘ 
                                                 
439 Joint Action 2007/805/CFSP  
440 Council Decision 2013/383/CFSP 
441 Council Decision 2011/819/CFSP 
442 Article 3(1)(e) Council Decision 2013/527/CFSP 
443 UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008) 
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The UNSC authorised States to use all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea. In particular, it encouraged States ‗interested in the use of 
commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia‘ to actively respond to piracy off the 
Somali coast. EUNAVCO was the first response of the Union to the demands of the 
UNSC.444 It was a military coordination action (an EU Coordination Cell) to support the 
activities of Member States deploying military assets in theatre. On the launch of 
EUNAVFOR Atalanta, also in 2008, the military coordination cell was closed.445 
 Atalanta‘s objective is to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of 
acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Its mandate has been repeatedly 
amended. For example, in December 2009 the Council entitled the Operation to 
contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the Somali coast.446 In March 2012, 
the Council extended the area of operations of Atalanta to include Somali internal waters 
and Somali land territory.447 The Decision also established the conditions under which 
suspects arrested and detained in the internal or territorial waters of States other than 
Somalia should be transferred. Moreover, because of the area of operations of Atalanta 
and the many countries affected by piracy off the Somali coast and in the Indian Ocean, 
the Operation involves the participation of several third States. For example, Atalanta 
requires the adoption of agreements on the status of the Operation in the territory of third 
States, like the bilateral agreements between the EU and Somalia, Djibouti and 
Seychelles.448 Moreover, the Operation also requires agreements on the conditions of 
transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from Atalanta to third States. 
The famous (or infamous) EU-Mauritius and EU-Tanzania Tanzania are examples of 
this type of agreements. 449  Thirdly, several third States, like Norway, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Ukraine and Serbia, play an active role in Atalanta, and participate in its 
Committee of Contributions.450     
                                                 
444 Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP 
445 Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP 
446 Council Decision 2009/207/CFSP 
447 Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP 
448 See, respectively, Council Decisions 2009/29/CFSP, 2009/88/CFSP and 2009/916/CFSP 
449 Council Decisions 2011/640/CFSP and 2014/198/CFSP, respectively. Note that these agreements 
gave place to litigation before the CJEU. See Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case and 
Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case 
450 See, for example, Council Decision 2009/356/CFSP regarding the contribution of Norway to 
Atalanta and Council Decision 2009/359/CFSP, on the consequent establishment of a Committee of 
Contributors, where Norway is represented 
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 The objectives of Atalanta are complemented by EUCAP Nestor, which is active 
since July 2012.451 The latter‘s mandate includes, inter alia: to assist authorities in the 
region in achieving the efficient organisation of the maritime security agencies carrying 
out the coast guard function; to assist Somalia in developing its own land-based coastal 
police capability supported by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework; and to 
provide assistance in strengthening national legislation and the rule of law through a 
regional legal advisory programme, and legal expertise to support the drafting of 
maritime security.  
 On-land, the Union has provided training to the Somali security forces through 
EUTM Somalia, which was launched in February 2010.452 Finally, the EU Operations 
Centre, which has been active since March 2012, provides support in the field of 
operational planning and conduct of the CSDP in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel 
region. Its objective is to increase efficiency, coherence synergies amongst CSDP 
missions and operations within both regions.453 
4.2 Similar policies and activities under different instruments: the toolbox as a 
challenge for coherence 
The lines that follow demonstrate that similar policies and activities are simultaneously 
implemented under different instruments of the Union‘s CFSP and development 
cooperation toolbox. Although this situation does not necessarily lead to incoherent 
policies and activities, it obviously adds an extra challenge for coherence, as the 
procedures for the implementation of these instruments, including the roles of EU actors 
within these procedures, differ.   
Peace and security  
At the national level, peace and security in Somalia are promoted under the EDF‘s 
national programme for Somalia, the IcSP and EUTM Somalia. 
 Under the EDF‘s national programme for Somalia,454 the Union has contributed to 
strengthening the security sector by supporting, inter alia: 455 recruitment, training and 
                                                 
451 Article 3 of Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP 
452 Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP  
453 Article 1 of Council Decision 2013/725/CFSP 
454 Decisions C(2012) 8041 and C(2015) 671, Annex 1 
455 Interestingly, development cooperation measures regarding Somalia often consider reforms of the 
judiciary as support to the security sector 
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equipment for police officers and the judiciary; the initiation of structural reforms of the 
judiciary, including through technical assistance, capacity building and provision of basic 
support. Under the IfS, the Union has supported a programme to reduce the impact of 
explosive threats to the Somali population.456 This is remarkable since Article 11(3) of the 
Cotonou Agreement – the framework of the EDF – establishes: 
‗Particular emphasis shall be given to the fight against antipersonnel landmines and 
explosive remnants of war.‘ 
At the supra-national level, the EU promotes peace and security in Somalia by 
supporting the APSA. The APSA has been promoted under the EDF‘s Intra-ACP 
programme and, in particular, under the APF. Besides supporting AMISOM, 457  the 
Union has promoted the APSA by, for example: 458 supporting African training centres; 
making general contributions to the APSA; funding training exercises of APSA 
structures; supporting the AU in the establishment of a command, control, 
communication and information system for African-led peace support operations; and 
supporting the network of AU liaison offices. Moreover, under the ESA-IO regional 
programme of the EDF, the Union has also supported the peace and security mandates 
of regional organisations, which constitutes an essential part of the APSA. In this 
context, the Union has, for instance, supported IGAD‘s mediation and preventive 
diplomacy efforts for the conflict in Somalia.459  
Counter-piracy and maritime security 
Under the EDF‘s ESA-IO regional programme, the Union has funded a programme for 
the implementation of a regional maritime security strategy, which is known as MASE.460 
The purpose of the programme is to strengthen the capacities in the judiciary, legal and 
police areas of Horn of Africa countries to arrest, transfer, detain and prosecute pirates, 
as well as to disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders. Moreover, the Union has 
funded similar activities with an action to support the maritime transport sector in 
                                                 
456 Decision C(2011) 9459 
457 See, for example, Decisions C(2008) 8606, C(2011) 8878, C(2012) 6536 
458 See Decisions C(2012) 1479, C(2011) 5379, C(2011) 5481, C(2013) 8911 and C(2013) 8959, in this 
order 
459 Decision C(2015) 3379 
460 See, for example, Decision C(2011) 7682 
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Somalia, funded under the EDF‘s Intra-ACP programme.461 The coincidence in terms of 
objectives between these measures and the mandate of EUCAP Nestor is obvious.  
Food security  
The ESA-IO regional programme (EDF) has also been utilised to support IGAD‘s 
livestock policy initiative, with the objective of enhancing the contribution of the 
livestock sector to sustainable food security and poverty reduction in the IGAD region, 
including Somalia.462 Under the Food Facility Regulation, the EU has funded a measure 
to increase food availability for vulnerable Somali households.463 The objective of the 
measure was to contribute to increased food security and to develop a private sector-led 
economy by, for instance, rehabilitating irrigation land. The EDF‘s national programme 
for Somalia in the analysed period has also promoted food security, even though often 
under titles like ‗economic development programme for growth and resilience‘ or 
‗economic development programme‘. 464  Measures under the national programme for 
Somalia have been directed at supporting households that are food insecure to built more 
resilient livelihood and have enhanced food security. Under this programme the Union 
has repeatedly supported the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, whose aim is to 
ensure that all relevant stakeholders have access to appropriate information for 
emergency response and development planning.    
Education 
At the national level, the education sector has been supported under the EDF‘s national 
programme for Somalia.465 The activities promoted have been, inter alia: strengthening 
the capacity of partner administrations and institutions; increase equitable access to 
relevant formal and non-formal education and training; and strengthening the 
pedagogical skills of primary and secondary education teachers. 
 At the supranational level, for instance in 2014 the Union contributed to an initiative 
called Global Partnership for Education under the DCI and under the Intra-ACP 
programme of the EDF, simultaneously.466 Moreover, under the PanAf (DCI) the Union 
                                                 
461 Decision C(2012) 8992 
462 Decision C(2010) 2213 
463 Decision C(2010) 1614 
464 See Decisions C(2008) 8403, C(2012) 8041, C(2013) 8477 and C(2015) 671 
465 Decisions C(2008) 8403, Annex 2, C(2011) 8662 and C(2012) 8041, Annex 5 
466 Decisions C(2014) 7887, Annex 3 and C(2014) 8589, Annex 4, respectively 
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supported the AU with a measure towards harmonisation of higher education 
programmes in Africa.467 
The JAES 
EU measures supporting the JAES illustrate the tension between the ACP-EU 
Partnership and the Africa-EU Partnership. The JAES is supported under the pan-
African initiatives of the EDF and through the PanAf programme of the DCI. Through 
the former, the Union provides support to the AU, not only for AMISOM, but also for 
other matters that are not necessarily linked to peace and security. For example, under 
the Intra-ACP programme the Union has financed the JAES support mechanism and the 
AU Commission through the AU support programme.468 The creation of the PanAf 
programme under the DCI was motivated by the lack of a specific EU instrument to 
support the JAES. However, it creates a divide in the Union‘s support to the AU, which 
is currently assisted through the EDF and the DCI. Under the PanAf programme of the 
DCI, the Union has funded, inter alia: the AU capacity in election observation, AU 
research grants, and the JAES support mechanism and communication.469   
 Lastly, the adoption of the Africa Trust Fund adds even more complexity to the 
toolbox presented in this section.470 The objective of the Fund is to address crises in 
certain African regions, including the Horn of Africa. It is designed to, inter alia: support 
migration management; address the root causes of destabilisation; promote security and 
development and address human rights abuses.  
5 The legal dimension of coherence in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus  
5.1 Mechanisms for coherence in EU external relations law: empirical claims  
The empirical claims of this section respond to the theoretical claims presented in section 
4 of chapter 2. This is why the arguments that are put forward in this section should be 
considered together with those formulated in chapter 2.471 All empirical claims concern 
horizontal inter-policy coherence between the CFSP and the development cooperation 
policy. Empirical claims no 2 and 4b also consider vertical coherence in EU development 
                                                 
467 Decision C(2014) 8513 
468 Decisions C(2012)1998 and C(2013) 9357 
469 Decision C(2014) 8515 
470  This instrument was adopted in 2015 and is, thus, outside the analysed period. Commission 
Decision on the establishment of a EU Emergency Trust Fund (C(2015) 7293) 
471 See section 4 of chapter 2, pages 79-105 and Annex 1 of the thesis  
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cooperation. However, the case study only focuses on EU legal acts, which means that 
the vertical axis is only considered from the perspective of the Union towards its Member 
States, and not vice versa.  
Empirical claim no 1: the principles and objectives set out in Article 21 TEU ensure a 
certain degree of consistency between CFSP and development cooperation measures, 
but not coherence 
This claim results from the examination of the statement of objectives in the selected 
legal acts. The analysis distinguishes between two types of objectives. On the one hand, 
the development of democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. These external objectives correspond to the principles the 
Union is founded on.472 On the other hand, the analysis focuses on the objectives that 
define the CFSP and the development cooperation policy: international security (i.e. 
CFSP) and economic and social development, as well as poverty eradication (i.e. 
development cooperation policy). 473  Lastly, the analysis reflects on the effects of the 
‗liberalisation‘ of objectives in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus. The case study 
shows that this is a long-standing process, which the introduction of the single set of 
objectives can be considered to confirm. It refers to the tendency towards disconnecting 
external policy areas from the objectives that have traditionally characterised them, 
allowing other policy areas to promote these objectives. The analysis concludes that, in 
the CFSP-development cooperation nexus, the liberalisation of objectives contributes to 
ensuring a certain degree of consistency across policies and activities, because it increases 
the cases in which the same objectives are promoted under different policy areas. 
However, the legal acts examined show that the liberalisation of objectives does not lead 
to the notion of coherence (i.e. complementarity, creation of synergies, 
comprehensiveness) between the objectives pursued in policies and activities 
implemented under different policy areas. It is not leading to a situation where actors 
take account of all the different EU objectives at stake, including those promoted under 
different policy areas. In contrast, the liberalisation of objectives can be said to be 
changing the scope of the development cooperation policy. 
                                                 
472 Article 21(1) TEU 
473 Articles 21 and 24 TEU; Article 208 TFEU 
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Democracy, rule of law, human rights: the governance agenda 
These intertwined objectives were set out in treaty provisions regulating the CFSP and 
the development cooperation policy before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.474 
Under the current legal framework, they can be found in Article 21(2)(b) TEU. This 
means that these are general objectives of EU external action.475 The development of 
democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is an essential part of the governance agenda that characterises the CFSP and 
the development cooperation policy. The EU assumes that poverty and conflict cannot 
be prevented if States are unable or unwilling to serve their citizens. In fact, the 
governance agenda is an expression of the security-development nexus approach. Hence 
it is not surprising that governance reform, in general, and specific measures directed at 
developing democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights are central 
in the legal acts analysed. The Council Decision establishing EUTM Somalia provides a 
clear example of what the governance agenda is about:476       
‗In order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens.‘ 
The action on support to State building and peace building sectors of the EDF‘s annual 
action programme 2014 for Somalia mentions among its objectives:477  
‗Rule of Law and Security: human security and justice enhanced through strengthened 
institutions and greater citizen access to policing and justice services that address key 
grievances and injustice, with a particular focus on justice for women, children and 
minorities.‘ 
In a similar manner, one of the tasks of EUCAP Nestor is:478  
‗To provide assistance in strengthening national legislation and the rule of law through a 
regional legal advisory programme, and legal expertise to support the drafting of maritime 
security and related national legislation.‘ 
                                                 
474 Ex-Article 11 TEU and ex-Article 177 TEC, respectively 
475 Case C-263/14, Parliament v Commission, Tanzania Case 
476 Article 1(1) Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP 
477 C(2015) 671, Annex 2, page 1 
478 Article 3(1)(e) of the Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP 
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Security, poverty, economic and social development: the security-development nexus  
One of the effects of adopting the security-development nexus is the prioritisation of 
governance reform in the agendas of both the CFSP and the development cooperation 
policy. Another such consequence is that security and development objectives begin to be 
seen as closely intertwined. This justifies the need to consider the effects of security 
measures over development objectives that are mainly promoted under development 
policies and vice versa. In the legal acts analysed development cooperation measures 
admit their direct contribution to security objectives, but these statements of intention are 
not directly accompanied by references to CFSP measures. On the other hand, none of 
the selected CFSP legal measures refers to its impact on economic and sustainable 
development or on poverty reduction. A clear example is the Union‘s support to 
Mogadishu‘s port security. When this activity is financed through the IfS, the Union 
claims:479 
‗Functioning port facilities in Mogadishu are critical to the stability of the capital and the 
country and essential for social and economic recovery.‘ 
Although EUCAP Nestor provides a similar support, the Decision establishing this 
CSDP mission does not include any reference to how port security contributes to 
development objectives.480 
 Development cooperation measures supporting the education sector provide good 
examples of the nexus between security and development. For example, the action 
concerning support for the education sector under the EDF‘s annual action programme 
2008 for Somalia argues that illiteracy:481  
‗Has resulted in the adult population and the youth suffering as a ―lost generation‖ in 
education terms, carrying a risk in worsening fragility/increasing conflicts. Lessons learnt 
showed it is possible to generate a fair amount of hope in a war torn environment (through 
training and employment prospects).‘ 
The liberalisation of EU external objectives: towards comprehensiveness? 
The selected legal acts show that the liberalisation of objectives in the CFSP-development 
nexus is a process that began before the introduction of the single set of objectives 
                                                 
479 Decision C(2011) 9459, page 14 
480 Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP 
481 Decision C(2008) 8403, page 4 
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brought about by the Lisbon Treaty reforms. While this process may ensure a certain 
degree of consistency across policies and activities, it does not lead to the positive idea of 
coherence (i.e. comprehensiveness). While development cooperation measures consider 
– and substantially contribute to – security objectives, they do not refer to CFSP 
measures where these objectives are also developed. Furthermore, CFSP measures do 
not take account of development objectives. This is problematic from the perspective of 
the general requirement of Article 7 TFEU and, in particular, as far as the policy 
coherence for development agenda enshrined in Article 208(1) TFEU is concerned. It is 
also at odds with the security-development nexus approach.  
 In contrast, the liberalisation of objectives can be said to be causing a change in 
scope in the development cooperation policy. Noticeably, while all development 
cooperation measures refer to security challenges in Somalia, only two of them refer to 
poverty. This is especially worrying after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty as the 
campaign against poverty is now the main objective of the development cooperation 
policy.482 The resilience programme of the EDF‘s annual action programme 2014 for 
Somalia stands out as the only legal act that refers to this legal innovation:483   
‗Working with the most vulnerable populations to build their resilience is in line with 
Resilience Communication and also a fundamental part of poverty reduction which is the 
ultimate aim of EU development policy.‘ 
The statement of objectives in CFSP and development cooperation measures seems to 
indicate different perceptions regarding the possibility of being subject to litigation before 
the CJEU regarding the choice of legal basis. While CFSP measures avoid any reference 
to development objectives, development cooperation measures do not seem to be 
concerned with recognising their contribution to international security objectives. As this 
situation does not change in measures adopted before and after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, it can be considered reminiscent of the primacy of the acquis 
communautaire that the treaties no longer enshrine.484 In short, when the reminiscence of 
the primacy of the acquis meets the liberalisation of objectives, the result is a change in 
the scope of the development cooperation policy. In contrast, these two circumstances do 
not seem to be bringing about increased complementarity between CFSP and 
                                                 
482 Article 208(1) TFEU 
483 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 1 
484 Ex-Article 47 TEU and Article 40 TEU 
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development cooperation measures. The case study confirms the tension between the 
provision of common objectives and the definition of legal delimitation rules, which is 
explained in chapter 2 of this thesis, and analysed again under empirical claim no 3 of the 
current section.485  
Empirical claim no 2: CFSP and development cooperation measures are guided by 
strategic documents, but not shared ones   
This claim results from the analysis of the strategic documents mentioned in the selected 
legal acts. While CFSP measures are based on Council conclusions and UNSC 
resolutions, development cooperation measures focus on strategic documents of the 
Government of Somalia or are designed by external actors such as the UN and the World 
Bank. In both cases, external actors play a fundamental role in defining the priorities of 
the Union. 
 As far as the development cooperation policy is concerned, the Joint Strategy Paper 
for Somalia (2008-2013), which is the main strategic document for the 10th EDF country 
programme for Somalia, was based on the priorities of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme. This programme was the result of a participatory joint needs 
assessment led by the World Bank and UNDP. On the basis of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, the EU, together with Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, 
Sweden, UK, and Norway, developed a Joint Strategy Paper (2008-2013). This Strategy 
corresponds to the first stage of EU joint programming.486 It identified as crosscutting 
issues: gender, the environment, conflict prevention, and the fight against HIV. For 
example, the action to support the education sector in the EDF‘s annual action 
programme 2008 for Somalia was consistent with the crosscutting issues identified in the 
Joint Strategy Paper, since it clearly prioritised female participation in primary and 
secondary school:487  
‗The options of gender affirmative support include: girls only primary schools, girls only 
classes in secondary education; reduced/subsidised school fees for disadvantaged girls (about 
3,500 in total in the trial period); conditional cash transfers/vouchers to girls. These will be 
complemented by pedagogical work such as: reviewing curricula, strengthening Educational 
                                                 
485 See section 4 of chapter 2 of this thesis, pages 85-98 
486 See section 5 of chapter 2 on joint programming in EU development cooperation, pages 105-115 
487 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 2, pages 2-3. We shall bear in mind that Article 1 of the Cotonou 
Agreement (see note 410) establishes that ‗systematic account shall be taken of the situation of women and 
gender issues in all areas — political, economic and social.‘   
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Development Centres (or similar institution), gender specific/sensitising training for 
teachers.‘ 
The national indicative programme for Somalia under the 11th EDF focuses on the 
priorities established in the Somali Compact and states:488 
‗EU joint programming for Somalia will take the form of the Compact. EU Member States 
have been, together with the EU institutions, party to preparation of the Compact from the 
very initial stages and have subscribed to its mutual accountability framework as well as to 
align their support to the Compact priorities and the below coordination mechanisms. These 
mechanisms will provide common platforms for policy dialogue and will offer the 
opportunity for better synergies and division of labour between donors, including progressive 
alignment between EU's and EU member states' intervention.‘ 
Individual measures falling within the national indicative programme for Somalia (2014-
2015) specify that they are based on the Somali Compact. For example, the action on 
support to statebuilding and peacebuilding sectors under the EDF‘s annual action 
programme for Somalia 2014 claims:489   
‗This Action is part of the wider ‗Compact Response Programme' and aims to respond 
rapidly to the commitments made by the EU to support the priorities of the Federal 
Government of Somalia (FGS). These objectives are in line with the Peace-building and 
State-building Goals (PSG) of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, notably PSGs 
1, 2 and 3‘. 
When the Union is contributing to actions led by international organisations, it 
incorporates the priorities defined by other international organisations. A clear example 
is to be found in a measure supporting explosive contamination clearance funded under 
the IfS. This measure takes the UN strategy for the recovery and stabilisation of 
Mogadishu as its guiding instrument.490 
‗The UN Strategy for the Recovery and Stabilisation of Mogadishu which sets out 
sustainable initiatives that will improve the lives of the population and focuses on three 
sectors: human security, basic services and employment.‘  
                                                 
488 Decision C(2014) 3715, Annex, page 16  
489 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 2, page 1 
490 Decision C(2011) 9459, page 3 
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Surprisingly, none of the analysed measures mention the European Consensus on 
Development (2006) and only one refers to the Council Conclusions adopting a Strategic 
Framework for the Horn of Africa (2011):491 
‗The measures provided for in this Decision are consistent with the political objectives and 
overall engagement of the EU in Somalia, as well as will the EU Strategic Framework for the 
Horn of Africa.‘  
Certain legal acts mention Commission communications, like the one on a thematic 
strategy for food security.492 Only one of the legal measures analysed refers to the Agenda 
for Change (2011):493 
‗The proposed programme has been designed based on the outcome of extensive 
consultations with the main stakeholders in Somalia. It is also based on the New Deal 
Compact for Somalia, and on several EU and Global Development Policies such as the 
MDGs, the EU Strategy for Africa, the EU Agenda for Change, the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) 
Fragile States principles particularly Principle 7, the New Deal for interventions in fragile 
states and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).‘ 
In contrast, beside explicit references to the OECD framework, such as the one in this 
fragment, most Commission decisions refer to OECD principles like ownership, 
alignment or concentration. For example, the action on education sector support under 
the EDF‘s annual action programme for Somalia 2008 claims:494 
‗The proposed method of implementation is therefore centralised management, albeit in 
close consultation with the respective Somali Administrations in the three Zones, in 
particular the Ministry of Education, Transitional Federal Government. This will ensure 
improved ownership.‘ 
This is not surprising as the Cotonou Agreement establishes that development finance 
cooperation shall be:495 
                                                 
491 Council Conclusions: Horn of Africa (16858/11) and C(2013) 3009, Annex, page 1. Notice that 
this strategy has been replaced by The EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, adopted in the 
Council Conclusions 13363/15 
492 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 3 
493 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 1, pages 6-7  
494 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 2, page 5 
495 Article 56 of the Cotonou Agreement (see note 410) 
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‗Guided by the internationally agreed aid effectiveness agenda, cooperation shall be based on 
ownership, alignment, donor coordination and harmonisation, managing for development 
results and mutual accountability.‘ 
In contrast, CFSP measures refer to Council conclusions and UNSC resolutions. The fact 
that Council decisions establishing CSDP missions and operations refer to UNSC 
Resolutions is important (sometimes even essential) to their international legality. For 
example, EUTM Somalia claims:496 
‗In its Resolution 1872 (2009) on the situation in Somalia, adopted on 26 May 2009, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stressed the importance of the re-establishment, 
training, equipping and retention of Somali security forces, and urged Member States and 
regional and international organisations to offer technical assistance for the training and 
equipping of the Somali security forces. In its Resolution 1897 (2009), adopted on 30 
November 2009, the UNSC recalled its previous resolutions and reaffirmed its respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia.‘  
‗In its conclusions of 27 July 2009, the Council decided to step up the engagement for 
promoting peace and development in Somalia. To this end, the Council studied the 
possibilities for the Union to contribute to international efforts, including in the field of 
security.‘ 
The case study shows that the priorities of the Union do not only result from strategy 
policy documents of the EU (i.e. top-down coherence), but are essentially externally 
driven (i.e. bottom-up coherence). In fact, the Commission does not refer to the common 
approaches that should ensure both vertical and inter-policy coherence, like conclusions 
of the Council and the Union‘s strategic frameworks for the Horn of Africa.497 Even 
within the development cooperation policy, the Commission refers to different common 
approaches depending on the specific programme or instrument implemented. From the 
viewpoint of CFSP-development cooperation coherence, the case study demonstrates 
that the Council and the Commission are looking into different directions to guide their 
action. While the Council looks into the UNSC, the Commission looks into the 
Government of Somalia and leading international actors on the ground like the UN and 
the World Bank.   
                                                 
496 Indents 1 and 2 of the Preamble of the Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP 
497 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council Conclusions: 16858/11) and EU Horn of 
Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 (Council Conclusions: 13363/15) 
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Empirical claim no 3: the statement of objectives and activities of CFSP and 
development cooperation measures is not conclusive of the legal basis used for their 
adoption 
According to settled case law of the CJEU, the aim and content of a European act 
determines its legal basis. It determines whether a single legal basis is needed or if a dual 
legal basis is required. This test, which the Court continues to refer to in its case law 
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, assumes that there are specific 
contents and aims pertaining to specific policy areas as otherwise it would make no sense 
to claim that the test determines the legal basis. The analysis of the examined legal acts 
shows that this is not the case. Neither the content, nor the aims pursued are conclusive 
of the policy area chosen, and practice does not seem to have found any alternative 
criteria leading to coherence. What tool the Union uses depends, exclusively, on who 
decides to act. EU actors thus have considerable flexibility to decide whether the CFSP, 
the development cooperation policy or the IcSP is most adequate. The price to be paid is 
that there is no consistency over the choice of the legal basis, because the same content 
and the same aims are pursued under different legal bases. The idea that when Member 
States are the actors on the ground the legal basis chosen is the CFSP, whereas if this is 
not the case, the development cooperation policy is used is not conclusive either. As will 
be analysed, there is a development cooperation measure contributing to an action 
implemented by DfID. I refer to the activity supported and the objectives promoted 
because development cooperation measures include sections on ‗activities‘ and 
‗objectives‘ that correspond to the Court‘s idea of ‗content‘ and ‗aim‘, respectively, in the 
Court‘s case law. I also consider the IcSP, as a sui generis development cooperation 
instrument.  
The activity supported is often not conclusive of the legal basis chosen   
Union action in Somalia over the last few years offers striking examples regarding the 
difficulty of distinguishing between measures that fall naturally under the CFSP and 
activities that require a development cooperation policy legal basis.498  
 The EU has facilitated technical advice to governance structures both under the 
development cooperation policy and the CFSP. Under the IcSP, the Union has funded 
                                                 
498 Section 4 of this chapter shares similarities with empirical claim no 3. However, while the former 
provides a general overview of the Union‘s toolbox, the latter presents a more detailed analysis focusing 
specifically on the choice of legal basis (i.e. CFSP or development cooperation). See pages 148-151    
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the provision of technical assistance to the Ministry of National Security of the 
Government of Somalia to develop a National Security Plan, a National Intelligence 
Plan and a Countering Violent Extremism policy. Likewise, under EUCAP Nestor, the 
EU has supported the Government of Somalia (and other national governments in the 
Horn of Africa) in the drafting of maritime security and related national legislation.499 
This is not surprising because it is part of the governance agenda. 
Another example is the training provided for the Somali military and police forces. 
The EU has covered troop allowances and salaries for the police of AMISOM and 
financed the training of the Somali military forces under the EDF (by supporting 
AMISOM) and under EUTM Somalia. 500  Moreover, the Union has also funded the 
Somali police under the EDF‘s national programme for Somalia.501  
The Union has provided protection to vessels chartered by the World Food 
Programme off the Somali coast and, on land; it has supported the military protection of 
the Federal Institutions of Somalia. It has done so under EUNAVFOR Atalanta and 
through its support to AMISOM under the European Development Fund. 502  Lastly, 
under the Instrument for Stability, the Union has supported capacity building activities 
for local authorities to monitor security in the Mogadishu port area. As part of one of 
EUCAP Nestor‘s tasks, the EU has assisted authorities in the Horn of Africa ‗in 
achieving the efficient organisation of the maritime security agencies carrying out the 
coast guard function.‘503 In all of these cases, if, without knowing the legal basis chosen, 
we were asked which policy area the Union has used we could probably not provide the 
right answer. 
The content does determine the legal basis in certain cases. This is so in certain 
measures that focus on issues different than institution building and which are not 
justified by the existence of a situation of crisis and/or conflict. For instance, support for 
the education sector, which is a social development measure central to Union action in 
Somalia, is always conducted under development cooperation policy instruments, like 
the European Development Fund.504 The content is also decisive in the choice of the legal 
basis when the treaties determine that a given instrument falls within a certain policy 
area. This is the case for sanctions that can be adopted under the CFSP or the AFSJ but 
                                                 
499 Decisions C(2014) 9580 and 2012/389/CFSP, respectively  
500 Decision C(2008) 8606 and 2010/96/CFSP, respectively 
501 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 2, page 3 
502 Council Decision 2008/851/CFSP and Decision C(2008) 8606, respectively  
503 Decisions C(2011) 9459 and 2012/389/CFSP, respectively 
504 See, for instance, Decision C(2008) 8403 
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cannot be development cooperation policy measures.505 In the case of Somalia, the Union 
has adopted restrictive measures against Somalia and against individuals, and it has 
always done so under CFSP legal bases. 506  Likewise, successive decisions on the 
appointment and extension of the mandate of the EU Special Representative for the 
Horn of Africa, Alexander Rondos, have been based on CFSP legal bases.507 Despite the 
fact that Mr Rondos is mandated to bridge the gap between the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy, the decision to appoint an EU special representative 
must always be based on a CFSP legal basis.508  
When the activity supported is not conclusive of the legal basis chosen, the statement 
of objectives is often a matter of reasoning 
The risk stemming from being able to fund the same activities under the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy is that it becomes difficult to assess whether political 
actors really intended to pursue the objectives they argue they wanted to pursue. EU 
measures in support of the governance sector in Somalia are a good example in this 
regard. Under the EDF, the Union has supported federal, regional and local institution 
building. In particular, the EU has trained and equipped local authorities to manage tax 
revenues; it has provided basic infrastructure, equipment and technical assistance to 
regional and federal governments and parliaments; and it has offered recruitment and 
training for federal and regional civil services. In a similar manner, under the IcSP, the 
EU has funded the emerging interim administrations of South Central Somalia:509  
‗Through a range of tailored technical support and capacity building measures for emerging 
administrations.‘ 
While the content of these two measures is similar, the objectives political institutions 
argued they were promoting are very different. The action under the EDF aims at 
advancing:510 
                                                 
505 Council Decision 2010/231/CFSP; Articles 215 and 75 TFEU 
506 See, for instance, Regulations 478/2014 and 432/2013, respectively  
507 Council Decision 2015/440/CFSP 
508 Article 33 TEU 
509 Decisions C(2008) 8403, Annex 1 and C(2014) 9580, respectively 
510 Decision C(2008) 8403, page 2 
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‗Reconciliation, democracy and governance at federal, regional and local levels, allowing the 
delivery of a new constitution adopted by referendum and democratically elected institutions 
at the end of the transitional period.‘ 
This is so even though the Commission decision foresees no activity that one can directly 
link to the promotion of reconciliation and democracy. However, by including these 
objectives, the Commission connected its measure to the key objectives of Somalia‘s 
transitional period (2004-2009) that had been decided at the National Reconciliation 
Conference held in Kenya between 2002 and 2004. In contrast, the measure under the 
IcSP claims to aim at:511  
‗Supporting the stabilisation of districts recently taken from AS and new interim 
administrations in South Central Somalia by contributing to a multi-donor trust fund.‘ 
In this case, by linking its action to providing stability in a situation of crisis, the Union 
justified the choice of the IcSP. If the situation described in this IcSP measure qualified as 
a situation of crisis (i.e. access to newly accessible areas), we may wonder why the police 
support provided under the EDF‘s annual action programme 2014 for Somalia was not 
also provided under the IcSP:512  
‗In this context the reform and development of the civilian police remains a critical priority. 
In Puntland the security sector has yet to embark on a process of institutional reform and 
development. In South Central Somalia the Somali police force has limited reach beyond the 
capital Mogadishu and their functions are limited to providing basic patrols and escorts. 
However, a strategic action plan for the police now exists at the federal level as well as a 
recruitment and deployment plan for newly accessible areas, and senior officers are steadily 
developing technical capability for criminal investigations and the gathering of evidence.‘ 
In fact, Union action in Somalia shows that, in the Union‘s action in fragile states, 
almost every measure can be justified as tackling these situations. Somalia has been in 
crisis, in need of conflict prevention and peace-building measures and has posed a threat 
to international peace and security for the whole period covered by the case study. 
Paradoxically, it is in contexts of state fragility, like the case of Somalia, where the EU 
deploys its full CFSP and development cooperation policy artillery, and thus when being 
                                                 
511 Decision C(2014) 9580, Annex, page 4  
512 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 2, page 3 
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able to clearly define what falls under each of these policy areas becomes most important. 
This is why the IcSP further complicates what was already a difficult choice.  
The statement of objectives is often not conclusive of the legal basis chosen 
This is so either because there is only a reference to shared objectives or because of 
reference to objectives that define another policy area. EUTM Somalia and EUCAP 
Nestor are clear examples. According to the Decision on its establishment, with EUTM 
Somalia the Union conducts a military training mission:513 
‗In order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens.‘ 
EUCAP Nestor, on the other hand, is tasked with the objective:514 
‗To assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean of a self-
sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-
piracy and maritime governance.‘ 
While the content of these two CSDP operations is undoubtedly fit to pursue CFSP 
objectives it could also form part of development cooperation measures. This is why, by 
not mentioning the specific objectives the measure aims towards, the Council does not 
recognise the existence of a parallel policy area, the development cooperation policy 
area, under which similar activities could also be conducted. 
 The silence of CFSP measures contrasts with the extent to which development 
cooperation measures are explicit as regards the development objectives they promote, 
and also the security ones. This is part of the liberalisation of objectives analysed under 
empirical claim no 1. This is the case for the Union‘s contributions to AMISOM through 
the APF of the EDF.515  
‗The overall aim is to promote long-term peace, security and good governance in Somalia. It 
is based on an objective which is widely accepted internationally, namely to initiate and 
accomplish all the planning involved in the creation of an environment conducive to 
national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Somalia, where human rights 
                                                 
513 Article 1 of Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP 
514 Article 1 of Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP 
515 Decision C(2010) 5930, Annex, page 3 
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are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and internally displaced persons and 
refugees can return home in safety and dignity.‘ 
While the Court would probably justify these as obstacles or prerequisites to development 
objectives that need to be tackled under the CFSP, one may doubt whether these are 
mainly development objectives, or only incidental development objectives.   
 The liberalisation of objectives may ensure a certain substantive coherence but 
renders procedural coherence impossible and makes it difficult to avoid substantive 
contradictions and overlaps of a different nature.   
Empirical claim no 4a: there is no manifest coordination between the Council and the 
Commission; the Commission refers to CFSP measures (but not vice versa)  
An increase in efforts regarding inter-policy coordination can be observed in the period 
analysed. This can be perceived in CFSP measures and also in development cooperation 
measures. In development cooperation, these efforts translate into increased ‗awareness‘ 
as regards measures implemented under different policy areas, including the CFSP. In 
contrast, in the case of the CFSP inter-policy coordination efforts focus on entrust the 
HRVP with vague mandates regarding institutional coordination. However, nothing 
indicates that CFSP and development cooperation measures are effectively coordinated. 
In the Somalia Donor Group, the actors that are really responsible for development 
cooperation programmes periodically sit together to discuss coordination. In contrast, the 
kind of institutional coordination foreseen in CFSP measures is mediated (i.e. via the 
HRVP). Even when coordination concerns actors on the ground (e.g. Head of EUCAP 
Nestor and Union delegations in the region) the actors involved are left to decide if and 
when they want to coordinate.   
 In its provision on ‗coherence of EU response‘, the Council Decision on the 
establishment of EUNAVFOR Atalanta states:516 
 ‗The Presidency, the SG/HR, the EU Operation Commander and the EU Force 
Commander shall closely coordinate their respective activities regarding the implementation 
of this Joint Action.‘ 
Later, the Council Decision establishing EUCAP Nestor, in its Article 14 on ‗consistency 
of the Union‘s response and coordination‘ claims:517  
                                                 
516 Article 8 of the Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP 
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‗The HR shall ensure the consistency of the implementation of this Decision with the 
Union‘s external action as a whole, including the Union‘s development programmes.‘ 
This Article also adds paragraphs on the institutional relations that the head of the 
mission will maintain with relevant actors in the region, including the Union delegations, 
Member States‘ heads of mission, and other CSDP operations. The role of the EEAS in 
ensuring horizontal inter-policy coordination is not considered.518 Moreover, there are 
obvious reasons to question whether the HRVP can fulfil this role for all CSDP missions 
and operations across the planet. The fact that none of the analysed development 
cooperation measures mentions the role of the HRVP in coordinating CFSP and 
development cooperation efforts is another argument to put into question whether she is 
leading this coordination. The vague character of references to inter-policy coordination 
(i.e. CFSP-development cooperation) in CFSP measures contrasts with the degree of 
detail with which these measures regulate coordination with States and other CSDP 
actions. The Committee of Contributors of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia, 
which bring together EU and non EU States participating in these CSDP actions, are 
great examples of this. 519  The creation of the Operations Centre as a tool that is 
specifically designed to foster coherence within and amongst CSDP missions and 
operations in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel region are also examples of the same 
idea.520  
 As regards the increase in ‗awareness‘ in development cooperation measures, for 
instance an act adopted under the IfS in 2011 in the field of explosive contamination does 
not mention CFSP action in Somalia. In 2014, an action under the IcSP aimed at 
contributing to stability in Mogadishu, refers to the complementarity of assistance 
provided under CSDP missions as well as humanitarian aid.521 The same can be said 
about the EU‘s contributions to AMISOM. While in the first few years references to the 
CFSP are scarce, later we find very explicit references to the EU‘s comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                        
517 Article 14 of the Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP. A similar reference can be found in Article 7 
of Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP (EUTM Somalia) 
518 The EEAS is only mentioned in IfS and IcSP measures, as it is responsible for the implementation 
of these measures, together with the Commission. See Decisions C(2011) 9459 and C(2014) 9580 
519  PSC Decisions Atalanta 7/2009 (2009/758/CFSP) and EUTM Somalia/1/2011 
(2011/815/CFSP), respectively  
520 Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP 
521 Decision C(2014) 9580 
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approach to Somalia, detailed information about the different CSDP missions deployed 
and about the humanitarian assistance provided:522 
‗The EU's support to AMISOM is an important part of its comprehensive approach to 
Somalia, guided by its strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, encompassing active 
diplomacy, security support and development assistance.‘ 
Towards the end of the analysed period, we can even find sections on ‗complementarity, 
coordination and follow-up‘. In the EDF‘s annual action programme 2014 for Somalia, 
the Commission claims:523  
‗This Action contributes to the wider ‗comprehensive approach‘ of the EU support to 
Somalia, covering active diplomacy in support of the political process, security sector 
support and development assistance‘. 
‗Support to the security sector is closely coordinated with three Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) missions for Somalia and other instruments such as the African 
Peace Facility (APF), the Regional Indicative Programme and Maritime Security 
Programme.‘ 
The increase in ‗awareness‘ efforts is remarkable. However, as long as cross-referencing 
other EU measures is not accompanied by concrete references regarding how different 
measures can complement each other‘s objectives these references will not be a real drive 
for coherence.  
Empirical claim no 4b: coordination between the Commission and the Member States 
is externally driven the Commission refers to measures of other donors (including 
Member States) 
The most relevant frameworks for coordination between the EU and its Member States 
include the whole donor community. This is not to say that the EU does not coordinate 
with its Member States. For instance, the Joint Strategy Paper (2008-2013) was the main 
strategic document for the implementation of the 10th EDF in Somalia. The Union, its 
Member States and Norway signed it. Nevertheless, coordination between the EU and its 
Member States is often externally driven.  
                                                 
522 Decision C(2013) 3009, Annex, page 2. See also Decision C(2010) 5930 
523 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 2, pages 6-7 
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 In 2006, the Reconstruction and Development Programme that resulted from the 
joint needs assessment led by the UN and the World Bank, and which provided a 
strategic framework for assistance over the next five years, established that the Somalia 
Donor Group, the NGO Consortium and the UN Country Team would nominate 
representatives who would meet monthly in the Executive Committee of a dedicated 
body for the Coordination of International Support to Somalia (CISS). The CISS was the 
main framework for coordination of international support to Somalia between 2008 and 
2012. It agreed on common international positions to be taken forward with Somali 
counterparts at all levels. An Executive Committee was its governing structure, which 
was co-chaired by the UN and the World Bank. It had different sector committees, which 
are often mentioned in EU legal acts, like the education sector committee.524   
 As regards the structures for coordination that followed the Somali Compact (2013), 
there is a working group for each of the five Peace and State-Building Goals of the 
Compact, and sub-working groups, and all of them meet on a regular basis. For example, 
PSG working group 1, on constitution, elections and federalism, and PSG Working 
Group 3 on justice. The national indicative programme of the EDF‘s country programme 
for Somalia (2014-2020) refers to EU joint programming as a commitment of the EU and 
its Member States to the coordination mechanisms set out in the Somali Compact. It 
claims:525   
‗These mechanisms will provide common platforms for policy dialogue and will offer the 
opportunity for better synergies and division of labour between donors, including progressive 
alignment between EU‘s and EU member states‘ intervention.‘ 
Besides the existence of frameworks to coordinate individual actions of different donors, 
the case of Somalia shows the existence of many joint programmes, comprising the EU, 
Member States and other donors, and often led by international organisations. For 
example, the EDF‘s annual action programme for Somalia 2008 established action that 
involved the pooling of funds from donors and was implemented by FAO. According to 
the Commission, FAO ‗has a de facto monopoly and added value in terms of 
information systems management‘.526 Another example is the Somalia Stability Fund, 
which is a multi-donor fund supported by the EU, the UK, the Netherlands, the UAE, 
                                                 
524 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 2 
525 Decision C(2014) 3715, Annex, page 16 
526 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 3, page 3 
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Denmark, Norway and Sweden. A Secretariat Office, comprising two representatives 
from the UK Department for International Development (DfID), administers the fund. 
Besides the Secretariat Office, a Joint Donor Committee constitutes the ultimate 
governance mechanism deciding on the use of the Fund and funding allocations. The 
annual action programme 2014 establishes that a part of the action will be implemented 
with DfID. This annual action programme also refers to the World Bank Multi-Partner 
Trust Fund and to the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia. The EU states that it 
will support: 
 ‗The re-engagement of the World Bank with Somalia and recognises its unique 
implementation capacity with regards to the financing aspect of the New Deal framework.‘  
As far as ‗awareness‘ is concerned, the Commission considers its Member States as other 
donors. When it refers to the actions of other actors, it generally does not establish a 
distinction between the measures of Member States and those of other donors. In the 
EDF‘s annual action programme 2014 for Somalia, the Commission claims:527 
‗It will also collaborate with several emergency and development operations financed by 
traditional donors such as USAID, DFID, WB, Norway, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Germany, France, Spain, etc.‘ 
‗On police support, the EU closely coordinates with Japan who is the other key donor in this 
area, with the UK /DfID a future contributor.‘ 
Rather than real complementarity efforts, these references constitute an acknowledgment 
of the existence of other measures complementing the new measure. The Union does not 
refer to how exactly the action that is being adopted will complement existing efforts. It 
merely shows awareness of what other donors are doing. This is not only the case as far 
as vertical coherence in EU development cooperation policy is concerned. This is also 
the case between the different measures of the Union‘s development cooperation, 
without considering the action of Member States. For instance, the action of governance 
sector support under the EDF‘s annual action programme for Somalia 2008 claims:528 
‗Other measures complementing the proposed intervention include contributions through the 
African Peace Facility and the Instrument for Stability in support of the deployment of 
                                                 
527 Decision C(2015) 671, Annex 1, page 5; Annex 2, page 7, respectively 
528 Decision C(2008) 8403, Annex 1  
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AMISOM and support to the Transitional Federal Institutions through the Instrument for 
Stability.‘ 
6 Chapter conclusions 
When assessing if the mechanisms for coherence set out in the treaties are effective in the 
case of Somalia, the distinction between soft power coherence and pragmatic coherence 
becomes useful again. The legal measures of the case study and the analysis conducted in 
the introductory sections of this chapter provide arguments in favour of the claim that the 
Union can be said to ensure a degree of consistency sufficient to render it recognisable as 
an international actor. The Union is the actor presented in Article 21 TEU, and it acts 
according to its general approach to State fragility spelt out in policy documents. 
Engagement in Somalia over the last decade confirms that the security-development 
nexus has not only been formally incorporated into the agenda, but is also a reality in EU 
external action. The link between the notions of security and development, and the 
absolute prioritisation of support for the governance sector, which are repeatedly 
mentioned in policy documents, are a fact. Although the EU‘s response to the problems 
faced by Somalia can be criticised, the approach is consistent with the priorities set out at 
a general level in strategic policy documents. Moreover, the prioritisation of the 
development of democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, is not only a matter of policy prioritisation. Both before and after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the treaties enshrined these principles as CFSP 
and development cooperation objectives. 529  In general terms, political actors seek to 
advance vertical and horizontal inter-policy coherence according to the mechanisms set 
out in the treaties. If these mechanisms are not effective, political actors cannot be 
blamed alone. Commission decisions include sections on ‗complementarity actions‘ and 
‗donor coordination‘, which can be said to fall under vertical inter-policy coordination 
via awareness, in the first case; and via institutional coordination, in the second case. 
These decisions also identify their objectives and activities in a systematic manner. This 
forms part of the Court‘s aim and content test to choose the appropriate legal basis, and 
thus of legal delimitation as another mechanism for coherence. As regards horizontal 
coherence in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus, CFSP decisions entrust 
important responsibilities regarding institutional coordination to the HRVP, just as the 
                                                 
529 Ex-Article 11 TEU and ex-Article 177 TEC; Article 21(2)(b) TEU 
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treaties do. Furthermore, CFSP and development cooperation measures show that the 
Union is committed to international multilateralism. The Union responds to priorities 
identified by external actors, like the UN and OECD, and invites third States to form 
part of its actions. For example, Norway is part of EU joint programming in 
development cooperation, and many third States participate in EUNAVFOR Atalanta. 
Cooperation with external actors is foreseen in treaty provisions on the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy.530 Moreover, Article 21 TEU states that that the Union 
shall work towards a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations and 
must: 
‗Promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance.‘ 
Both CFSP and development cooperation measures are guided by EU strategic 
documents. By way of example, Council conclusions are important in CFSP measures. 
The EU and Norway joint strategy paper (2008-2013) was central in the implementation 
of the national programme for Somalia under the 10th EDF. Furthermore, the extent to 
which the development of EU external relations is proceduralised ensures a certain 
degree of consistency and predictability over time. This is especially true in the case of 
the development cooperation policy, where individual measures fall under annual action 
programmes, which at the same time implement multiannual indicative programmes. 
There is certainly room for improvement, but the areas in which CFSP and development 
cooperation measures are consistent allow the EU to show its identity as an international 
actor and, thus, to advance the notion of soft power coherence.  
 When the analysis is less abstract and focuses on whether the mechanisms for 
coherence are able to secure pragmatic coherence in the case of Somalia, the assessment 
is not so positive. A distinction must be made between vertical coherence in EU 
development policy and horizontal coherence in the CFSP-development cooperation 
nexus. While the mechanisms for coherence seem to be effective in the first case, they 
encounter important problems in the latter case. Paradoxically, the mechanisms for 
coherence are much more relevant in the relations between EU and Member States 
separate competences in the field of development cooperation, than in the interaction 
between CFSP and development cooperation as EU external policy areas. There are 
                                                 
530 See, for example, Articles 42(1) and 208(1) TFEU 
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essentially four findings resulting from the case study presented in section 5 of this 
chapter. 
 The first finding is that there is a difference between ensuring coherence across 
policies and activities and ‗playing the game of coherence‘. The comparison between 
vertical coherence in EU development policy and horizontal coherence in the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus reveals this difference. For example, development 
cooperation measures refer to institutional frameworks for coordination, where the EU 
and Member States periodically discuss their development programmes. In contrast, the 
role of the HRVP in organising institutional coordination between the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy, which is mentioned in CFSP measures, seems to be 
more of a general reminder of the treaty-defined role of the HRVP than a real drive for 
coherence. Moreover, development measures from the analysed period show an increase 
in ‗awareness‘ as regards CFSP action. However, as long as cross-referencing is not 
accompanied by real institutional coordination and/or complementarity in terms of 
objectives, the increase seems to be more about filling in new templates than a real means 
for coherence in the CFSP-development cooperation nexus.     
 The second finding of the case study is that different dimensions of coherence can be 
in tension. The conclusions to chapter 2 of this thesis stress the existence of tensions 
between coherence and other interests. The case study shows that there are also 
conflicting interests within the idea of coherence in EU external action, depending on the 
specific context where we analyse coherence. We must bear in mind that there is only a 
maximum number of strategic documents that actors can respond to. While measures 
often refer to multiple policy documents, effectively they respond to the priorities 
identified in a single document. Depending on the strategic document that is central to a 
given measure, a particular dimension of coherence is strengthened, often to the 
detriment of others. There is an important tension between context-specific coherence 
and the overall coherence of EU external action. For example, there is a tension between 
intra-programme or intra-instrument coherence in EU development cooperation and the 
overall coherence of the development cooperation policy (and between this and other 
fields of EU action, like the CFSP). The fact that each instrument (and even each 
programme) has its indicative programme, which identifies specific priorities, ensures 
coherence in the measures that fall under this instrument, but complicates coherence 
across instruments. In fact, EU action in Somalia confirms that the abstract idea of the 
Union‘s wide toolbox to tackle international concerns is not only a buzzword. There are 
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plenty of instruments implemented in parallel under the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy, as well as a long-list of legal acts falling under each of these 
instruments. This, by itself, renders the quest for coherence in EU foreign policy 
especially challenging. In fact, section 4 provides reasons to claim that legal delimitation 
through the definition of the scope of legal instruments is not exactly conducive to 
coherence, as many instruments can be utilised to facilitate the same type of assistance. 
 The importance of external actors in defining the Union‘s priorities in Somalia 
highlights the tension between context-specific and overall coherence of EU external 
action. External actors, like the UN or the World Bank, are concerned with ensuring 
complementarity between donors‘ actions in particular areas (e.g. reconstruction of 
Mogadishu). While this may increase the efficiency of specific EU measures, it may 
come at the expense of the overall coherence and efficiency of EU action (i.e. CFSP-
development cooperation nexus). The latter is important for the Union to make the most 
out of its different policy fields, and also to present its unified identity regardless of the 
policy area or instrument deployed. By way of example, the focus on context-specific 
coherence may explain why Commission decisions do not refer to Council conclusions 
(i.e. common approaches), which should ensure top-down coherence between CFSP and 
development cooperation measures. In fact, the role of external actors reveals not only a 
tension between context-specific and overall coherence, but also tensions between: 
external and internal coherence, top-down and bottom-up coherence, vertical and 
horizontal coherence, and pragmatic and soft power coherence.   
 Third, the case study shows that the Union behaves in Somalia as a security actor in 
the CFSP and as a development actor in the development cooperation policy, which 
confirms that the nature of these policy areas is different. The Commission and the 
Council are not guided by the same common approaches. While the Commission looks 
at the actors on the ground (particularly, at the Government of Somalia), the Council 
looks at the UNSC. Moreover, the Council and the Commission engage in different 
inter-policy coordination frameworks. In EU development cooperation, the weak 
character of legal delimitation (i.e. EU and Member States operate in a truly parallel 
manner) is mitigated by inter-policy coordination, because the EU and the Member 
States cooperate as donors. This cannot be said about the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus. While the Commission takes part in donor coordination frameworks, 
the Council coordinates CSDP missions and operations with participant third States, as 
well as with other CSDP actions. Furthermore, the implementation of the development 
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cooperation policy is informed by OECD principles that stress the importance of national 
ownership, as well as predictability of the assistance offered. In contrast, CFSP measures 
do not provide certainty for partner countries, as they are only established for short 
periods of time and then successively extended. The distinct nature of the CFSP and the 
development cooperation policy is relevant because it provides evidence to claim that the 
legal debate has overestimated the importance of the CFSP and non-CFSP legal divide in 
the quest for coherence in EU external action.531 In fact, it provides arguments to suspect 
that, were the CFSP an ordinary EU competence, ensuring coherence in the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus would remain a challenge.  
 Fourth, the case of Somalia provides arguments in favour of the importance of legal 
delimitation rules in ensuring horizontal inter-policy coherence in the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus. The case study shows that there is no consistency over 
the choice of the legal basis (i.e. CFSP or development cooperation). The aim and 
content test does not work, and practice has not found alternative criteria to ensure 
consistency over these choices. In fact, the choice of the legal basis in the context of the 
single set of objectives reveals a tension between substantive and procedural coherence, 
and both are relevant to the idea of soft power coherence. The liberalisation of external 
objectives contributes to substantive coherence (i.e. different EU actors promote the same 
objectives). However, it also leads towards a situation where procedural coherence is not 
ensured (i.e. the Union proceeds in an inconsistent and unpredictable manner). 
Moreover, the case of Somalia demonstrates that the CFSP and the development 
cooperation policy are EU policy areas of a different nature. The Union behaves in 
Somalia as a security actor in the CFSP, and as a donor in the development cooperation 
policy. This is why the fact that EU actors can promote the same objectives under both 
policy areas is prone to substantive contradictions and overlaps, which minimise the 
efficiency of the Union‘s action. Lastly, the case study shows that the liberalisation of 
external objectives is bringing about effects that can be said to differ from its intentions. 
While CFSP legal acts are reluctant to refer to their incidental effects over development 
objectives, it is difficult to argue that poverty reduction, or even sustainable development, 
are the main objectives of development cooperation. The liberalisation of objectives has 
an impact on the substantive scope of EU policy areas. In contrast, even when 
development cooperation measures show ‗awareness‘ as regards CFSP ones, they merely 
                                                 
531  See, for example, the position of H. G. KRENZLER and H. SCHNEIDER regarding the 
communitarisation of the CFSP (note 8) 
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acknowledge the existence of other measures in the same field. They do not explain how 
the new measure seeks to complement the objectives pursued in existing CFSP actions. 
The clear-cut separation between ‗awareness‘ and complementarity in terms of objectives 
seems to indicate that the liberalisation of objectives is not bringing about the expected 
comprehensiveness of EU objectives.  
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Conclusions of the thesis  
1 Introduction to the conclusions of the thesis 
The thesis stems from the observation that, despite the many references to coherence in 
external action in the treaties and case law of the CJEU, the examination of this question 
has remained at a rather abstract level in legal literature. It analyses the concept of 
coherence in external relations, and disentangles the different ways in which the legal 
framework is supposed to advance coherence. Based on this analysis, I propose a 
categorisation of the legal rules and principles that are relevant to the struggle for 
coherence around four mechanisms set out in primary law. The thesis argues that these 
mechanisms can be tested in particular areas of policy action. The case of the CFSP-
development cooperation nexus in the Union‘s action in Somalia is an example of such a 
test. It does not provide a conclusive assessment of the suitability of the legal framework 
vis-à-vis the quest for coherence. However, it puts forward a set of findings that can be 
used to think about how the law of EU external relations could more effectively promote 
coherence in this field. Section 3 of these conclusions reflects on some of these findings.  
 The broad nature of coherence as the ‗issue at stake‘ in this thesis has multiple 
consequences. On the one hand, coherence is not confined to the legal sphere, as it is 
ultimately a political ambition. On the other hand, the legal effects of coherence are to be 
found in its guiding nature in the design and interpretation of other legal norms.  
 These elements render the research topic of this thesis unavoidably challenging, as 
the legal effects of coherence often hide behind other legal rules and principles that are 
more obviously constraining for policy actors. However, the topic gives the opportunity 
to show that there are concepts in EU primary law – like coherence – which, despite 
seemingly innocuous, are able to explain certain legal innovations and play a role in the 
case of law of the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the broad character of coherence allows 
the thesis to reflect upon the interaction between law and politics in external relations, as 
well as about the external dimension of the EU as a political project. The thesis argues 
that the different purposes that coherence serves are linked to the Union‘s actorness and 
its effectiveness at the international level. It also claims that coherence can be in conflict 
with other priorities (what I call extrinsic tensions), such as the interests of individual 
Member States. In fact, the challenges of coherence often correspond to the challenges 
that the Union faces as an external project. This is why the quest for coherence is 
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illustrative of the external dimension of the EU as a supranational integration project. It 
is a reminder of the context in which legal norms operate. 
2 ‘Coherence, coherence’ 
It has been a central objective of this thesis to provide arguments supporting the claim 
that the idea of coherence in external action is neither as vague nor as irrelevant as it may 
appear at face value. The fact that the ambition of coherence extends to everything the 
Union does and its goal-oriented nature are some of the reasons why references to it are 
generally abstract and ambiguous. However, if the focus is on trying to understand how 
coherence is sought between particular policies and activities coexisting in external 
action, it is possible to transform the abstract idea of coherence into a more tangible one. 
The thesis identifies different dimensions of the notion, as well as different purposes it 
serves. It also demonstrates that the ways in which the law of external relations tries to 
contribute to coherence can be organised around certain mechanisms, which can be 
tested in practice.    
2.1 A multifaceted notion    
Coherence can be thought of as comprising the ideas of consistency (i.e. no 
contradictions) and complementarity between policies and activities. There are, however, 
many other dimensions of coherence. The core notions of consistency and coherence are 
central regardless of the perspective from which we analyse the issue. Nevertheless, 
depending on the angle we take, we will identify many ways in which policies and 
activities can be said to be consistent or not, coherent or not. Do we focus on coherence 
as regards the procedures followed in the development of EU external relations (i.e. 
procedural coherence) or on coherence of the policies and objectives promoted (i.e. 
substantive coherence)? Are we interested in coherence at a certain point in time or in 
coherence as a continued way of acting (i.e. continued coherence)? Do we analyse 
coherence as regards the principles the Union is founded on or coherence in relation to 
specific policy choices?  
 Moreover, when the idea of coherence is not analysed in isolation, but in the context 
of the purposes it serves, it becomes clearer why advancing it is relevant. In fact, the 
quest for coherence adds an extra layer to the link between loyalty and effectiveness, 
which results from the principle of pacta sunt servanda in public international law, and 
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from the principles of sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity, in EU law. 532 It is 
assumed that coherence is essential to promote the idea of soft power coherence. By 
acting in a coherent manner, the Union shows its ‗qualitative added value as an 
international actor‘. It confirms that it is an international organisation that is founded on 
certain principles, which it seeks to advance around the world. This is important for the 
Union to be well positioned to influence other actors to act in the direction of its external 
objectives, and be thus effective as an international actor. Often this abstract and indirect 
link between coherence and effectiveness is replaced by a more concrete connection 
between these two notions. Coherence is not only relevant for the Union to present an 
identity to external partners. It is also considered that it maximises the efficiency of EU 
action, showing that the Union is an actor that makes a reasonable use of its resources, 
and which can make a real difference as regards its international objectives. Coherence 
also advances the idea of pragmatic coherence.  
 Furthermore, the theoretical analysis has argued that there is a link between 
coherence and certainty of EU external action that has been confirmed by the CJEU.533 
The findings of the case study have also explained that the strategic priorities of 
developing partner countries are crucial in the definition of the assistance that the EU 
provides. By acting coherently, the Union grants predictability to its partners, which 
explains why coherence does not only serve EU purposes.  
 The analysis of the notion also indicates that the quest for coherence is more 
multifaceted than it seems. This has two important consequences. First, law and policy 
measures designed to advance coherence need to take account of its different dimensions, 
as otherwise what contributes to a given aspect of coherence may be detrimental to a 
different one (i.e. intrinsic tensions of coherence). Second, the question as to whether two 
policies and activities are coherent or not can hardly be answered with a yes or a no. The 
research confirms that coherence is not a zero sum game. The case of Union action in 
Somalia demonstrates that it is possible to ensure coherence in certain dimensions (e.g. 
consistent promotion of the principles the Union is founded on), while at the same time 
acting in an incoherent manner as regards other aspects of the query (i.e. lack of 
coherence over the choice of the legal basis).  
                                                 
532 See section 5 of chapter 1, pages 34-35 
533 Case C-658/11, Parliament v Council, Mauritius Case, para 60 
 180 
2.2 Mechanisms for coherence in EU external relations law 
In order to examine the legal dimension of coherence from EU primary law to a 
financing decision of the Commission supporting the education sector in Somalia, the 
thesis categorises the different ways in which the law of external relations seeks to 
advance coherence around four mechanisms. These mechanisms are examined in each 
chapter. From the rather theoretical and abstract approach of chapter 1, chapter 2 focuses 
on the thematic case of the CFSP-development nexus. Chapter 3 complements the 
former with an analysis of that case in the context of Union action in Somalia. 
 The proposed mechanisms are helpful in understanding the approach of the thesis to 
the role of law as regards coherence. The idea of a mechanism highlights that legal rules 
and principles are perceived as means towards coherence as a broad political ambition. 
This is why the thesis has not analysed policy coherence, but the extent to which the legal 
framework seems to be conducive to policy coherence. Moreover, while the definition of 
the mechanisms relies on treaty provisions and case law of the CJEU, it is based on a 
broad interpretation of the role that law plays in advancing coherence in external action. 
Besides focusing on explicit references to coherence in EU primary law, the proposed 
mechanisms include less obvious ways in which the legal framework can be said to have 
an impact on coherence. By way of example, strategic policy documents like the 
European Consensus on Development (2006) are considered expressions of the principle 
of sincere cooperation guided towards coherence, which play an important role in the 
case law of the CJEU. This is why the definition of common approaches constitutes one 
of the four mechanisms for coherence in external relations law.  
 Categorising the role of law as regards the quest for coherence around different 
mechanisms, and then presenting the results of the research in the form of theoretical and 
empirical claims, makes it possible to easily identify differences between the way in 
which legal rules and principles are supposed to operate and how they really operate in 
the development and implementation of policy action. Rather than providing the 
ultimate test of the adequateness of these mechanisms, the thesis provides a theoretical 
framework to think about the legal aspect of coherence at the level of policy action. The 
case of the CFSP-development cooperation nexus shows that this framework can be 
tested in practice. The outcome is summarised in Annex 1 of this thesis.  
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2.3 Extrinsic and intrinsic tensions affecting coherence 
The quest for coherence is confronted with different tensions that are either extrinsic (i.e. 
tension between coherence and other interests) or intrinsic (i.e. tension between different 
dimensions of coherence).  
 The political sensitivity of external relations explains legal fragmentation in this area. 
It also explains why Member States are often concerned about EU and Member State 
joint action (i.e. vertical coherence), which can strengthen the Union‘s international 
actorness to the detriment of their individual actorness. The fears and ambivalences of 
Member States regarding the external dimension of the EU constitute a fundamental 
extrinsic tension affecting coherence. The reticence to an initiative like joint 
programming in EU development cooperation, which has been analysed in chapter 2, is 
an example of this idea. In fact, the crucial responsibility of Member States in ensuring 
coherence in external relations has led Simon Nuttall to claim that coherence has been 
used as an excuse. According to the author:534 
‗The more the institutional structure of European foreign policy-making has developed, and 
become complex, the more complaints there have been about a lack of coherence in the 
process, sometimes to the point where serious failures of foreign policy have been ascribed to 
it, even if the criticism has amounted to little more than the truism that the member states 
could not agree to follow a common political line.‘ 
However, the quest for coherence in external relations is not limited to the obstacles 
created by Member States. The fact that the EU does not operate in isolation on the 
international scene explains a tension between what external actors demand from the 
Union and the law of EU external relations (including the mechanisms for coherence). 
While legal delimitation is important to protect the substantive scope of policy areas and 
to advance coherence in external action, external actors ask from the Union to promote 
security, stability and peace under the development cooperation policy. 
 Moreover, the link between coherence and effectiveness of Union action competes 
with another idea of effectiveness whereby acting coherently is a second order problem. 
In this case, the priority is to maximise the cases in which the EU responds to 
international concerns. Under this idea of effectiveness, inconsistency over the choice of 
legal basis is not a problem for the effectiveness of the EU as an international actor.    
                                                 
534 S. NUTTALL, op. cit. 60, page 93 
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 Besides these extrinsic tensions, the quest for coherence is also affected by internal 
tensions. The different dimensions of coherence can be in tension. For example, there 
can be conflicts between context-specific coherence and the overall coherence of EU 
external action. The fact that the Intra-ACP programme is implemented on the basis of 
its own strategic documents might ensure coherence in measures falling under it. 
However, this can happen at the expense of overall coherence in EU development 
cooperation, since other instruments and programmes will be guided by different 
strategies. 
 The legal framework can be perceived as a source of intrinsic tensions of coherence 
as legal reform aimed at ensuring particular dimensions of coherence is creating problems 
for other aspects. The single set of objectives illustrates a clear tension between 
substantive and procedural coherence. While it can advance substantive coherence (i.e. 
the same objectives can be promoted under different strands of EU action) it does so at 
the expense of procedural coherence (i.e. it cannot prevent incoherence over the choice of 
the legal basis). The creation of instruments designed to advance coherence over 
particular topics, which overlap with the material scope of existing instruments, is 
another example of legal reforms that can bring about tensions of coherence. For 
instance, the PanAf programme of the DCI has been created to provide a specific 
instrument to support the JAES. However, it will coexist with pan-African initiatives of 
the EDF‘s Intra-ACP programme.    
3 Analysing EU external relations law from the viewpoint of coherence 
3.1 The interaction between law and policy  
Approaching the law of external relations from the perspective of coherence illustrates 
the close interaction between law and policy in this field. Instead of drawing a watertight 
distinction between the roles of law and policy in the quest for coherence, the thesis takes 
the view that these are two different means contributing to the same end. Law and policy 
are both responsible for advancing coherence between different policies and activities of 
EU external action. Manifestations of coherence in policy documents are essential in 
understanding the legal aspect of the query. By the same token, it is not possible to grasp 
the obsession with coherence in policy documents without considering the legal 
framework underpinning coherence in external action. Policy documents implicitly refer 
to legal fragmentation as an important challenge for coherence. The trendy idea of the 
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EU‘s comprehensive approach is, in fact, a disguised reference to the role of strategic 
policy documents (i.e. common approaches) in advancing coherence between policies 
and activities. Recurrent references to the Union‘s wide toolbox to tackle international 
concerns in policy documents imply the challenges created by the whole repertoire of 
legal instruments coexisting in EU external action.  
 Just as the political dimension cannot be understood without the legal dimension, 
the latter is part and parcel of a politicised context. We must not forget that legal 
complexity in external relations responds to Member States‘ political sensitivities. Being 
aware of the political context in which the law of EU external relations operates is also 
essential in understanding that Article 21 TEU is a striking example of the idea of soft 
power coherence (i.e. ‗the qualitative added value of the EU as an international actor‘). 
The Court‘s interpretation of Member State duties flowing from the principle of sincere 
cooperation in the Inland Waterways Cases was influenced by the idea of the Union‘s 
actorness on the international scene. 535  The far-reaching effects of the security-
development nexus, which is a policy approach linked to the quest for coherence, 
demonstrates the extent to which policy has an impact on the legal framework. If the 
proposal to modify the IcSP (enabling the EU to directly fund military activities under 
the development cooperation policy) is approved, it will be a remarkable example of the 
legal effects of the security-development nexus.       
 The structure of the thesis is illustrative of the interaction between law and policy in 
external relations. Chapter 1 examines the policy/political aspect of the obsession with 
coherence in the first sections, and then focuses on the legal dimension of the query. 
Chapters 2 and 3 take the same approach regarding the security-development nexus and 
the analysis of the former in the context of Union action in Somalia.   
3.2 A critical approach to the law of external relations  
The study of the role of law in the quest for coherence in external action leads to a 
reflection about how the legal framework could more effectively promote it. Given the 
broad nature of the object at hand, this reflection extends to the law of external relations 
in general. 
 The law of EU external relations seems to underestimate the interactions between 
law and policy in this field. On the one hand, there are reasons to argue that the legal 
                                                 
535 See section 3 of chapter 1, page 20 
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framework underestimates its effects over policy action. The creation of instruments 
supposedly aimed at ensuring coherence in external action which overlap with existing 
ones (e.g. IcSP) is an example of this idea. Underestimating the impact of legal reform 
over policy action leads to unexpected legal effects. By way of example, the ‗liberalisation 
of objectives‘, which has been confirmed by the single set of objectives, does not seem to 
be bringing about the expected complementarity of EU objectives promoted under 
different policy areas. In contrast, it is arguably having an impact on the substantive 
scope of policy areas, like the development cooperation policy.  
 On the other hand, the legal framework underestimates the specificities of the policy 
contexts in which legal rules and principles must be applied. By way of example, the 
findings of the case study conducted in chapter 3 lead to the conclusion that the CFSP 
and the development cooperation policy have a completely different modus operandi. The 
EU behaves in Somalia as a security and as a development actor. However, the 
mechanisms for coherence set out in the treaties and developed in secondary law do not 
reflect this reality. This renders the quest for coherence in the CFSP-development 
cooperation nexus highly problematic. For example, the Commission and the Council 
are guided by different strategic documents and take part in different coordination 
frameworks. This limits the potential of common approaches and inter-policy 
coordination as mechanisms towards inter-policy coherence. 
 The legal debate seems also inclined to establish watertight distinctions between the 
matters of EU external relations that fall under the scope of legal research, and those that 
IR and political science literature should address. The extent to which the legal literature 
has focused on whether coherence is a principle of EU law, assuming that if it is not the 
idea of coherence is devoid of legal effects, is a clear example of the artificial creation of a 
strict distinction between law and policy. The degree to which the substantive dimension 
of coherence (i.e. as opposed to the procedural one) has been ignored in legal literature 
can be said to be another such example. Somehow the legal debate seems to assume that 
the role of law within the quest for coherence is confined to the procedural dimension of 
the query. Nevertheless, the thesis shows that there are not so evident ways in which law 
can affect policy and vice versa. Article 21 TEU is a proof that the legal framework 
intends to have an impact on substantive coherence.  
 This thesis provides arguments to claim that legal reform in EU external relations 
ought to consider more carefully the interaction between law and policy in this field. 
While the quest for coherence is often perceived as a choice of political actors alone, this 
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thesis demonstrates that there are different ways in which the legal framework can make 
it easier or more difficult for political actors to advance coherence in external action. In 
fact, political actors must ensure coherence under a legal framework that does not clearly 
delimit the scope of policy areas, and which includes a whole range of instruments that 
are potentially overlapping.  
 Finally, in the introduction to the thesis I claimed that I do not share the view that 
legal research should be confined to the analysis of those legal norms that most obviously 
constrain political action. Hopefully this piece of research has been able to show that, by 
limiting its scope in this way, the legal debate misses the opportunity of making sense of 
important developments in EU external relations law, and to engage in a reflection about 
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Chapter 1 




The CFSP-development cooperation nexus  
Chapter 3 
The Union’s action in Somalia: selected legal acts 





Common objectives 1 
The principles and objectives set out in Article 21 
TEU ensure consistency between the different areas 
of the Union's external action 
  
The principles and objectives set out in Article 21 
TEU ensure a certain degree of consistency between 
CFSP and development cooperation measures, but 
not coherence 
Common approaches 2 
The Union identifies its strategic interests and 
objectives relating to the CFSP and to other areas of 
the external action of the Union 
  
CFSP and development cooperation measures are 
guided by strategic documents, but not shared ones  
Legal delimitation 3 
The aim and content of a European act determines 
its legal basis 
  
The statement of objectives and activities of CFSP 
and development cooperation measures is not 
conclusive of the legal basis used for their adoption 
Horizontal inter-policy coordination 4a 
The Council and the Commission ensure consistency 
between the different areas of the Union's external 
action and cooperate to that effect 
  
There is no manifest coordination between the 
Council and the Commission; the Commission refers 
to CFSP measures (but not vice versa)  
Vertical inter-policy coordination 4b 
The Commission promotes complementarity 
between the policies of the Union and the Member 
States on development cooperation 
  
Coordination between the Commission and the 
Member States is externally-driven; the Commission 




Union action in Somalia: CFSP and development cooperation toolbox 
(2008-2014) 
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1 Development cooperation under the EDF 
 1.1 National programme for Somalia 
 1.2 ESA-IO regional programme 
 1.3 Intra-ACP programme 
  1.3.1 APF 
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2 Development cooperation beyond the EDF 
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 2.2 EIDHR 
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  2.3.2 Beyond the Pan-African programme 
 2.4 Food Facility Regulation 
3 CFSP  
 3.1 Restrictive measures against Somalia 
 3.2 EUSR for the Horn of Africa 
 3.3 EUSR for the African Union  
4 CSDP  
 4.1 NAVCO 
 4.2 EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
 4.3 EUTM Somalia 
 4.4 Operations Centre  
 4.5 EUCAP Nestor 
 
* Notice that the 14 legal acts examined in the case study appear in italics   
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1 Development cooperation under the EDF 
National programme for Somalia 
Decision no 2/2008 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 18 November 2008 on the 
allocation of resources to Somalia from the 10th European Development Fund 
(2008/951/EC) 
Council Decision of 27 May 2013 on the position to be adopted on behalf of the 
European Union within the ACP-EU Council of Ministers concerning the status of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia in relation to the Partnership Agreement between the 
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part (2013/258/EU) 
Decision no 2/2013 of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers of 7 June 2013 concerning the 
request made by the Federal Republic of Somalia for observer status with regard to, and 
subsequent accession to, the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the one part, and the European Community 
and its Member States, of the other part (2013/322/EU) 
Strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes  
Commission Decision on the adoption of the EU and Norway Joint Country Strategy 
Paper and Special Support Programme for Somalia (C(2009)6794)  
Commission Decision of concerning an allocation of special support to Somalia from the 
10th European Development Fund and adopting an addendum to the Country Strategy 
Paper and Special Support programme for Somalia (SSSP) 2008-2013 (C(2011)5638) 
Commission Decision of 11.6.2014 on the adoption of the National Indicative 
Programme between the European Union and Somalia (C(2014)3715) 
Annual action programmes 
Commission Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2008 in favour of Somalia to be financed 
from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2008)8403)  
Commission Decision of 25 November 2009 on the Annual Action Programme 2009 in 
favour of Somalia to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund 
(C(2009)9114) 
 209 
Commission Decision of 24.11.2011 on the Annual Action Programme 2011 in favour of 
Somalia to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2011)8662) 
Commission Decision of 7.11.2012 on the Annual Action Programme 2012 in favour of 
Somalia to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2012)8041) 
Commission Decision of 4.12.2013 on the Annual Action Programme 2013 in favour of 
Somalia to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2013)8477) 
Commission Decision of 4.12.2013 modifying Decision C(2012)8041 on the Annual 
Action Programme of 2012 in favour of Somalia to be financed from the 10th European 
Development Fund: Support for Governance and Security Sectors IIII (C(2013)8764) 
Commission Decision of 31.7.2014 modifying Decision C(2011)8662 on the Annual 
Action Programme of 2011 in favour of Somalia to be financed from the 10th European 
Development Fund and the Bridging Facility: Operational support (air transport) services 
(C(2014)5547) 
Commission Decision of 4.2.2015 on the Annual Action Programme 2014 in favour of Somalia to 
be financed from the European Development Fund Bridging Facility (C(2015)671) 
1.2 ESA-IO regional programme 
Strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes 
Commission Decision on the adoption of the Regional Strategy Paper and Regional 
Indicative Programme between the European Community and the Region of Eastern and 
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (C(2008)6826) 
Commission Decision of 17.5.2013 revising the 10th European Development Fund 
indicative allocation for the Eastern and Southern Africa – Indian Ocean Region as a 
result of an ad-hoc review (C(2013)2841) 
Commission Decision of 22.5.2015 on the adoption of the Regional Indicative 
Programme between the European Union and Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the 
Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO) (C(2015)3379) 
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Annual action programmes 
Commission Decision of 02.08.2012 on the Annual Action Programme 2012 in favour of 
the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region to be financed from the 
10th European Development Fund (C(2012)5387) 
Commission Decision of 19.11.2013 on the Annual Action Programme 2013 in favour of 
the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean region to be financed from the 10th 
European Development Fund (C(2013)7958) 
Individual measures 
Commission Decision of 22 April 2010 on an action not foreseen in the Annual Action 
Programme 2010 in favour of Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Region to 
be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2010)2213) 
Commission Decision of 20.10.2011 on a measure in favour of Eastern and Southern 
Africa/Indian Ocean region – Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) – to be financed from 
the 10th European Development Fund (C(2011)7682) 
Commission Decision of 8.5.2013 on the adoption and financing of an ad hoc measure to 
Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE) in favour of the Eastern and Southern 
Africa and Western Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region, to be financed from the 10th 
European Development Fund (C(2013)2388) 
1.3 Intra-ACP programme 
Strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes 
Commission Decision on the adoption of the intra-ACP Strategy Paper and Indicative 
Programme between the European Community and the ACP Group of States 
(C(2009)1501) 
Commission Decision of 13.11.2015 on the adoption of the 2014-2020 Strategy Paper 
and Indicative Programme for intra-ACP cooperation between the European Union and 
the ACP Group of States (C(2015)7766) 
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Annual action programmes 
Commission Decision of 16.11.2012 on the Annual Action Programme 2012 in favour of 
Intra-ACP cooperation to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund 
(C(2012)8392) 
1.3.1 APF 
Strategy papers and multiannual indicative papers  
Décision de la Commission relative au programme d'action triennal de la Facilité de 
soutien à la paix pour l'Afrique, 2011-2013, à financer sur les ressources du 10e Fonds 
européen de développement (C(2011)6096) 
Commission Decision of 17.12.2012 amending Commission Decision C(2011)6096 on 
the three-year action programme for the African Peace Facility 2011-2013, to be financed 
from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2012)9578) 
Commission Decision of 23.7.2013 on a second amendment to Commission Decision 
C(2011)6096 on the three-year action programme for the African Peace Facility 2011-
2013, to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2013)4541) 
Commission Decision of 15.7.2014 on the 2014-2016 action programme of the African 
Peace Facility to be financed from the European Development Fund Bridging Facility 
and the 11th European Development Fund (C(2014)4907) 
Commission Decision of 23.2.2015 amending Commission Decision C(2014) 4907 of 15 
July 2014 on the 2014-2016 Action Programme of the African Peace Facility in favour of 
the African Union Commission to be financed from the European Development Fund 
Bridging Facility and the 11th European Development Fund (C(2015)1254) 
Individual measures 
Commission Decision regarding an action under a programme financed from the 9th 
European Development Fund: African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (C(2008)8606) 
Commission Decision on an allocation of funds under the African Peace Facility 
programme to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund: African Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM III) (C(2009)10011) 
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Commission Decision of 1.09.2010 On an allocation of funds under the African Peace Facility 
programme to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM IV) (C(2010)5930) 
Commission Decision of 22.03.2011 On an allocation of funds under the African Peace 
Facility programme to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund: African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM V) (C(2011)1822) 
Commission Decision of 29.07.2011 on an action to be financed under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: African Peace and Security 
Architecture Support Programme (C(2011)5379) 
Commission Decision on an allocation of funds under the African Peace Facility from 
the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM 
VI) (C(2011)8878)  
Commission Decision of 23.02.2012 on an action to be financed under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM VII) (C(2012)1255) 
Commission Decision of 12.03.2012 on an action to be financed under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: Support to the African Training 
Centres in Peace and Security (C(2012)1479) 
Commission Decision of 20.09.2012 on an allocation of funds under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM VIII) (C(2012)6536) 
Commission Decision of 19.3.2013 on an allocation of funds under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM IX) (C(2013)1563) 
Commission Decision of 24.5.2013 on an allocation of funds under the African Peace Facility from 
the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM X) 
(C(2013)3009) 
Commission Decision of 23.8.2013 on an allocation of funds to be financed under the 
African Peace Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: Amani Africa II 
Support Programme (C(2013)5481) 
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Commission Decision of 6.9.2013 on an allocation of funds under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM XI) (C(2013)5640) 
Commission Decision of 13.12.2013 on an allocation of funds under the African Peace 
Facility from the 10th European Development Fund: Support to the establishment of a 
Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS) for African-led 
peace support operations (C(2013)8911) 
Commission Decision of 16.12.2013 on an individual measure in favour of Intra-ACP 
countries to be financed under the African Peace Facility from the 10th European 
Development Fund (C(2013)8957) 
Commission Decision of 16.12.2013 on an individual measure in favour of the African 
Union liaison offices to be financed under the African Peace Facility from the 10th 
European Development Fund (C(2013)8959) 
1.3.2 Beyond the APF 
Unclassified measures  
Commission Decision of on the Specific Action Programme on support expenditure 
linked to the European Development Fund for 2009-2011 in favour of all ACP countries 
and OCTs to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2008)7478) 
Commission Decision of 16.12.2011 on the Work Programme 2012 for the Technical 
Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU (CTA) to be financed from the 
10th European Development Fund (C(2011)9548) 
Commission Decision of 13.12.2012 on a technical cooperation facility in favour of Intra-
ACP cooperation to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund 
(C(2012)9721) 
Commission Decision of 21.03.2011 on a measure in favour of Intra-ACP cooperation to 
be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2012)1998) 
Commission Decision of 4.10.2013 on an ad-hoc measure in favour of the Intra-ACP 
Cooperation to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2013)6612) 
Commission Decision of 4.12.2013 on an individual measure in favour of all ACP States 
to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2013)8758) 
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Commission Decision of 19.12.2013 on the 2013 support measure in favour of Intra-ACP 
cooperation to be financed from the 10th European Development Fund (C(2013)9357) 
Commission Decision of 30.1.2014 on the non-establishment of entitlements and on the 
recovery of ineligible expenses incurred by the African Union Commission (C(2014)381) 
Commission Decision of 24.11.2014 on the adoption of an individual measure in favour 
of intra-ACP cooperation to be financed from the European Development Fund Bridging 
Facility (C(2014)8589) 
2 Development cooperation beyond the EDF 
2.1 IfS and IcSP 
Commission Implementing Decision adopting an Exceptional Assistance Measure under the 
Instrument for Stability in favour of Somalia: Creation of conditions for safe access and recovery in 
south central Somalia (C(2011)9459) 
Commission Implementing Decision of 12.12.2014 on the Exceptional Assistance Measure ‘Support 
to enhanced stability and security in Somalia’ to be financed from the General Budget of the 
European Union (C(2014)9580)  
2.2 EIDHR 
Commission Decision of 15.04.2009 on the Annual Action Programme 2009 for the 
European Instrument for the promotion of Democracy and the Human Rights worldwide 
(EIDHR) to be financed under Articles 19 04 01 and 19 04 03 of the general budget of the 
European Communities (C(2009)2635) 
Commission Decision of 18.03.2010 on the Annual Action Programme 2010 for the 
European Instrument for the promotion of Democracy and Human Rights worldwide 
(EIDHR) to be financed under Articles 19 04 01 and 19 04 03 of the general budget of the 
European Union (C(2010)1614) 
Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2012 for the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (reference no missing) 
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2.3 DCI 
2.3.1 Pan-African programme 
Strategy papers and multiannual indicative programmes 
Commission Implementing Decision of 30.7.2014 adopting a Multiannual Indicative 
Programme for the Pan-African programme for the period 2014-2017 (C(2014)5375) 
Annual action programmes 
Commission Implementing Decision of 20.11.2014 on the Annual Action Programme 
2014 for the Pan-African Programme to be financed from the general budget of the 
European Union (C(2014)8513) 
2.3.2 Beyond the Pan-African programme 
Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities 
Commission Decision of 12.08.2008 on the 2008 Annual Action Programme for the 
thematic programme ‗Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development‘, to be 
financed under Articles 21 03 01 and 21 03 02 of the general budget of the European 
Communities (C(2008)4187) 
Commission Decision of 08.06.2010 on the Annual Action Programme 2010 for the 
thematic programme ‗Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development‘ to be 
financed under Articles 21 03 01 and 21 03 02 of the general budget of the European 
Union (C(2010)3581) 
Commission Implementing Decision of 12.05.2011 on the Annual Action Programme 
2011 for the thematic programme ‗Non State Actors and Local Authorities in 
Development‘ to be financed by the general budget of the European Union 
(C(2011)3126) 
Commission Implementing Decision of 29.4.2013 on the thematic Annual Action 
Programme 2013 for ‗Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development‘ to be 
financed from the general budget of the European Union (C(2013)2333) 
 216 
Commission Implementing Decision of 28.10.2014 on the Annual Action Programmes 
for 2014 and 2015 Part 1 ‗Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities‘ to be 
financed from the general budget of the European Union (C(2014)7987) 
Cooperation with third countries in the areas of Migration and Asylum 
Commission Decision of 11.12.2009 approving special measures for the Horn of Africa 
in the area of migration and asylum to be financed under Budget line 19.02.01 of the 
general budget of the European Union (C(2009)10089) 
Global Public Goods and Challenges 
Commission Implementing Decision of 22.10.2014 on the Annual Action Programme 
2014 for the ‗Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) in the areas of Migration and 
Asylum‘ to be financed from the general budget (C(2014)7585) 
Commission Implementing Decision of 29.10.2014 on the Annual Action Programme 
2014, 2015 and 2016 for the ‗Human Development‘ theme of the Global Public Goods 
and Challenges programme to be financed from the general budget of the European 
Union (C(2014)7887) 
2.4 Food Facility Regulation  
Commission Decision of 24.04.2009 for implementing the facility for rapid response to soaring food 
prices in developing countries to be financed under Article 21 02 03 of the general budget of the 
European Communities in 2009 (C(2009)3068) 
CFSP  
3.1 Restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Common Position 2009/138/CFSP of 16 February 2009 concerning restrictive 
measures against Somalia and repealing Common Position 2002/960/CFSP 
Council Decision 2010/126/CFSP of 1 March 2010 amending Common Position 
2009/138/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Decision 2010/231/CFSP of 26 April 2010 concerning restrictive measures against 
Somalia and repealing Common Position 2009/138/CFSP 
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Council Regulation (EU) no 356/2010 of 26 April 2010 imposing certain specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, in 
view of the situation in Somalia 
Council Regulation (EU) no 1137/2010 of 7 December 2010 amending Regulation (EC) 
no 147/2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Somalia 
Council Decision 2011/635/CFSP of 26 September 2011 amending Decision 
2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council implementing Regulation (EU) no 956/2011 of 26 September 2011 
implementing Articles 12(1) and 13 of Regulation (EU) no 356/2010 imposing certain 
specific restrictive measures directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities or 
bodies, in view of the situation in Somalia 
Council Decision 2012/388/CFSP of 16 July 2012 amending Decision 2010/231/CFSP 
concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Regulation (EU) no 641/2012 of 16 July 2012 amending Regulation (EU) no 
356/2010 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain natural 
or legal persons, entities or bodies, in view of the situation in Somalia  
Council Regulation (EU) no 642/2012 of 16 July 2012 amending Regulation (EC) no 
147/2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Somalia  
Council Decision 2012/633/CFSP of 15 October 2012 amending Decision 
2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Regulation (EU) no 941/2012 of 15 October 2012 amending Regulation (EC) no 
147/2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Somalia 
Council implementing Regulation (EU) no 943/2012 of 15 October 2012 implementing 
Article 12(1) and Article 13 of Regulation (EU) no 356/2010 imposing certain specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, in 
view of the situation in Somalia 
Council Decision 2013/201/CFSP of 25 April 2013 amending Decision 
2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Regulation (EU) no 431/2013 of 13 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) no 
147/2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Somalia  
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Council Regulation (EU) no 432/2013 of 13 May 2013 amending Regulation (EU) no 
356/2010 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain natural 
or legal persons, entities or bodies, in view of the situation in Somalia 
Council Decision 2013/659/CFSP of 15 November 2013 amending Decision 
2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Regulation (EU) no 1153/2013 of 15 November 2013 amending Regulation 
(EC) no 147/2003 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Somalia 
Council Decision 2014/270/CFSP of 12 May 2014 amending Council Decision 
2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council Regulation (EU) no 478/2014 of 12 May 2014 amending Regulation (EC) no 
147/2003 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Somalia  
Council implementing Decision 2014/729/CFSP of 20 October 2014 implementing 
Decision 2010/231/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Somalia 
Council implementing Regulation (EU) no 1104/2014 of 20 October 2014 implementing 
Article 12(1) of Regulation (EU) no 356/2010 imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities or bodies, in view of 
the situation in Somalia 
3.2 EUSR for the Horn of Africa 
Council Decision 2011/819/CFSP of 8 December 2011 appointing the European Union Special 
Representative for the Horn of Africa 
Council Decision 2012/329/CFSP of 25 June 2012 extending the mandate of the 
European Union Special Representative or the Horn of Africa 
Council Decision 2013/365/CFSP of 9 July 2013 amending Decision 2012/329/CFSP 
extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of 
Africa 
Council Decision 2013/527/CFSP of 24 October 2013 amending and extending the 
mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa 
Council Decision 2014/673/CFSP of 25 September 2014 amending Decision 
2013/527/CFSP amending and extending the mandate of the European Union Special 
Representative for the Horn of Africa 
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Commission Decision of 2.10.2014 implementing Council Decision 2014/673/CFSP 
amending Council Decision 2013/527/CFSP amending and extending the mandate of 
the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa (C(2014)7223) 
3.3 EUSR for the African Union 
Council Decision 2011/697/CFSP of 20 October 2011 amending Decision 
2011/621/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative 
to the African Union 
Council Decision 2013/383/CFSP of 15 July 2013 amending and extending the mandate 
of the European Union Special Representative to the African Union 
Commission Decision of 17.7.2013 implementing Council Decision 2013/383/CFSP 
extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative to the African 
Union (C(2013)4746) 
4 CSDP  
4.1 NAVCO 
Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008 on the European Union military 
coordination action in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO) 
4.2 EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast 
Council Decision 2009/907/CFSP of 8 December 2009 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a European 
Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of 
acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2008 of 18 November 2008 on 
the appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation 
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to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2008/888/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2009/29/CFSP of 22 December 2008 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Somali Republic on the status of the 
European Union-led naval force in the Somali Republic in the framework of the EU 
military operation Atalanta 
Council Decision 2009/88/CFSP of 22 December 2008 concerning the conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Djibouti on the status of 
the European Union-led forces in the Republic of Djibouti in the framework of the EU 
military operation Atalanta 
Council Decision 2009/293/CFSP of 26 February 2009 concerning the Exchange of 
Letters between the EU and the Government of Kenya on the conditions and modalities 
for the transfer of suspected pirates and armed robbers from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and 
for their treatment after such transfer 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2009 of 17 March 2009 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2009/288/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2009 of 21 April 2009 on the 
acceptance of third States‘ contributions to the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2009/356/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2009 of 21 April 2009 on the 
setting up of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2009/369/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/4/2009 of 27 May 2009 on the 
appointment of an EU Operation Commander for the European Union military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2009/413/CFSP) 
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Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/5/2009 of 10 June 2009 amending 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2009 on the acceptance of third 
States' contributions to the European Union military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast (Atalanta) and Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2009 on the 
setting-up of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2009/446/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/6/2009 of 22 July 2009 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somalia coast (Atalanta) (2009/559/CFSP)  
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta 7/2009 of 2 October 2009 amending 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2009 on the acceptance of third 
States‘ contributions to the European Union military mission to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast (Atalanta) and Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2009 on the 
setting-up of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2009/758/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2009/877/CFSP of 23 October 2009 on the signing and provisional 
application of the Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Republic of 
Seychelles on the conditions and modalities for the transfer of suspected pirates and 
armed robbers from EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for their treatment 
after such transfer 
Council Decision 2009/916/CFSP of 23 October 2009 concerning the signing and 
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of 
Seychelles on the status of the European Union-led force in the Republic of Seychelles in 
the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta 
Political and Security Committee Atalanta/8/2009 of 4 December 2009 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
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contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somalia coast (Atalanta)  (2009/946/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2010 of 5 March 2010 amending 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2009 on the acceptance of third 
States‘ contributions to the European Union military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast (Atalanta) and Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2009 on the 
setting up of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2010/184/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2010 of 23 March 2010 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somalia coast (Atalanta) (2010/185/CFSP)  
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2010 of 28 May 2010 on the 
appointment of an EU Operation Commander for the European Union military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2010/317/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/4/2010 of 19 July 2010 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2010/423/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2010/437/CFSP of 30 July 2010 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/5/2010 of 26 November 2010 on 
the appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2010/753/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP of 7 December 2010 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
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Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2011 of 13 April 2011 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2011/237/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2011 of 15 June 2011 on the 
appointment of an EU Operation Commander for the European Union military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2011/341/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2011 of 5 July 2011 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2011/399/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP of 12 July 2011 on the signing and conclusion of the 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the 
conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the 
European Union-led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of 
suspected pirates after transfer 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/4/2011 of 2 December 2011 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2011/792/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/5/2011 of 16 December 2011 
amending Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2009 on the 
acceptance of third States‘ contributions to the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) and Political and Security Committee Decision 
Atalanta/3/2009 on the setting up of the Committee of Contributors for the European 
Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of 
acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2011/846/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP of 23 March 2012 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
 224 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2012 of 25 May 2012 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2012/284/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2012 of 3 July 2012 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2012/361/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2012 of 27 November 2012 on 
the appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation 
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2012/743/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/4/2012 of 18 December 2012 on 
the appointment of an EU Operation Commander for the European Union military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2012/808/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2013 of 22 March 2013 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2013/159/CFSP)  
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2013 of 2 July 2013 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2013/356/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2013 of 2 December 2013 on the 
appointment of an EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2013/712/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP of 10 March 2014 on the signing and conclusion of 
the Agreement between the European Union and the United Republic of Tanzania on 
the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the 
European Union-led naval force to the United Republic of Tanzania 
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Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/1/2014 of 18 March 2014 on the 
appointment of the EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) and repealing Decision Atalanta/3/2013 
(2014/152/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/2/2014 of 29 April 2014 on the 
acceptance of a third State's contribution to the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) and amending Decision Atalanta/3/2009 
(2014/244/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2014 of 3 July 2014 on the 
appointment of the EU Operation Commander for the European Union military 
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) (2014/433/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/4/2014 of 24 July 2014 on the 
appointment of the EU Force Commander for the European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) and repealing Decision Atalanta/1/2014 
(2014/500/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP of 21 November 2014 amending Joint Action 
2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
4.3 EUTM Somalia 
Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP of 15 February 2010 on a European Union military mission to 
contribute to the training of Somali security forces 
Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European 
Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM 
Somalia) 
Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011 amending and extending Decision 
2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of 
Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) 
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Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Somalia/2/2011 of 6 December 2011 
on the establishment of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union military 
mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) 
(2011/814/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Somalia/1/2011 of 6 December 2011 
on the acceptance of third States‘ contributions to the European Union military mission 
to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) 
(2011/815/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2012/835/CFSP of 21 December 2012 extending Decision 
2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of 
Somali security forces 
Council Decision 2013/44/CFSP of 22 January 2013 amending and extending Decision 
2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of 
Somali security forces Decision 2015/441/CFSP of 16 March 2015 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUTM Somalia/1/2013 of 17 December 
2013 on the appointment of an EU Mission Commander for the European Union 
military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) 
(2013/777/CFSP) 
4.4 Operations Centre  
Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP of 23 March 2012 on the activation of the EU Operations 
Centre for the Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa 
Council Decision 2013/725/CFSP of 9 December 2013 amending and extending 
Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa  
Political and Security Committee Decision EU Operations Centre/1/2014 of 27 
February 2014 on the appointment of the Head of the EU Operations Centre for the 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa 
(2014/126/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2014/860/CFSP of 1 December 2014 amending and extending 
Decision 2012/173/CFSP on the activation of the EU Operations Centre for the 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operation in the Horn of Africa 
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4.5 EUCAP Nestor 
Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union Mission on Regional 
Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUCAP Nestor/1/2012 of 17 July 2012 
concerning the appointment of the Head of the European Union Mission on Regional 
Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) (2012/426/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUCAP Nestor/1/2013 of 11 January 2013 
on the establishment of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union Mission 
on Regional Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
(2013/41/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUCAP Nestor/2/2013 of 11 January 2013 
on the acceptance of third States‘ contributions to the European Union Mission on 
Regional Maritime Capacity-Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
(2013/42/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2013/367/CFSP of 9 July 2013 amending Decision 2012/389/CFSP 
on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of 
Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUCAP Nestor/3/2013 of 23 July 2013 on 
the appointment of the Head of the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime 
Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) (2013/400/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2013/660/CFSP of 15 November 2013 amending Decision 
2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity 
Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
Commission Decision of 21.11.2013 implementing Council Decision 2013/660/CFSP 
amending Decision 2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional 
Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
Council Decision 2014/485/CFSP of 22 July 2014 amending Decision 2012/389/CFSP 
on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of 
Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUCAP Nestor/1/2014 of 24 July 2014 
extending the mandate of the Head of Mission of the European Union Mission on 
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Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
(2014/642/CFSP) 
Political and Security Committee Decision EUCAP Nestor/2/2014 of 24 July 2014 on 
the acceptance of third States' contributions to the European Union Mission on Regional 
Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) (2014/645/CFSP) 
Council Decision 2014/726/CFSP of 20 October 2014 amending Decision 
2012/389/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity 
Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) 
Commission Decision of 27.10.2014 implementing Council Decision 2014/726/CFSP 
amending Decision 2014/485/CFSP on the European Union Mission on Regional 
Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor) (C(2014)8194) 
 
